Gunboats and Cartels: The Return of Force in the Americas

On 17 March 2026, General Francis L. Donovan—the newly installed Commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)—presented his first posture statement to the House Armed Services Committee, with a presentation to the Senate on 19 March. These posture statements, provided by each of the Combatant Commands to Congress annually, provide an opportunity for the military to layout their view of threats and opportunities in their region. While these are always tied to the political objectives of a current administration and thus reflect administrative priorities, they also provide a useful window into understanding how the US military engages with partners and can help shape the definition of threats and opportunities within their area of responsibility.

At a time when the United States has refocused attention on the Western Hemisphere, understanding how SOUTHCOM defines the relationship is all the more important—particularly given the shift towards kinetic action in the region. The 2026 posture statement signals not just a change in priorities, but a doctrinal shift: from development-centered security and influence competition toward a force-first model of hemispheric deterrence grounded in counter-criminal warfare.

A New Commander and the Region’s Perception of SOUTHCOM

Given the recent US history of ignoring the region, US Southern Command has played an increasing role in defining the relationship between the United States and regional actors. This is not necessarily due to the US national interest or to the preferences of regional allies, but due to US priorities focusing on other parts of the globe. This has led to SOUTHCOM commanders often shaping the relationship as much—if not more—than policy makers in Washington. This trend was so strong that analysts in the region noted the increased militarization of US foreign policy toward the region in recent years—even before the increased use of kinetic force in the past year.

Recent SOUTHCOM commanders have expanded the scope of SOUTHCOM’s mission from purely security and military issues to examine an array of topics related to influence and economic factors. Indeed, former Commander General Laura Richardson regularly used the term “economic security is national security” and encouraged lawmakers to increase financing to the Inter-American Development Bank—a regional multilateral development bank—during her congressional hearings as part of a strategy of promoting economic development and combatting security issues in the region. In addition, General Richardson’s visits to the region included not only meetings with military officials, but also with other key governmental actors and at times included Biden’s cabinet officials from other sectors—such as her visit to Central America alongside former Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.

In many ways, Richardson’s successor, Admiral Alvin Holsey, marked a great degree of continuity. Not only had he previously served as Military Deputy Commander for Richardson, but his 2025 posture statement showed a similar view of the threats and opportunities in the region. However, Holsey announced his retirement in October 2025—less than one year into his term. The announcement came following reported clashes between Holsey and the Pentagon related to boat strikes in the Caribbean. Holsey’s surprise retirement opened the door for a shift in SOUTHCOM’s approach to the region and makes Donovan’s speech all the more important.

Shifting Focus toward Physical Threats

One notable factor about the new posture statement is that it is substantially shorter than past posture statements. At just 12 pages—including the cover—the 2026 SOUTHCOM posture statement is significantly shorter than the historical average of 31.7 pages and last year’s 37-page document. This reduction in length does not reflect simplification, but prioritization: an intentional narrowing of strategic focus toward immediate, operationally actionable threats. (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Length of SOUTHCOM Posture Statements. Source: The Authors.

Over the past decade, SOUTHCOM has increasingly viewed the rise of Chinese influence in Latin America as the primary challenge in the Western Hemisphere. While the 2026 posture statement continues to address China’s role in the region, its prominence is notably diminished in favor of a greater focus on the role of cartels and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)—in part due to the Trump administration’s designation of the cartels as FTOs in 2025. This shift from great power competition and the view of China as a pacing challenge in the region toward viewing criminal organizations as a greater threat in the region echoes other voices in the administration and a new approach in handling crime as a threat through the use of force (Figures 2 & 3).

Figures 2 & 3. Number of Mentions of Key Words Overtime. Source: The Authors.

In addition to being less of a focus, the way in which China is treated as an opponent in the region has also changed. While recent posture statements have discussed the wide array of ways in which Chinese activities increase Chinese influence in the region—from their economic influence to information operations—the 2026 posture statement focuses more narrowly on China’s physical presence in the region and potential dual-use resources. This includes highlighting concerns over Chinese engagement in ports as well as cooperation on space related issues. While these concerns appeared in earlier posture statements, they were previously situated within a broader framework of economic, political, and informational influence. Their isolation in the 2026 statement signals a shift toward viewing China less as a systemic competitor and more as a source of discrete, physical security risks.

At the same time, General Donovan’s statement revealed an important shift not only in what SOUTHCOM viewed as a priority, but what tools they would use to address these challenges. While former his predecessors—most notably General Richardson—emphasized the need for a holistic approach to addressing regional challenges, Donovan’s focus looked more at the need to use military force to deter opponents—particularly the cartels. This came at the expense of a greater emphasis on building up partner capacity and recognition of the need to leverage US economic power to support development in the region. While partnership remains a key theme within the 2026 posture statement, this shift from building partner capacity to enlist[ing] priority hemispheric partners to expand burden sharing’ reflects a move away from long-term institutional development toward more immediate operational alignment, where partners are expected to contribute directly to enforcement and interdiction efforts.

The “Shield of the Americas: and the Return of “Drugs and Thugs”

The timing of the release of the new posture statement is also important. Coming just 10 days after the Trump administration hosted the “Shield of the Americas Summit” in Doral, FL—where SOUTHCOM is headquartered—as well as SOUTHCOM’s “Americas Counter Cartel Conference” just days before that, the new posture statement reinforces the central message of these gatherings: that the United States and its partners are increasingly willing to employ lethal force as a routine instrument of counter-narcotics strategy.

The renewed focus on countering drug trafficking and the desire to leverage lethal force against these actors is a marked shift in the US approach both to regional affairs and to the War on Drugs. Although recent years saw a growing emphasis on addressing the structural drivers of crime—particularly in response to the documented failures of mano dura policies—this trend has reversed sharply. The renewed embrace of hardline tactics reflects not only rising insecurity, but also a political recalculation in which immediate reductions in violence are prioritized over longer-term institutional resilience.

The clearest regional example of this comes from El Salvador, where President Nayib Bukele has incarcerated  approximately 1.7 percent of the population in his efforts to combat crime. However, while crime has dropped precipitously in the country, the strategy has drawn sustained criticism for due process violations and systemic human rights abuses, raising broader questions about whether short-term reductions in violence can justify long-term erosion of institutional legitimacy. Despite these criticisms, the model has garnered support from leaders in many countries in the region—with several politicians promising to replicate the model in their countries.

The Trump administration has also viewed this approach favorably and integrated kinetic force increasingly into its approach to regional affairs and counter narcotics efforts. Since August 2025, the US military has struck at least 45 boats in the Caribbean and Pacific that they claim were drug traffickers and recently started joint operations to attack cartels in Ecuador. This shift has now been codified not only in the new posture statement but also in emerging operational patterns, signaling that the use of force is becoming a normalized instrument of US engagement in the region rather than an exceptional measure.

That said, the growing use of force also raises significant legal and strategic questions that cannot be ignored. Maritime interdiction and self-defense authorities do not automatically extend to broad lethal targeting campaigns against suspected traffickers, particularly where evidentiary standards remain opaque, host-nation consent is unclear, or strikes occur outside recognized armed-conflict frameworks. Allegations involving follow-on attacks against survivors or incapacitated vessels would invite even sharper scrutiny under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Even where specific operations prove tactically effective, perceived disregard for legal constraints can erode partner confidence, generate diplomatic friction, and hand criminal organizations a potent propaganda narrative. For that reason, any durable counter-cartel strategy will require not only operational success, but transparent legal authorities, disciplined rules of engagement, and credible accountability mechanisms.

For regional governments, this shift presents a dual-edged dynamic: while it offers enhanced US support and operational capacity, it also risks reinforcing longstanding perceptions of US militarization and intervention in hemispheric affairs—perceptions that have historically complicated diplomatic and political alignment.

Conclusion

While the 2025 Posture Statement marked a degree of continuity between the Biden and Trump administrations, SOUTHCOM’s 2026 Posture Statement radically departs from recent trends in SOUTHCOM’s approach to the region.

The critical question is not whether this approach can produce results—it likely will to some degree, especially in the short term. The question is what those results will ultimately cost. In a region where governance remains uneven and public trust in institutions is fragile, the normalization of military force as the primary policy tool may solve one problem while deepening several others.

To mitigate these risks, US policymakers should ensure that expanded kinetic operations are paired with renewed investment in institutional capacity, judicial integrity, and economic resilience across partner states. Without these parallel efforts, the current approach risks addressing the symptoms of insecurity while leaving its underlying drivers intact.

The post Gunboats and Cartels: The Return of Force in the Americas appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.