Little Bighorn and the Enduring Lessons of Irregular Warfare
“Echoes of Little Bighorn: Insights for SOF Success,” by Christiane Thompson, Janetta Harris, Bernard Harris Jr., Raymond Powell, and Michael Hay, Joint Special Operations University Press, April 14, 2026.
Check out this article from JSOU Press! The report uses the Battle of the Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876, as a case study to examine enduring principles of irregular warfare relevant to modern Special Operations Forces.
Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer led approximately 600 soldiers of the 7th Cavalry against a Native American coalition of 4,000 to 8,000 people, led by Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Gall, and Two Moons. The Native Americans deployed decentralized command, superior terrain knowledge, mobility, psychological warfare, and cultural cohesion to defeat Custer’s force at Last Stand Hill, killing over 200 soldiers. The authors argue that Custer’s fatal underestimation of his opponent, combined with fractured command and control and a failure to conduct adequate intelligence preparation, exposed his force to a series of encirclements that his divided units could not survive.
Battle of Little Bighorn, 1876 (Interactive Map)
The authors draw direct lines from the battle to IW principles that SOF practitioners face in contemporary conflicts. Native American religion and warrior psychology generated unit cohesion, motivation, and a willingness to fight at maximum intensity, factors the authors connect to Thucydides’ motivations of fear, honor, and interest.
The report also draws a compelling parallel to the 2017 ambush at Tongo Tongo, Niger, where a U.S. Special Forces ODA team suffered casualties due to flawed command and control, overconfidence, and insufficient knowledge of the operational environment. The authors conclude with recommendations organized across the physical, information, and human dimensions, calling on SOF leaders to conduct rigorous intelligence preparation, invest in cultural immersion, and guard against confirmation bias. The authors assert that technology and AI cannot substitute for intimate local knowledge, sound judgment, and adaptable leadership in irregular warfare.
Irregular Warfare Lessons from the Battle of Little Bighorn
“The principles of IW dealing with decentralized command, terrain mastery, mobility, psychological warfare, and cultural cohesion remain as critical in modern conflicts, even in the age of AI, as they were on the banks of the Little Bighorn River.”
“Sitting Bull did not organize or lead his allies through detailed orders or rigid hierarchies but through broad mission command, relying on warrior tactical skills and communal decision-making as well as the ingenuity of their loosely coordinated bands. The subordinate warrior leaders possessed autonomy to maneuver and make decisions without awaiting orders from Sitting Bull or other senior chiefs. This flexibility allowed the Native Americans to exploit tactical opportunities rapidly, whereas the U.S. cavalry units found themselves unable to respond rapidly to changing situations and encircled in disparate defensive positions…The Native Americans demonstrated a mastery of the physical environment which was a pivotal factor for their victory…Terrain knowledge was paramount for the outcome of the battle, and it remains a decisive factor in understanding the operational environment (OE) and modern warfare…Psychological effects remain a non-negotiable tactic in modern warfare… At Little Bighorn, the Native Americans used traditional war cries, aggressive charges, and overwhelming numbers, all of which created confusion among the cavalry units and amplified the effects of being encircled.”
“For modern SOF, psychological effects often appear through information operations, deception, or the creation of uncertainty to break the adversary’s will rather than defeat them conventionally…For SOF, a key takeaway is the significance of cultural intelligence; understanding motivations, alliances, and belief systems can determine whether operations succeed or collapse. Partnership building and cultural knowledge can shape the spectrum of violence. In 21st-century warfare, cultural misjudgment and foregoing coalition building can prove as costly as operational and tactical error.”
Echoes of Little Bighorn in the Ambush at Tongo Tongo
“Originally classified as a reconnaissance mission, the unit’s mission quickly turned into a pursuit of a suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) commander…the forces were operating without the full command and control (C2) oversight, force protection, or support that a counterterrorism mission would normally require, thus exposing a serious flaw at the operational level…The detachment and their local counterparts found themselves suddenly outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and pinned in open terrain with little cover. As small groups were compelled to fight on their own, C2 swiftly broke down, with some groups fleeing to temporary defensive positions and others becoming separated in the confusion.”
Tongo Tongo Ambush, 2017 (DoD Video Report)
“Military professionals can compare Tongo Tongo to the Battle of the Little Bighorn. In both situations, flawed C2 created vulnerability, overconfidence reduced the perception of risk, and the locals had a better understanding of the operating environment…The lesson for SOF is clear: a given mission can be disastrous due to pride, complacency, a lack of local terrain knowledge, and insufficient integration of forces against a determined adversary.”
Revisiting history forces military professionals to confront enduring truths about ground combat and irregular warfare, from the consequences of overconfidence to the decisive role of terrain, culture, and command. The study of conventional forces also grounds that understanding and reveals the baseline demands of war, which sharpens how we assess the complexity and risk inherent in special operations. As emphasized as well in the Modern War Institute’s recent article on Ulysses S. Grant’s Personal Memoirs, serious professionals study the past to build judgment, not to admire it. Leaders who commit to that discipline carry forward lessons that directly shape performance in today’s operational environments.
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