The Trump administration’s attempts to coerce Iran would have been more effective if they had been imposed earlier.

Since the Trump administration imposed a naval blockade on Iran on April 13, the debate over the measure has focused on whether it is too risky, too weak, or too disruptive to oil markets. But the real problem is simpler: Washington chose the right coercive tool at the wrong time. Before direct war, a blockade might have sharpened pressure on a regime still trying to avoid full-scale confrontation and still hoping for a deal on tolerable terms. 

This was not a hypothetical window. In the weeks leading up to the war at the end of February, Iranian leaders signaled a preference for avoiding escalation. Diplomatic channels remained active, and officials emphasized the possibility of a negotiated outcome rather than pre-emptive military action. Even as tensions rose in February, Tehran avoided initiating conflict, aware that being seen as the aggressor would carry high political and strategic costs.

In that context, a blockade would not necessarily have pushed Iran toward war. On the contrary, it could have reinforced Tehran’s existing incentive to avoid escalation. Faced with mounting economic pressure, the regime would have had stronger reasons to negotiate rather than risk a confrontation that could threaten its survival, before the outbreak of war.

After war had already begun, however, the same blockade became less a tool of compulsion than another step in an escalation ladder, one that gave Tehran new opportunities to raise global energy costs, broaden the crisis, and shift the political burden back onto the United States.

The missed opportunity becomes even clearer when looking at the halt of the 12-Day War in June 2025. That brief conflict marked the moment of maximum vulnerability for the Iranian regime. For decades, Tehran’s forward defense doctrine was designed precisely to prevent war from reaching Iranian territory. That doctrine collapsed almost immediately after Israel attacked Iran on June 13, 2025. 

The initial strikes, particularly the rapid elimination of senior commanders, created shock, disorganization, and a temporary rupture in the regime’s command structure. But the war did not end. It paused. Crucially, the regime understood that the cessation of hostilities on June 24 was not a resolution of the conflict but merely an interruption. From that point forward, it shifted into preparation mode.

In the months following the war, Iran moved to decentralize command structures, build redundancy into its systems, and disperse decision-making authority. These adaptations were designed to ensure survivability under attack and to preserve retaliatory capacity even under sustained pressure. This helps explain how Iran has remained resilient despite losing its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and senior commanders and facing sustained external pressure. The answer is not simply ideological commitment or repression, though both matter. It is a structural adaptation. The regime adjusted to the new reality faster than its adversaries adjusted their strategy.

The most consequential shift, however, has been strategic. Faced with sustained pressure, Tehran has turned to what might be called its geography card. The threat to the Strait of Hormuz, once considered a last-resort option, has now become central to Iran’s survival strategy. By signaling its ability to disrupt one of the world’s most critical energy corridors, Iran has found a way to externalize the costs of confrontation, transforming a bilateral crisis into a global one.

Iran’s evolving strategy has fundamentally altered the logic of the US blockade at this stage of the war. Instead of isolating Iran, it risks widening the crisis. Instead of forcing quick concessions, it creates incentives for Tehran to escalate in domains where it holds asymmetric advantages. At the same time, the blockade has failed to secure the broad international backing necessary for sustained pressure.

Perhaps most importantly, the strategic environment itself has changed in ways that cannot easily be reversed. The assumption that the Middle East can return to the pre-war status quo is no longer realistic. Iran has adapted its military structure, redefined its deterrence posture, and demonstrated its willingness to escalate if its survival is threatened. Regional states, too, have been transformed by the conflict. Iraq and the Gulf States were directly exposed to Iranian strikes or indirect spillover, shaking their sense of security and stability. In the Gulf, the attacks not only targeted infrastructure and territory but also challenged the reliability of long-standing security arrangements with the United States.

The blockade, once conceived as a tool to compel Tehran, has become at best a mechanism for managing escalation, a way to pressure Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit disruption rather than fundamentally alter its behavior. Extending it further risks reinforcing the very dynamics it was meant to prevent. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) seizure of two cargo ships on April 22, following the US capture of Iran-linked shipping earlier this week, confirms that Iran’s escalatory measures are not yet depleted. Iran has already demonstrated that when it perceives an existential threat, it is willing to escalate horizontally, targeting shipping, raising global economic costs, and widening the conflict beyond its borders.

This is the core strategic miscalculation. Coercive tools are most effective before an adversary adapts, not after. By the time the White House moved to impose a blockade this month, the moment of maximum vulnerability had already passed. Iran was no longer reacting in shock, but operating with a revised doctrine.

About the Author: Shukriyah Bradost

Shukriya Bradost is a doctoral researcher and international security analyst at Virginia Tech, with expertise in geopolitics, non-state actors, militia groups, and Middle East affairs. A trained lawyer and member of the International Federation of Journalists, she has over 15 years of experience as a journalist, editor, and media commentator. She is affiliated with the Middle East Institute and is a contributor to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Her insights have been featured in a wide range of outlets, from The Jerusalem Post to Al Jazeera, and she is a regular guest on international news and current affairs programs.

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