The two conflicts on Afghanistan’s borders are pushing the already economically weak nation toward bankruptcy and famine.

Hostilities between Iran and the United States have affected every country in the world, but none more so than Iran’s neighbors. Proximity to a war theater is bad enough, but being trapped by it is even worse.

This is the predicament of Afghanistan, a landlocked country that shares a 921-kilometer (572-mile) border with Iran to the west. Afghanistan is no stranger to war, which it has experienced internally for decades. However, the Taliban’s assumption of power in 2021 ended a period of prolonged, violent insurgency in favor of a largely unchallenged government. Afghanistan is now “stable,” and the Taliban is seeking to rebuild the country through economic development.

Instead, the outbreak of war in Iran has exacerbated Afghanistan’s deep humanitarian and economic crises. It was already suffering before the war began, and conditions have only worsened since. The outcomes for civilians are dire, and the country presently risks famine and bankruptcy.

Afghanistan’s Trade Is Drying Up

Before February 28, Afghanistan’s economy was threadbare. The country’s GDP per capita is less than $420. Nearly every development indicator places the country at or near the bottom of its lists.

These woes have a political cause. The Taliban government—due largely to its hostility to women’s rights, human rights, and continued ties to terrorism—is recognized by no other country except Russia. This means that Afghanistan is unable to access IMF support, international payment systems such as SWIFT, or foreign credit to rebuild. World Bank support intended for Afghanistan is provided to third parties, with no funds to the Taliban.

Despite non-recognition, countries have sought to trade with Afghanistan. The country’s landlocked geography means that land routes are critical. Historically, the most important connections ran through Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, along the 2,640-kilometer (1,640-mile) Durand Line. Until recently, Pakistan-bound trade accounted for 80 percent of Afghan exports.

Since October of 2025, however, the border has been closed following several months of “open war” between the Pakistani military and the Taliban due to a dispute over the Durand Line. Flows of trade and Afghan migrant workers to Pakistan, who pay remittances back to Afghanistan, have ceased.

Amid this conflict, the Taliban had been looking toward Iran, the only other adjacent large country. Like Pakistan, Iran’s markets were big enough to sell Afghan goods and employ Afghan migrant workers who send remittances back home. Most importantly, the land route through Iran to its seaports is the best geographic alternative to Pakistani highways and the port of Karachi.

Indeed, as a result, a great deal of Afghanistan’s non-Pakistani trade was being routed through Iran to the port of Chabahar. Iran became the country’s top trading partner in 2025, overtaking Pakistan, with trade totaling $3.5 billion.

Chabahar, which is operated by India, is Iran’s easternmost seaport, away from the Strait of Hormuz. For Afghanistan, the port’s geography makes it a direct alternative to Karachi for moving products to market. The importance of Chabahar to Afghanistan is so great that a cash-strapped Taliban nonetheless invested $35 million in the port in 2024.

Yet, war has throttled that route, too. Since February, transporting goods between Afghanistan and Chabahar has been a logistical nightmare. Trucks must transit Iran overland amid US and Israeli airstrikes to connect with ships transiting Chabahar, which are sailing near an active war zone and a US blockade.

The Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce has reported that loading has “stopped” and “[e]verything is on hold.” Afghanistan’s Iran-bound trade, therefore, has effectively been cut off.

To make matters worse, many Afghan migrant workers in Iran have been fleeing the country to escape war and are returning home. Millions of Afghans live in Iran, and over 1,700 are returning every day, which increases pressure on the Afghan economy to provide for them.

The influx of people and lack of trade mean that demand for basic goods in Afghanistan is surging amid supply shocks. Fuel, similarly, is expensive due to rising oil prices amid the war. Consequently, inflation is building. Unemployment—an existing problem—is now likely to grow even more widespread, especially among returning migrant workers. If the economic crisis in Afghanistan is the norm, this situation is bound to take it to new heights.

Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis Isn’t Getting Any Better

Linked to Afghanistan’s economic woes is a longstanding humanitarian crisis, which is getting worse as the war continues. Food is even more unaffordable and, now, often unavailable to many people, with the price of vegetables and cooking oil increasing by 13 percent and staples increasing by 3 percent. The UN estimates that 17.4 million Afghans will face “acute food insecurity” this year, with nearly 5 million in an emergency phase.

Afghanistan was previously food-insecure and relied on foreign aid, among other things. Already, the Taliban’s assumption of power had limited Afghanistan’s aid inflows due to international hostility. The war with Iran has made aid even scarcer, as the country is no longer a priority for aid in the region. Chinese aid, despite Beijing’s overtures to the Taliban, has only come in small dollar amounts.

Before this year, Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza had already drawn much humanitarian aid away from Afghanistan commitments. Since the Iran War, however, other theaters of conflict, such as Lebanon—where Israel has been fighting Lebanese authorities—have become greater priorities to donors and NGOs.

In 2026, the UN reports that Afghanistan’s $1.71 billion aid requirements are only 10 percent funded, at present. If this funding doesn’t increase, Afghans will remain deprived of food supply and other essential needs, such as medical care. Even if funded, however, aid is linked to trade, since essential shipments must be delivered to Afghanistan. The closure of trade routes makes their transfer even more difficult.

The Alternative Route to Central Asia

Instead of Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan must rely on a new artery: Central Asia. Three countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—border Afghanistan to the north. Although their economies aren’t large and are unlikely to accept Afghan workers, any bilateral trade with Afghanistan is good enough for the latter.

More compelling for both parties is the use of each other as a transit corridor. Highways through Central Asia provide alternative routes to larger economies as markets for Afghan trade, ie, Kazakhstan, China, and, over the Caspian Sea, to Russia and Europe.

Similarly, in Central Asia, Afghanistan may serve as a transit route for goods to ports along the Indian Ocean—for access to the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia. For Central Asian countries, this has been a primary goal as they seek to access new markets. Should such trade continue, it may generate customs fees for the Taliban government, akin to how Afghan rulers generated revenue for centuries from the Silk Road trade.

The Taliban has taken notice, and trade with Central Asian countries is a new priority. On April 5, a month after hostilities in Iran began, Afghanistan hosted the ministers from five Central Asian countries and agreed to boost two-way trade with Afghanistan to $10 billion by 2030.

To these ends, trade was already increasing between Afghanistan and Central Asia. Uzbekistan, the largest adjacent economy, traded $1.7 billion with Afghanistan in 2025, on par with Iran and Pakistan. Uzbek exports consist mostly of grain, petroleum, and electricity, of which it is Afghanistan’s biggest supplier. With Tajikistan, trade with Afghanistan grew by 30 percent in 2025.

More must happen before Afghan trade with Central Asia can reach its full potential, chiefly the building of road and rail infrastructure. However, at the very least, there is a third frontier that can rescue Afghanistan, sandwiched between two wars, from its precipice. So long as it remains open, Afghanistan has hope.

About the Author: Arjun Singh

​​Arjun Singh is a journalist and political columnist in Washington, DC. He has written for The Wall Street Journal, National Review, The Epoch Times, National Post, and The Daily Caller. He previously lived in India for several years and worked for a member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha.

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