‘Sanctions meat grinder,’ fragile supply chains, and nuclear risk—the February Nuclear Digest shows growing strains  

Bellona’s new Nuclear Digest for February is out now and catalogs a number of mounting pressures on Russia’s global nuclear footprint. From stalled projects in Europe to rising strategic risks after the collapse of arms control agreements, the events of last month show a more fragmented and less predictable nuclear landscape. Among other things, our analysis shows three important fault lines: Hungary’s Paks-2 project, Europe’s struggle to replace Russian nuclear components, and the consequences of the expiration of the New START Treaty. 

Hungary’s nuclear build: ‘A sanctions meat grinder’ 

Hungary’s Paks-2 nuclear power plant, built by Russia’s Rosatom, reached a symbolic milestone with the pouring of first concrete. But behind the ceremony, Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov writes that the project is under strain. 

He says the milestone comes years late—and under difficult conditions. What was once planned for 2022 has only now begun, delayed by a combination of regulatory and geopolitical obstacles. More fundamentally, Gorchakov says, the project has become entangled in sanctions pressure. 

“Paks-2 has fallen into a ‘sanctions meat grinder,’” according to Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev, Gorchakov notes, placing it alongside other delayed Rosatom projects facing similar constraints.  

The breakdown of cooperation with Siemens Energy illustrates the problem. Export licensing restrictions from Germany halted delivery of key control systems, forcing Rosatom to seek replacements. While Russian or European alternatives are being discussed, their availability and compatibility remain uncertain. 

Our analysis suggests that Paks-2 is no longer just an infrastructure project. It is a geopolitical balancing act. Hungary’s continued cooperation with Rosatom stands in contrast to broader European efforts to reduce reliance on Russian nuclear technology, leaving the project exposed to political and economic turmoil. 

At the same time, in light of the results of the April 12 elections in Hungary and the departure of Viktor Orbán’s government, the position of the new Hungarian authorities toward this project may change in the near future and become less favorable. 

Kozloduy: ‘much harder than it seems’ to switch parts 

If Paks-2 shows the impact of sanctions on new projects, Bulgaria’s Kozloduy plant reveals how difficult it is to disentangle existing systems from Russian supply chains. 

Attempts to replace Russian-made components with local alternatives led to repeated shutdowns of one reactor unit, after newly installed parts failed. The episode underscores the risks of rapid substitution in highly specialized systems. 

The situation “shows how difficult it can be to find replacements for all supplies from Russia and fully abandon them,” Gorchakov writes.  

The challenge, he argues, is deeper than many policymakers assume. Europe’s dependence extends far beyond nuclear fuel to include niche components with limited or nonexistent alternative suppliers. “Many such parts are harder to replace simply because there is no market for them,” he adds.  

This creates a dilemma for Soviet-built nuclear plants in Europe—continue limited cooperation with Russian suppliers or invest in developing new production capacity. We suggest that a coordinated European approach may be necessary, including joint programs to manufacture replacement components for Soviet-designed reactors. Without such efforts, the transition away from Russian technology risks introducing new operational vulnerabilities, particularly in aging plants undergoing life-extension programs. 

The end of the New START only the latest treaty abandoned 

Beyond civilian nuclear energy, Bellona warns that strategic stability is also eroding. The expiration of the New START Treaty removes one of the last remaining frameworks for nuclear arms control between Russia and the United States. 

In recent years, Gorchakov notes, there has been “a gradual abandonment of long-standing agreements in the field of nuclear arms control,” accompanied by rising nuclear rhetoric and renewed military signaling.  

The Arctic is emerging as a key area of concern. Home to Russia’s Northern Fleet and a large share of its nuclear arsenal, the region is already heavily militarized. Without treaty limits, Gorchakov warns, there are few constraints on further expansion. 

“Only political will can restrain Russia from potentially increasing its nuclear arsenal in the Arctic,” Gorchakov says.  

According to Bellona’s estimates, Russia could relatively quickly increase the number of deployed warheads on existing naval platforms, adding roughly 100 more without major technical hurdles. The loss of transparency and verification mechanisms raises the risk of miscalculation, with implications far beyond the Arctic. In our analysis, this marks a broader weakening of the global nuclear order. 

A System Under Strain 

Taken together, these developments point to a nuclear sector under growing stress. Projects like Paks-2 are slowed by sanctions and political friction. Existing plants like Kozloduy struggle with the legacy of technological dependence. And at the strategic level, the collapse of arms control agreements is increasing uncertainty. 

Bellona’s experts see these trends as interconnected. The same geopolitical tensions reshaping energy supply chains are also undermining long-standing security frameworks. Read about these developments and many more in our new Nuclear Digest.  

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