Rethinking Responses To Coups In West Africa – Analysis

ECOWAS should use its special summit on regional integration in 2025 to reconsider its approach to managing coups.

By Aïssatou Kanté 

Recurrent coups since 2020 and the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reveal the region’s deep governance and democracy challenges.

ECOWAS’ struggle to address these crises, along with perceptions of double standards in its handling of military coups vs. ‘constitutional’ coups perpetrated by elected governments, has damaged the organisation’s image in West Africa.

Thedecisionby ECOWAS heads of state to hold a Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa in 2025 presents an opportunity to resolve these issues. The summit will be inclusive and consultative and aims to strengthen ECOWAS, making it more efficient and reactive. West African leaders also called for a strategic review, including of ‘the relationships between electoral processes, democracy and development.’

The summit should, however, specifically reflect on how to better respond to coups, manage military transitions, and strengthen democratic governance. This includes the recurrence of coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger and the prolonged nature of their transitions back to civilian rule. The ability of military leaders to resist pressure from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), United Nations and bilateral actors should also be on the agenda.

Security cooperation in West Africa is becoming fragmented at a time when violent extremism is rising

Africa is currently facing a broadcrisisof multilateralism. In this context, ECOWAS’ strategic review should first consider the regional features that led to the recent coups and challenged its ability to effectively respond and support transitions. Three features in West Africa stand out.

The first is that the popular support initially shown to the putschists was less about giving them carte blanche than an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the overthrown regimes.

The second is the lack of effective responses from ECOWAS and the AU to terrorism since 2012, particularly in the Sahel, and to governance crises stemming from constitutional amendments and controversial third terms. This situation limits both organisations’ ability to play a decisive role in current and future crises.

The third is Western partners’ diminishing influence amid heightened geopolitical competition with Russia. Combined with the sovereigntist stance of military regimes, external actors have little room for manoeuvre in the region. Paradoxically, this has caused the fragmentation of political and security cooperation in West Africa at a time when violent extremism is rising in the Sahel and spreading to Gulf of Guinea countries.

It is crucial for ECOWAS to make its Supplementary Act on sanctions clearer and more predictable

New Institute for Security Studiesresearchshows that given the consolidation of current military regimes and the failure of regional and continental coup management approaches, pragmatism is needed to stabilise affected countries. This includes improving specific ECOWAS regulations and institutional practices.

ECOWAS will need to refine its tools and procedures when dealing with coups based on its experiences in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Following the Niger overthrow in July 2023 in particular, the regional body applied an unprecedented array of political, economic and financial sanctions andthreatenedto intervene militarily.

None of these measures worked – instead, they consolidated popular support for the military. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States and the announcement of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s withdrawal hasfragmentedECOWAS and severely limited its deterrent capability.

To build support, it is crucial for ECOWAS to make its Supplementary Act on sanctions clearer and more predictable. Well-defined procedures on the use of force are also needed, along with strategies for carrying out military action while maintaining its strategic and financial autonomy.

More broadly, ECOWAS heads of state should restart efforts to revise the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These were initiated in 2015 after the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré and again in 2021 after the succession of recent coups began. Member states proposed ways to strengthen democracy and governance, including giving ECOWAS additional means to act against the manipulation of constitutions, and establishing a standard on term limits for presidents.

ECOWAS is widely perceived as more concerned with the interests of leaders than the region’s people

The timing of the proposals indicates ECOWAS’ tendency to react rather than prevent crises. The lack of progress suggests that heads of state are more concerned with protecting their power than meeting popular demands for better governance oversight. This largely explains West Africans’ disillusionment with ECOWAS, which is widely perceived as a ‘union of heads of state’ more concerned with the interests of leaders than the region’s people.

The political stakes of ECOWAS reform are high. The commitment of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to the goal of promoting and protecting democratic governance is crucial. But these are the very states whose positions have undermined ECOWAS.

Ahead of its 50th anniversary in 2025, ECOWAS remains a key player in regional integration and security cooperation. Becoming more efficient and reforming its ability to manage coups will improve the organisation’s image in the eyes of West African citizens. Above all, it will help to stabilise a region facing major political and security problems.

• About the author: Aïssatou Kanté, Researcher, Littoral West African States, ISS Regional office for West Africa and the Sahel
• Source: This article was published at ISS Today