The imminent direct peace talks between Israel and Lebanon in Washington are unprecedented—and disastrous for Hezbollah, which will do its utmost to make them fail.

In a positive development for Middle East security, the US-brokered 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah appears to be holding, and the United States is now seeking to extend it. If it endures, the ceasefire will put an end to 46 days of war between Israel and Hezbollah in the latest round of conflict.

In the broader and more fundamental context of achieving enduring regional security, the ceasefire was preceded by rare, direct talks between Lebanese and Israeli officials in Washington last week. Even though they have historically maintained a quarrelsome relationship, Lebanon and Israel agreed to hold direct talks for the first time in decades. These talks began on April 14 with a meeting of the two countries’ ambassadors in Washington, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Most substantially, the talks produced an agreement to hold future negotiations on a peace deal.

In a follow-up to the ceasefire, and to set the conditions for further progress in peace talks, President Donald Trump announced that he would invite Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to the White House “for the first meaningful [joint] talks between Israel and Lebanon since 1983.”

These developments are historic and unprecedented. The fact that the United States has succeeded in separating Lebanon from the ongoing US-Iran negotiations will not only deepen the US-Lebanon relationship, but also deliver a critical blow to Iran’s sponsor-proxy model, which has enabled it to project power across the Middle East.

Four Ways Hezbollah Could Undermine the Israel-Lebanon Talks

To no one’s surprise, shortly after the announcement of the joint Israel-Lebanon talks, Hezbollah sharply escalated its rhetoric, framing the developments as humiliating and shameful for Lebanon. In a speech to the group’s rank and file, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem demanded the Lebanese government cancel the meeting. After the ceasefire was concluded, Qassem vowed to keep his fighters in the field, ready for combat in case of any Israeli violations. Criticizing Aoun and indicating that Hezbollah was not concerned by Lebanon’s planned direct talks with Israel, Hezbollah official Mahmoud Qamati described the negotiations as a failure and “submissive.”

If the current ceasefire is extended—as is widely expected—amid potential progress in negotiations, Hezbollah will likely attempt to influence or manipulate the process. It could do so in a number of ways. 

First, the group might attempt to stir up sectarian violence or broader security disruptions to challenge the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and disrupt the peace process. Hezbollah has already resorted to menacing language; Qamati, for instance, said that the group is capable of “turning the country upside down” after the Lebanese government formally banned its military wing. Similarly, Hezbollah official Nawaf Al-Moussawi commented in an interview that Aoun could meet the same fate as the slain Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated by Islamist extremists after he signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

Second, Hezbollah might engage in negotiations and approve the conditional disarmament of its military wing—at least partially. In this scenario, it would likely relinquish parts of its heavy arsenal while quietly retaining enough weapons to continue to wield influence. In return, however, the group would demand significant concessions from Beirut—most likely the integration of some of its forces into the LAF and security institutions, and members of its political wing into key positions across Lebanese state institutions. Such a scenario would require broad Lebanese political consensus and constitutional reform. It would also face exceptionally strong political opposition, as most Lebanese despise Hezbollah’s existing sway over Lebanese state institutions and see little reason to aid the group in further infiltration. For these reasons, it should be understood as the least likely outcome in the near term.

Third, and most drastically, Hezbollah could unilaterally launch a resumption of fighting against Israel, particularly if the US and Israel resume Operation Epic Fury against Iran. In this regard, and likely as part of messaging, a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese analyst suggested in a recent interview that the group might resume attacks against Israeli forces—through projectiles, killings, or the deployment of snipers and IEDs—in Israeli-occupied territory in southern Lebanon in the event of renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran, taking advantage of Israel’s renewed focus on Tehran. In fact, on Tuesday, Hezbollah launched several rockets at Israeli forces stationed in the south of the country; on Sunday it claimed that an Israeli armored convoy had triggered explosives previously planted by its militants in southern Lebanon.

Still, there is one major reason Hezbollah might wish to avoid this outcome: it would likely prove suicidal for the group, given the massive losses it incurred during Israel’s 2023–24 military campaign and in the latest 2026 escalation. In the event of a renewed conflict, its support base—the broader Shiite community in Lebanon, mostly concentrated in the south where a prospective war would take place—would suffer the most. 

A fourth scenario could involve Hezbollah exercising influence over the talks in order to sabotage them. Recognizing that the Israel-Lebanon peace negotiations are inherently lengthy and unfold over extended periods of time, Hezbollah could engage in talks to buy time, with the ultimate goal of maintaining the status quo, rebuilding its political influence, and eventually stalling the process. It could pursue this through various mechanisms, particularly attempting to insert Hezbollah-aligned Shiite representatives into the negotiations or recreating delaying mechanisms akin to its previously imposed “indirect negotiations” format. It may also leverage its existing patronage networks within state institutions, continue its intimidation of political opponents and the Lebanese state, and rebrand its “resistance” and “victory” narratives around defending the homeland—shifting away from the so-called “unity of fronts”—to remobilize its base. The group may even fake disarmament, as it did during the south of the Litani River phase. However, this scenario also appears unlikely, given the Lebanese government’s demonstrated political will at this pivotal moment and the strong international support it currently enjoys, led by the United States.

Hezbollah and its affiliated commentators are already attempting to shape the post-ceasefire narrative, particularly regarding who set the terms of the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire. Much of the commentary from analysts and newspapers aligned with the group frames the ceasefire as a victory for Hezbollah, depicting Iran as the actor that imposed the ceasefire as part of its negotiations with the United States. 

How to Make the Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Stick

The current ceasefire is consistent with United Nations Resolutions 1559 and 1701, as well as the 2024 ceasefire agreement calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed factions in Lebanon. However, the new ceasefire introduces language on advancing peace and normalization between Lebanon and Israel under American facilitation. This represents a historic opportunity for Lebanon to conduct its foreign policy free from external influence—a point underscored by Lebanese President Aoun in his latest televised address after the ceasefire went into force. While not explicitly stated, the prospects of a peace deal with Israel were encapsulated in Aoun’s remark that the ceasefire should evolve into “permanent agreements” with its southern neighbor.

For now, Israel retains the option under the ceasefire to continue targeting Hezbollah in self-defense if the group poses a threat. Indeed, only hours after the ceasefire came into effect, Netanyahu vowed to press ahead with Hezbollah’s disarmament, stating that Israel would maintain an expanded security zone stretching 10 kilometers into southern Lebanon during the 10-day ceasefire.

Ultimately, extending the ceasefire will hinge on progress in negotiations, particularly on the Lebanese government’s ability to demonstrate that it can disarm Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups, according to the terms of the ceasefire. In this regard, the Lebanese government has already taken a significant first step by ordering the LAF and security forces to deploy throughout Beirut before the ceasefire was announced. In time, this deployment should expand to include Beirut’s southern suburbs—a Hezbollah stronghold—and then gradually extend across the country. This should also happen according to a clear timetable.

Regardless of the outcome of US-Iran negotiations, a second round of ambassador-level talks between Israel and Lebanon is scheduled to take place today at the State Department in Washington, which will most likely result in an extension of the current ceasefire. 

By launching these negotiations, Lebanon is asserting that the state alone holds the authority to negotiate. Having monopolized the decision over war and peace for nearly two decades, Hezbollah is now beginning to lose the coercive leverage and narrative it maintained over Lebanese political and diplomatic decision-making. The Lebanese state is thus gradually regaining exclusive authority over the conduct of diplomacy. These negotiations offer a rare opportunity for the state to reclaim ownership of its national narrative, representing a crucial step toward sovereignty and state-building. Their failure, however, would likely lead to internal collapse or even civil strife.

About the Author: Rany Ballout

Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor’s degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden. His views are his own.

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