Middle East conflict: how the US and Iran could step back from the brink

Donald Trump’s deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face a renewal of American bombardment was due to expire this week, but was extended at the last moment, this time with no defined time limit. But the risk of renewed escalation remains real, as both sides continue to block traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important – and contested – waterways..

Yet, despite hardline rhetoric on both sides, diplomacy has not collapsed. In fact, several plausible off‑ramps exist that could allow Washington and Tehran to cool tensions without either side appearing to capitulate.

Research in conflict resolution suggests that warring parties will be more likely to come to an agreement when both sides can take away what they consider a winning result. Often, this comes in trade-offs between what you are willing to give away in order to gain elsewhere. Nevertheless, it’s axiomatic in conflict resolution that it’s much easier to start a war than to stop it.

The most viable pathway to a settlement remains a reset of the nuclear file broadly along the lines of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), albeit under a new political brand.

Iranian officials have proposed a staged arrangement that would cap uranium enrichment at 3.67%, well below the level needed for a nuclear weapon. Such an arrangement would return intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections with the prospect of ultimately transferring stocks of higher‑enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for phased sanctions relief.

This would not represent a fundamental concession by Tehran. These were the parameters it accepted 11 years ago under the deal brokered by Barack Obama. But it would significantly lengthen Iran’s nuclear “breakout time” (the time it takes to produce enough weapons-grade uranium). It would also restore transparency that has been steadily eroded since the first Trump administration pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018.

For Washington, such a deal would fall short of longstanding demands for “zero enrichment” – but that position has so far proved unattainable. Even US officials now appear more focused on verifiable constraints than absolute prohibitions, understanding that China recognises the right to enrich uranium as a matter of sovereignty.

A capped and monitored programme would allow the US president to claim that Iran had been forced back under strict controls, while avoiding a further costly regional war. The irony is that this would largely put Iran back into an agreement that Obama agreed and which Trump, with considerable bluster, withdrew from in 2018. This appears to be a stumbling block for the US president.

A second and related off‑ramp concerns the duration rather than the existence of enrichment limits. Recent talks have stalled over US demands for a 20‑year moratorium on enrichment, which Iran has countered with proposals closer to five years. A compromise, such as a seven to ten-year limit with built‑in reviews, would give both sides something to sell domestically. It would represent long‑term risk reduction for Washington and for Tehran it would be a reaffirmation of Iran’s right to a nuclear future.

Time‑limited arrangements have precedent in arms control. They are known as confidence and security building measures and are often used in conflict prevention and resolution to build trust between parties while working towards a resolution. And they may be more politically durable than maximalist demands that are more likely to collapse as political conditions change.

Beyond the nuclear issue, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as Iran’s most potent source of leverage. Roughly one-fifth of global oil passes through the waterway, and even limited disruption has sent energy prices climbing this year. Former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev – a close ally of Vladimir Putin – recently described the strait as Iran’s “real nuclear weapon”. It’s a comment that captures how central maritime pressure has become to Tehran’s strategy.

An agreement guaranteeing the strait’s unconditional reopening without harassment, tolls, or threats, would provide immediate economic relief worldwide and give Washington a highly visible diplomatic win.

But Gulf states have expressed concern that such a bargain could end up managing rather than dismantling Iran’s leverage. It would effectively normalise – rather than remove – Iran’s ability to threaten shipping during crises.

For neighbouring countries, stabilisation without broader de‑escalation risks entrenching a dangerous precedent. This makes it all the more important that any Hormuz‑focused deal be tied to wider commitments on restraint and established confidence-building measures.

Lowering the stakes

Process matters as much as substance. Increasingly, mediators such as Pakistan, Oman and China appear to favour “sequenced de‑escalation”. This is where limited reciprocal steps, including mutual adherence to ceasefire agreements, shipping guarantees and relaxation of both sides’ maritime blockades, are locked in before negotiations widen to sanctions relief and regional security.

This approach lowers the political stakes of any single concession and reduces the risk that talks collapse under the weight of unresolved disputes. However, this scenario would make it harder for the US administration to define the agreement as a victory.

Similarly, there is the question of political narrative. The US president has vacillated between threats of overwhelming force and signals of fatigue with the conflict. This suggests he has a strong desire for an exit that can be framed as victory.

A narrowly defined agreement that could be rebranded, front‑loaded with Iranian compliance and heavy on enforcement language may prove more acceptable than a comprehensive treaty – even if its substance closely resembles older Obama-era frameworks.

The problem is the Trump administration’s failure to maintain a consistent narrative of what it wants from Iran. This presents a challenge to the established research on conflict resolution. The US president, in particular, has made understanding the US position difficult. In years to come, this crisis may be a useful case study when it comes to exploring conflict resolution theory. But, right now, it makes a settlement very hard to envisage.

David J. Galbreath has received funding from the UKRI.