Tactics Column: Lessons for Arsenal against Man City’s 4-2-4

It may sound counterintuitive, but Mikel Arteta might, before what is arguably the biggest Arsenal match in 20 years, need to adopt some things from a team that just lost 4-0 to our opponents.

There’s often a tactical tweak or a surprise selection when Pep Guardiola heads into a big game. Last month’s League Cup final was no different, with the Manchester City boss having his four-man frontline opt not to press Arsenal at Wembley, instead forming a sky blue wall, daring the Gunners to find a way through. This season has had so much talk of man-to-man marking, but Guardiola went the other way. Arsenal didn’t have a response.

The destination of the Premier League title may well be decided by Sunday’s performance at Manchester City. There’s no escaping the fact that City come into the game with more momentum and in better form. Across their last three games in all competitions, they have beaten Arsenal, Liverpool, and Chelsea without conceding a single goal, lining up in that 4-2-4 defensive shape in each of those fixtures.

Liverpool were on the receiving end of the heaviest defeat of those three, losing 4-0 at the Etihad in their FA Cup quarter-final, but there are lessons Arsenal can learn from the way Arne Slot’s side started that game.

Indeed, the visitors that day actually looked really good in the opening half an hour. They took six shots in that time. It took Arsenal over 70 minutes to reach the same number at Wembley a fortnight earlier, and that’s with three shots coming in one move just seven minutes into the game. Liverpool didn’t sustain their performance – they conceded from a penalty and quickly collapsed – but they found solutions to get forward against City’s 4-2-4 pressing setup that Arsenal didn’t find a fortnight earlier.

At Wembley, City’s front four simply stood in a compact line and watched the Arsenal centre-backs and goalkeeper on the ball, blocking off any route into the midfield pairing of Declan Rice and Martin Zubimendi.

It’s startling to see the space behind the Arsenal midfielders between the lines in the examples above, but they weren’t marked or pressed because there was never any real danger of them being found. City had enough bodies back to deal with a swift attack anyway, with their numerical advantage around the halfway line also giving them an advantage for any long balls Arsenal chose to play. In the moment above, seven Arsenal players are essentially shackled in their own third by just four City forwards.

That gap between City’s frontline and their midfield was even bigger at the start of the second half, with Arsenal again finding no way out of their own box.

Bernardo Silva and Rodri aren’t even in the shot above. Look how close they are to the halfway line when Arsenal are eventually about to go long.

Rodri wins the header and Bernardo is closer to putting him under pressure than any Arsenal player. Arsenal were nowhere near any potential second balls.

And even with all that, City still have three back against two Arsenal forwards if there’s an error and the ball breaks for Arteta’s side. They’re in complete control of the situation.

Arsenal had nothing. Clipped balls to the fullbacks saw them quickly put under pressure by City’s wide players – both the forwards and the defenders, depending on how high up the pitch Arsenal were aiming – and efforts from Bukayo Saka and Leandro Trossard to drop into the midfield to offer an extra body didn’t do anything to help matters.

Even when they both moved in and created more of a box shape with Rice and Zubimendi, it didn’t make life any harder for City, whose central midfielders could pick them up whilst continuing to cover any long balls into the Arsenal front two.So what did Liverpool do differently that Arsenal could take note of?

If Arsenal don’t want to go long, they need to appreciate that City are defending with just two players in that midfield line. Play outside of them. Stretch them across the pitch. Arsenal have done that against narrow midfields before, especially in the 2022-23 season, with Granit Xhaka finding joy outside of the Leicester block, and against Nottingham Forest, and against Brentford’s narrow three-man midfield. Playing outside the City midfield, and then offering an option off the front between them when they are pulled away from the centre of the pitch, would help push the entire team back and see Arsenal progress upfield.

Manchester City themselves have combated the same defensive shape with the same solution. Pep Guardiola’s side struggled against a similar-looking 4-2-4 at Wembley when they lost the FA Cup final to Manchester United in 2024. Look how narrow Kevin De Bruyne’s touches came that day.

Just a few months later, in the first game of the following season, Chelsea defended in a similar shape but City were ready. De Bruyne stationed himself on the left flank, with Rico Lewis – who normally inverts from right-back – holding the width as he pushed forward to stretch the play on the opposite side of the Chelsea double pivot.

Onto those lessons from Liverpool.

Slot’s double pivot did not ‘hide’ behind the four-man City frontline as often as Arsenal’s did. A 4-2-3-1 is recognisable in the image below but Liverpool’s players are much more interestingly staggered. Midfielder Curtis Jones has dropped below that City ‘press’ and between the two Liverpool centre-backs. His midfield partner, Ryan Gravenberch, is ahead of him, attracting attention from City’s two-man midfield, while Liverpool’s ‘wide’ players – Mohamed Salah and Florian Wirtz – are tucking in either side of the two-man Manchester City midfield. Jones found Wirtz with a pass through the lines.

Key to the space that Wirtz finds to Rodri’s right, is the fact that striker Hugo Ekitke has pulled way out to the left wing, keeping right-back Matheus Nunes honest. With the Frenchman threatening a run in behind, Nunes is tied to his position and can’t close Wirtz down. Liverpool have played one incisive pass, and they’re suddenly running at the City backline because they’ve found a way to use the gaps in Guardiola’s system.

It’s not hard to take the Arsenal lineup from Wembley and picture a similar setup.

It’s all about the movement. The 4-2-4 shape leaves City narrow and light in midfield, so find ways to use that to your advantage. Liverpool were also better than Arsenal with long balls from the back, and more willing to use them in the early stages at the Etihad.

Kepa sent 16 of his 34 passes long at Wembley, compared to Liverpool’s Giorgi Mamardashvili playing 10 of his 14 passes long in the opening half hour of Liverpool’s defeat. Crucially, he played those balls out to Man City’s right, where Ekitike was consistently pulling wide to challenge the right-back in the air. He had more joy than Arsenal had targeting Nico O’Reilly’s side. No Arsenal fans will need reminding of how strong O’Reilly looked in the air after the break.

With Ekitike moving wide and Liverpool aiming their long balls to the flank, Liverpool could create good opportunities to press even when they did not win the first contact or retain possession. Here’s an example of what that looked like, again with the Liverpool players swapped out for the Arsenal team from the League Cup final.

The red shirts in proximity to the target of the long ball outnumber the blue ones, turning hopeful-looking long balls into chances to win the ball at best, or push City back at worst.

Both a loose Ekitike touch or a City header that landed with Rodri were fine. The midfielder was under immediate pressure, facing his own goal, and with Liverpool having enough players in proximity to press every passing option.

Approaches like this alone will not be enough to see Arsenal win. Liverpool did this stuff well for half an hour … and then lost 4-0.

Arsenal will still have to create and take chances in the final third, and they will have to defend well in their own penalty area, marshaling Erling Haaland well again and being more aware of (and prepared for) the box-crashing abilities of Nico O’Reilly.

But a positive result will almost certainly demand periods where Arsenal show some control and some threat, putting the hosts under pressure and playing sustained periods of the game in City’s half. Those things didn’t happen much at Wembley and the struggles to play through City from the back were a big reason for that.

Should Guardiola adopt the same approach as in March, Arsenal should be better prepared. They’ve had a month to figure out what they could have done differently last time out. But City’s 4-2-4 pressing shape, should they adopt it again on Sunday, will not be a surprise this time around.

There is no excuse for having the same struggles in this one.

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