Exempting tips from income taxes, they note, could inflate deficits by up to $325 billion more.
Trump, on the other hand, isn’t offering up a ton of new spending but instead more tax cuts—ones above and beyond the foolish tips proposal. This includes, per the GOP platform, extending the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s personal income tax provisions, plus Trump’s latest proposals to lower the corporate tax rate to 15 percent and to eliminate taxes on Social Security retirement benefits (the latter being another idea widely criticized by economists). As readers here surely know, there are some good and bad tax reform ideas buried in those tax cuts, but—as purely a fiscal matter—they’re budget busters without offsetting tax hikes (e.g., eliminating special credits and exemptions) and/or fundamental changes to currently excessive spending (especially entitlements). Trump, of course, isn’t offering any of that.
Several economic policies the candidates have individually championed are also terrible economics. With Trump, we naturally have to start with tariffs—not only because it’s in my policy wheelhouse but also because it’s one of the few things about which he’s been both vocal and consistent for decades. (Spoiler: He really likes ‘em.) He’s also, of course, been consistently wrong about how tariffs actually work, yet he insists on not just sticking to his past proposals but doubling down on them. Most recently, he upped his global tariff plan from 10 percent to as much as 20 percent, while going on an extended rant over the weekend about how only foreigners pay them.
The latter point, of course, is nonsense. As Erica York explained in her excellent tariff primer for Cato’s globalization project, U.S. importers are legally required topay tariffs on any foreign goods that enter the country, and, while foreign exporters can theoretically lower their prices to offset those tariffs (in order to maintain market share), the more common result is that Americans—importers, middlemen, retailers, or end-consumers—end up footing the bill. For the tariffs Trump imposed, my Cato colleagues and I just posted the reams of evidence from a wide range of economists (14 studies in all) showing that this additional expense fell almost entirely on American companies and individuals, and that these costs—along with higher prices for U.S.-made goods, foreign retaliation, and related policy uncertainty—harmed the economy overall, including many American manufacturers.
It’s thus no surprise that studies examining Trump’s latest (and much broader) tariff proposals find extensive, and much bigger, harms for American consumers and the U.S. economy.