As the Sudanese Armed Forces have faced setbacks on the battlefield in Sudan’s civil war, they have increasingly turned to Islamists to shore up power—with gruesome results.

In mid-March, the US designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) and its armed wing, the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, as global terrorist groups. The crackdown on these IRGC-affiliated groups commenced soon after the US-Israeli attack on Iran; however, the designation also signaled a clear understanding in Washington of the growing threat that such actors pose to peace in Sudan, regional stability, and US interests more broadly.

The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has become one of the most destructive conflicts in the world. It has had disastrous consequences for local populations, including famine, forced migration, and other forms of abuse. The international community has left both sides largely unaccountable, and the SMB, linked to the SAF, has been increasingly emboldened in its committing of war crimes. The United States took charge and began an arduous peace process last year following Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington. However, for this to succeed, significant further steps are needed.

US sanctions on the SMB have to date been minimal and ineffective, but they could be expanded to leaders in the SAF who have been identified as tied to the SMB. These steps could be taken alongside regional coordination and multilateral peace-building efforts so that implementation is not delayed. The United States has the tools to lead such an effort, bringing stakeholders together and creating the ceasefire conditions needed for dialogue. For this to succeed, political interests must be aligned, international impetus for prioritizing the region must be in place, and Washington must have a comprehensive plan for deradicalizing the ruling factions.

Sudanese Islamists Are Infiltrating the SAF

The lack of firmer direction from the US and others has emboldened the SAF to escalate war crimes. Only this year, the strike on El-Daien Teaching Hospital killed 70 people and left the building inoperable. The political assassination of civilian leader Osama Hassan Hussein shook the nation, but has gone without reprimand for more than a month. Hussein had served as president of the Democratic Alliance for Social Justice Party and was a member of the leadership body of the Founding Sudan Alliance.

The SAF, despite its known connection to the SMB, has done little to dispel its labeling as a terrorist-linked actor. Instead, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the SAF and Sudan’s de facto leader, has appointed Yasir al-Atta, a supporter of the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, to chief of staff in the army. Al-Atta has advocated for incorporating SMB factions into the SAF military and has been recorded chanting Muslim Brotherhood slogans. This infiltration of more extremist ideology into the SAF hinders reform and peace efforts while drawing direct connections between the SAF and terrorist activity.

As it has suffered battlefield setbacks against the RSF, the SAF has undergone a widespread restructuring as part of an effort to regain a winning position. Following this, many current leaders have ties to the SMB; outside of the army, the Sudanese General Intelligence Service is staffed exclusively by Islamist officers. Sudan’s internal politics have dashed hopes for a successful peace process. Further complicating matters, SMB leader Haj Majid Suwar has recently called for the SAF to employ more lethal measures—implying approval for the use of chemical and unconventional weapons against the RSF and other enemies of the SAF. Al-Atta has echoed the sentiment. The SAF is no stranger to chemical weapons; it had a long history of their use during the rule of longtime Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, and it deployed chlorine gas barrel bombs against the RSF as recently as 2024. Openly using chemical weapons delegitimizes peace efforts and constrain Washington’s ability to establish the groundwork needed for a unifying solution.

Peace Might Be Possible in Sudan—with a More Comprehensive US Effort

As part of its efforts to encourage parties to reach a long and lasting solution, the United States earlier this year awarded an additional $200 million to the Sudan Humanitarian Fund. It has also, of course, played an active role in peace and humanitarian efforts in the region for decades.

Nonetheless, a more active role is needed. The expansion of SMB extremism into SAF leadership can be somewhat checked by placing sanctions on SAF leaders like al-Atta, giving a political incentive to “clean” leaders in the SAF to avoid engaging with them in order to preserve constructive relations with Washington. The US can find ample support from allies, including the United Nations and regional partners seeking a peaceful resolution to the war. A multilateral effort would disrupt SMB supply chains and empower more moderate voices within Sudanese politics by providing greater resources and protections. US accountability goes a long way when employed in a targeted and clear manner, and, with greater collaborative effort, the path to peace remains attainable.

Peace is needed for a population desperate for relief from famine and years of conflict. It is also needed to prevent a disintegration of stability across the region. Libya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia have experienced major shocks and an inflow of refugees due to the conflict, while global shipping lanes have been threatened in the Red Sea due to the ongoing war. The need for a US-led peace process is obvious, but the current state of the conflict instead shows stagnating campaigns, increasing atrocities, and an SAF growing more radical. For American policymakers, the danger is that Sudan becomes another arena where US hesitation allows armed Islamists, Iranian-aligned networks, and regional instability to harden into facts on the ground. A peace process is attainable, but Washington must hold accountable those who continue to derogate that possibility.

About the Author: Paul Mwirigi

Paul Mwirigi is a Kenya-based writer specializing in African affairs. His contributions explore political, social, and economic dynamics across Africa. He holds a degree from the University of East Africa and has developed a strong foundation in building scalable and efficient digital solutions to issues around the continent.

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