Deterrence in the South China Sea Fails Without Information Authority
The call with the theater commander ended the way they usually did, with a denial. The Corps commander set the phone down, looked at his staff, and ordered two divisions to withdraw from the border of a key Pacific ally. For weeks, the theater headquarters had refused his requests to employ psychological operations and public affairs specialists to counter a wave of Chinese propaganda accusing U.S. troops of atrocities. The products were ready, the teams were trained, and the commander could see the narrative damage in real time, but he did not have the authority to use the information capabilities already under his command.
Months later, the allied government quietly asked the United States to remove its forces, citing domestic pressure and political risk. A strategic partnership weakened, deterrence in the region eroded, and not a single shot was fired, all because a commander lacked the authority to fight in the information environment, he was already operating in. Deterrence is failing in the South China Sea because U.S. commanders lack delegated authority to employ information effects at the speed of Chinese competition.
The United States does not lack military capability in the South China Sea. It lacks something far more basic: the authority for commanders to compete in the information environment at the speed China does. Beijing advances its objectives through narrative control, legal manipulation, and psychological pressure, below the threshold of armed conflict, while U.S. forces remain organized and authorized for escalation that rarely comes. In this competition, information advantage is decisive, but only if commanders are empowered to employ it.
China’s approach to the South China Sea is not designed to win battles, but to shape perceptions and constrain decision‑making over time, forcing opponents into a rushed, defensive posture. By controlling the narrative, exploiting ambiguity, and imposing incremental costs, Beijing achieves strategic gains without triggering a military response. Deterring that strategy requires more than ships and aircraft. It requires commanders who can impose informational costs before a crisis escalates. Today, they largely cannot. This article first explains how China uses information as its main effort in the South China Sea, then shows why U.S. authorities lag, and finally argues for delegating information advantage authority to operational commanders to restore deterrence.
Information is China’s Battlefield
China’s “Three Warfares” – public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare – are not supporting efforts. They are the main effort. Beijing uses these tools to legitimize illegal maritime claims, intimidate regional partners, and portray U.S. presence as destabilizing. These actions occur continuously, not episodically, and they are synchronized across diplomatic, military, and informational lines of effort. In 2023, the People’s Republic of China used a laser to track a Philippine vessel that Beijing claimed had entered Chinese territorial waters. The Philippine Coast Guard documented the incident, released the documentation and publicized Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, making the PRC react to a narrative instead of setting it. This model of quick, decisive information activities must be foundational to U.S. operations in the Pacific, and it requires delegated information authority at the operational level.
The United States, by contrast, treats information as something to be coordinated, cleared, and approved, often after the moment has passed. Authorities to conduct information operations remain tightly held, fragmented across policy regimes, and inconsistently delegated. As a result, U.S. commanders often recognize Chinese information actions in real time but lack the authority to respond proportionally and immediately. That gap is not theoretical. It is operational.
The Real Problem is Authority, Not Capability
The Joint Force has invested heavily in information capabilities. The U.S. Army’s establishment of Theater Information Advantage Detachments (TIADs) and Multi‑Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) reflects growing recognition that information is central to competition with the People’s Republic of China. Units dedicated to information advantage, cyber operations, and influence activities now exist across the force. Yet capability does not equal effectiveness if commanders cannot employ it when and where it matters. From an operational perspective, the problem is not a lack of information forces, but the absence of clear authority to employ them at the tempo competition demands.
At the operational level, the problem is simple: information effects are treated as exceptional, not routine. While commanders can maneuver forces, conduct exercises, and posture assets under standing authorities, information activities often require additional approvals or coordination outside the chain of command. In a competition defined by speed and narrative momentum, that delay is decisive and not in the United States’ favor. China does not suffer from this constraint. Its system integrates information control into routine military and political activity. Every patrol, exercise, and legal assertion is accompanied by a narrative designed to shape regional and international perception. U.S. responses, when they come, are often hasty and sporadic, blunting their deterrent effect.
Delegation is the Missing Link
If information advantage is to function as a pillar of deterrence, authority must be delegated to the lowest level capable of employing it effectively. In the South China Sea, this means operational commanders who understand the environment, the adversary, and the timing required to impose costs short of conflict; either an Army Corps or a Marine Expeditionary Force, both of which can operate as a joint headquarters. Current U.S. law allows combatant commanders to delegate operational authority, but it does not clearly articulate delegation of information advantage activities. As a result, information effects are used selectively, not as a normal part of day‑to‑day command activity. While commanders can maneuver forces, conduct exercises, and posture assets under standing authorities, information activities frequently require additional approvals or external coordination. In a competition where speed and narrative momentum decide outcomes, delay is fatal.
Delegation does not mean removing oversight or abandoning policy constraints. It means recognizing that competition in the information environment is continuous and that commanders require standing authority to respond within it. Just as commanders are trusted to maneuver forces under mission command, they must be trusted to maneuver narratives within defined parameters.
Without this delegation, information forces remain reactive tools, employed after Chinese actions shape the narrative. With it, commanders can integrate information effects into daily operations, exercises, and presence missions, turning routine activity into deterrence.
Deterrence Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict Requires Speed
Deterrence in the South China Sea is not about preventing invasion tomorrow – it is about preventing normalization today. Every unchallenged Chinese narrative, legal claim, or coercive action shifts the baseline in Beijing’s favor. Information advantage allows the United States to contest that shift in real time, but only if commanders can act at the speed of competition. When integrated with routine operations and exercises, information effects can reassure partners, expose coercion, and complicate Chinese decision‑making without escalating to armed conflict.
This is not an argument for escalation. On the contrary, empowered information operations offer a way to impose costs and signal resolve without military confrontation. They reassure partners, expose coercion, and complicate Chinese decision‑making all while staying below the threshold of armed conflict.
The Risk of Doing Nothing
In the opening vignette, the Corps commander’s inability to employ information forces illustrates this systemic problem. Absent change, the United States will continue to cede initiative in the domain China values most. Military presence will remain necessary but insufficient. Exercises will reassure allies temporarily, only to be undercut by sustained Chinese narrative pressure. Deterrence will appear strong on paper but hollow in practice.
China does not need to defeat U.S. forces to win in the South China Sea. It only needs to convince regional actors that resistance is futile and that U.S. support is episodic. Information advantage, properly authorized and employed, is how the United States prevents that outcome.
Information Advantage is a Command Responsibility
Information advantage is not a supporting function or a communications problem. It is a command responsibility central to deterrence in the South China Sea. Without delegated authority, information forces cannot be employed coherently or decisively as part of joint and multidomain operations. Delegating authority to employ information effects is the fastest and most practical step the United States can take to compete below the threshold of conflict. Combatant commanders must provide standing authority for Corps and MEF level headquarters to conduct operational inform and influence activities without prior theater approval, within defined policy constraints.
Without that authority, information forces will remain underused, and deterrence will continue to erode incrementally. With it, commanders gain a tool suited to the fight China is waging. Deterrence is not failing because the United States lacks power. It is failing because it has not yet trusted its commanders to use information as power.
This article reflects the views of the author and does not represent the official position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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