The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
Iraq’s political and economic stagnation is unsustainable, and the PMF will be forced to make hard choices and preserve its influence.
The Iran War has created a bubble in Iraq—a temporary situation in which the political fate of all parties rapidly rises and just as inevitably falls. Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are attacking American forces in an attempt to reassert their relevance, and the United States is retaliating by targeting these armed groups with airstrikes. However, when the war ends, both sides will have to go back to the sad reality they do not want to acknowledge. Washington has little influence over the PMF, which is so deeply embedded in the economy and society that it cannot simply be wished away.
In the latest report from the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), Alfadhel Ahmad, a guest author, and Senior Fellow Joshua Yaphe, explore the future of this critical force in Iraqi politics and society. The PMF is facing serious challenges related to political participation, troop motivation, and financial sustainability, all of which could lead to a competition among the armed groups for survival. A major political or economic crisis could upset the balance at any time. That might mean a fight among the militias, with the state lacking the capacity and the political will to intervene.
After the Iran War comes to a close, the United States needs to resume its approach of incrementally encouraging the PMF’s isolation and marginalization, while seeking opportunities to engage with PMF members who genuinely want to transition away from militancy toward politics. As it does so, officials in Washington should recognize that the structural conditions that enable the PMF to operate and flourish will not last forever. Some of these armed groups are likely already facing extinction.
The Trump administration needs to use the tools at its disposal not as a cudgel to punish the Iraqi government, but rather to shape the conditions that will further drive these armed groups away from militancy, so that the pressure on them to transform and moderate comes from within Iraqi society.
The full text of the report is available here.
For more CFTNI publications, see the website.
About the Authors: Alfadhel Ahmad and Joshua Yaphe
Alfadhel Ahmad is an Iraqi political analyst and strategic communications advisor based in Najaf, Iraq. He has worked on a range of projects with senior Iraqi policymakers, including the prime minister, as well as members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives from the Foreign Relations, Finance, and Legal Committees. His writings have been featured in Al Jazeera,The New Region, and other publications.
Joshua Yaphe is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He was previously a senior analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and visiting faculty at the National Intelligence University. He has a PhD in History from American University in Washington, DC, and is the author of two books. Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared is available in paperback from the University of Liverpool Press, and Time and Narrative in Intelligence Analysis: A New Framework for the Production of Meaning is available in a free, open-access digital version at the Routledge website.
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