If Iran Won’t Deal, Trump Must Make the Cost of Refusal Unbearable

The ceasefire with Iran is expiring. The talks collapsed after 21 hours in Islamabad. Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. Trump himself, speaking aboard Air Force One, put the choice plainly: “Maybe I won’t extend [the ceasefire]. So you have a blockade, and unfortunately, we’ll have to start dropping bombs again.”

That is the right instinct. But dropping bombs alone is not a strategy. It is a continuation of what has not worked. The question before the administration is not whether to apply pressure, but what kind of pressure actually changes Iran’s calculus. The answer requires being honest about what the war has so far failed to accomplish, and clear about what must follow.

Start with what the strikes achieved and what they did not. The United States and Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, wiped out much of its senior military command, and damaged its nuclear facilities. These were historic accomplishments. But US intelligence assessments say Iran’s regime likely will remain in place for now, weakened but more hardline, with the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) exerting greater control. As one analyst put it: “When President Trump says he has changed the regime in Iran, he’s right in one sense: he’s changed it to a much more radicalized regime.” The war shifted who holds power in Tehran, but it did not shift what that power wants.

The IRGC, which now runs Iran more openly than at any point since 1979, looks at the nuclear question through the lens of survival. Analysts say the IRGC will be looking toward the example of North Korea, noting that the country has not been subject to attacks precisely because it possesses a nuclear deterrent. Former Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa banning a nuclear bomb died with him, and for any military whose conventional deterrence has been degraded, the ultimate deterrent is now “a very attractive prospect.”

This is the central strategic reality the Trump administration must accept: Iran’s incentive to acquire a nuclear weapon has increased, not decreased, as a result of the war. Bombing alone will not change that. Only a combination of measures that makes the pursuit of the bomb more costly than abandoning it can.

The first requirement is maintaining the naval blockade unconditionally, regardless of Iranian announcements about Hormuz openings. Iran has been selectively admitting ships from China, Turkey, Pakistan, and India under bilateral arrangements while blocking others, converting the strait into a political instrument rather than surrendering the leverage it provides. A blockade that can be circumvented through side deals is not a blockade. It is theater. CENTCOM must enforce the blockade against all sanctioned traffic without exceptions, including Chinese tankers, and Trump must be prepared to make that enforcement the hill his presidency stands on, economically and diplomatically.

The second requirement is activating European snap-back sanctions immediately. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged European countries on April 18 to quickly reimpose sanctions, warning that Iran is approaching nuclear weapons capability. This call should not have been made publicly as a request. It should have been delivered as a condition. Washington has leverage over European access to American markets and defense cooperation that it has consistently refused to use in Iran policy. That reluctance must end. A European sanctions regime that closes off the money that the blockade does not reach, will give Iran no economic off-ramp that does not run through US terms.

The third requirement is the most uncomfortable to name. The Iranian people have already done the work the administration hoped bombing would do. Surveys conducted inside Iran show that Iranians believe protests, foreign pressure, and intervention are more likely to bring about political change than elections and reforms. The regime is militarily weakened, culturally weakened, and economically weakened, with a plummeting currency. Protests that began in December 2025 over economic conditions grew into nationwide demonstrations in all 31 provinces, with hundreds of thousands participating and calls shifting from economic grievances to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic itself. This is the most significant popular uprising Iran has seen since 1979, and it is happening right now, under the weight of the war and the blockade.

Trump called on the Iranian people to take their government at the outset of the war. He should not abandon that call as a diplomatic inconvenience. Materially supporting the opposition, providing Internet access to circumvent the regime’s blackout, and making unambiguous public commitments to the protesters that American pressure will not cease while the IRGC shoots demonstrators in the street are actions within the administration’s power. They cost nothing militarily and they impose a political cost on the regime that no bomb can replicate.

A deal that leaves Iran with a five-year enrichment window and underground missile cities under reconstruction is not a deal. It is a countdown. Trump knows what the alternative looks like. He should pursue it.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx