Rebuilding Governance After Conflict: Lessons from Sudan for Fragile States
Introduction
Nearly three years after the conflict began between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, Sudan faces the world’s largest displacement crisis. An estimated 150,000 people have died, and over 12 million are displaced. More than 30 million, over half the population, require aid. Sudan’s GDP has fallen by more than 42 percent since the war began. Inflation exceeds 170 percent, and extreme poverty now affects over 71 percent of the population.
Despite ongoing conflict, reconstruction remains sporadic. In February 2026, a UN official warned that “no corner of Sudan is safe.” The SAF-aligned transitional government returned to Khartoum in early 2026 and began an intensive rehabilitation campaign in the capital. Meanwhile, Darfur and Kordofan continue to experience siege, displacement, and hunger.
Sudan highlights the challenges of post-conflict governance and the need to rebuild legitimate, effective institutions after state collapse. This article draws on Sudan’s experience to refine lessons from the fragile states literature and provides practitioners with a framework based on one of today’s most complex governance crises. It outlines five practical lessons: prioritize visible, basic service delivery across all regions; partner with grassroots governance systems; decentralize authority and resources; address security-sector reform as a political challenge; and make transitional justice an urgent priority, especially for women and survivors. These elements offer practitioners actionable strategies for Sudan and other fragile states.
The Scale of Sudan’s Governance Collapse
Sudan’s crisis is not only a humanitarian disaster but also a complete institutional collapse. The war has halted services, closed ministries, and devastated the economy. In February 2026, a UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the RSF committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, North Darfur. The SAF has been accused of indiscriminate shelling of hospitals and civilian infrastructure, including a March 2026 attack on El-Daein Hospital that killed 70 people, 15 of them children. The conflict has also fractured Sudan’s political scene. An RSF-aligned parallel government was formed in July 2025, while the SAF-backed transitional authorities operate from Port Sudan and, increasingly, from reclaimed parts of Khartoum. The conflict has fragmented Sudan’s political landscape. An RSF-aligned parallel government was established in July 2025, while SAF-backed transitional authorities operate from Port Sudan and increasingly from reclaimed areas of Khartoum. Ceasefire talks in Jeddah, sponsored by the United States and Saudi Arabia, have produced “no major progress” as of March 2026, with both sides believing they can achieve military victory. The African Union has welcomed a peace initiative from Sudan’s transitional government, but implementation remains a distant prospect.
In early 2026, as the SAF-aligned government returned to Khartoum, officials pledged to restore electricity, water, healthcare, and education within months. Debris was cleared, police stations reopened, and nearly two million Sudanese were expected to return by year’s end. In parts of Khartoum and Omdurman, water supply partially resumed, markets reopened, and neighborhoods organized fundraisers to install solar pumps and rebuild clinics.
This capital-focused approach carries significant risks. Over 80 percent of Sudanese citizens live outside Khartoum. In El Fasher, Zamzam camp, and Tawila, clinics have been destroyed, cholera is spreading, and famine conditions persist.Even before the war, about two-thirds of the country lacked electricity. Since the war, the energy sector has lost approximately 40 percent of its generation capacity. Reconstruction efforts remain concentrated on the capital’s more accessible grid.
Lesson One: Visible Service Delivery is Essential, but it Must be Equitable
Prioritizing reconstruction in Khartoum while neglecting Darfur and Kordofan will not restore state legitimacy and will reinforce the center-periphery grievances that fuel Sudan’s conflicts. International partners should link reconstruction funding to measurable progress in outlying areas, rather than focusing only on capital cities. This could include requiring a fixed percentage of aid to be allocated to projects outside the capital, with clear benchmarks for service delivery in marginalized states. Donors and governments should establish independent monitoring teams of local civil society representatives to track resource distribution and publish regular progress reports. Where possible, funding agreements should be conditional based on independently verified improvements in access to services such as electricity, healthcare, and water in outlying regions. By implementing these equity mechanisms, the international community promotes accountability and helps ensure reconstruction benefits all parts of Sudan.
Lesson Two: Work With, Not Against, Grassroots Governance Systems
Where the Sudanese state has collapsed, community-led networks have filled the gap. The most prominent example is the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), a grassroot, volunteer-driven network operating in all 18 states. ERRs provide healthcare, food, education, and civilian protection. They originated from neighborhood resistance committees, which were central to Sudan’s 2019 revolution. Today, ERRs form the backbone of the country’s humanitarian response, with nearly 26,000 volunteers working in areas inaccessible to international aid groups.
ERRs are rooted in the Sudanese Nafeer tradition of collective action to support those in need and rebuild during crises. By October 2024, an estimated 360 ERRs operated across seven states, with ERRs in Khartoum state coordinating in 54 neighborhoods. ERRs are among the few groups consistently trusted by Sudan’s transitional government, which has recognized the value of traditional authorities. In July 2025, Prime Minister Kamil Idris urged Native Administration leaders to play a “salient role” in national recovery, noting the country urgently needs their wisdom. This recognition is positive, but it must lead to a genuine partnership, not co-optation.
Sudan shows that governance reconstruction must start at the local level. Donors should prioritize funding for ERRs and resistance committees, rather than relying solely on state ministries, many of which may be non-functional.
To implement these principles, donors should first map and identify grassroots groups through consultation with local civil society leaders, humanitarian actors, and community authorities to determine which networks are effective and trusted. Vetting should include field assessments, reference checks with established aid partners, and reviews of previous impact, while allowing for flexible standards in emergency conditions. Support should combine direct funding with capacity-building, technical assistance, and regular follow-up to empower grassroots groups to manage resources and report transparently. The ERRs’ community-led aid model should inform post-conflict governance strategies, and donor engagement should strengthen, not replace, local ownership.
Lesson Three: Decentralization as a Conflict-Mitigation Tool, but Only if Done with Resources
Sudan’s history is marked by centralized governance that extracts wealth from the periphery while providing few services. This pattern continues in reconstruction. The SAF-aligned government’s higher committee for reconstruction focuses almost exclusively on the capital. Governors from poor, devastated states travel to Khartoum to pledge support for its revival, despite their own regions’ needs. This approach has created “islands of reconstruction in a sea of abandonment.” As a result, Sudanese citizens migrate toward areas with functioning infrastructure, accelerating internal displacement and sparking new conflicts over resources and land.
Effective decentralization requires both administrative authority and fiscal resources. Sudan’s pre-war budget was highly centralized, and the war has further weakened state governments. Any post-conflict settlement must include a clear formula for revenue sharing and conditional grants to state and local governments. International partners should ensure a significant portion of reconstruction aid is distributed through subnational authorities, with strong accountability measures. These should include third-party audits, regular publication of financial reports, and autonomous supervisory agencies with civil society members. Participatory budgeting can also be introduced, giving local communities a direct role in setting spending priorities and monitoring disbursements. These tools will strengthen the credibility and transparency of reconstruction efforts and help ensure resources reach their intended destinations.
Lesson Four: Security Sector Reform is a Political Problem
Sudan’s security sector has long served as a military institution and as a tool of authoritarian governance and economic extraction. Since independence, successive regimes have maintained power through coercion and by dispersing fiscal authority to unaccountable military, paramilitary, and commercial actors.
Any serious approach to security sector reform (SSR) in Sudan must address the political economy. A recent Peace analysis argues that SSR has failed not because of technical deficiencies, but because of exclusionary settlements, donor complicity, and an unwillingness to confront the core structures of military-fiscal rule. Tensions have increased because Sudan’s two warring factions, the SAF and RSF, were partners in the October 2021 military coup that disrupted the democratic transition until April 2023.
The African Union’s peace initiative identifies disarmament and security sector reform as essential. However, previous Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives in Sudan have consistently failed and undermined sustainable peace. The lesson is clear: DDR and SSR must be central to any political settlement, not treated as technical add-ons. Any post-conflict arrangement must address the militarized political economy, including integrating RSF fighters into a reformed national military, demobilizing parallel armed groups, and establishing civilian oversight of security institutions. Practitioners can draw on examples from other contexts: in Liberia, former combatants were integrated into a new national army with ongoing international training and oversight; in Sierra Leone, independent security oversight bodies were established alongside demobilization; and in South Africa, transparency and civic engagement were prioritized through a civilian secretariat for police services. Building representative security institutions, transparent recruitment and vetting, third-party oversight, and integrating former fighters into civilian life offer practical models for Sudan’s future SSR.
Lesson Five: Transitional Justice Cannot Wait, Especially for Women
In February 2026, the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission documented that the RSF’s takeover of El Fasher had “hallmarks that point to genocide” against non-Arab communities. This included mass killings, rape, torture, and “exterminatory rhetoric.” These acts signaled an intent to destroy the Zaghawa and Fur communities. Violence against women and girls has reached “catastrophic levels.” Documented cases of sexual violence have nearly tripled since the war began.
However, despite this horror, the quest for justice and accountability has declined significantly. Sudanese women leaders warn that the humanitarian aid system is being politicized and compromised, and that too little is being done to detect, deter, and support victims of sexual violence.
Sudanese women are also leading their own peace-building efforts. For more than three years, the Malam-Darfur Peace Development Organization has established a Social Cohesion Mechanism for Pastoralists and Farmers in South Darfur, arbitrating disputes and reducing violence during crucial seasons. Women Peace Ambassadors have conducted shuttle diplomacy between communities in conflict for nearly six years, facilitating communication and building trust. These examples emphasize the effectiveness of supporting women-led initiatives as central actors in community restoration and reconciliation. Practitioners should prioritize survivor-centered and gender-justice strategies by guaranteeing the meaningful participation of women in all phases of transitional justice, from truth-telling processes to the design of reparations programs.
Funding streams should be directly accessible to women-led organizations and survivors’ groups, enabling them to deliver legal aid, trauma care, and advocacy. Establishing safe spaces, confidential reporting systems, and culturally sensitive psychosocial support are key principles to center survivors’ needs and dignity throughout the process.
Sudan demonstrates that transitional justice is not a luxury to be postponed until after stability is achieved. Delaying justice fosters resentment and entrenches impunity. Even symbolic measures, such as a truth commission, public memorial, or reparations fund for survivors, can initiate the healing process. International partners should provide direct funding to women-led peacebuilding organizations, rather than routing resources through state institutions that may be unwilling or unable to prioritize gender justice.
Conclusion
Sudan’s war continues. Ceasefire talks have stalled, famine persists, and atrocities continue. However, reconstruction is already underway in fragments, and its approach will shape Sudan’s future for decades. The choice is not whether to rebuild now or later, but whether to rebuild equitably or risk repeating the divisions that led to Sudan’s collapse.
The lessons from Sudan are consistent with those from fragile states globally: prioritize visible and distributed services, empower grassroots governance, and decentralize both control and resources. Sudan’s experience aligns with lessons from other fragile states: prioritize visible, distributed services; empower grassroots governance; decentralize control and resources; address the political economy of security; and pursue justice without delay. However, Sudan offers a clear warning: focusing reconstruction on the capital while neglecting outlying areas is not true reconstruction and risks renewed conflict. conditioning aid on equitable distribution and ensuring that any political settlement incorporates genuine security-sector reform and transitional justice. The Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary fortitude in the face of catastrophe. The international community’s role is not to build the state on their behalf, but to foster the conditions that enable Sudanese citizens to rebuild their own institutions.
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