Islamic Extremism Rising Worldwide: Leadership, Financing, and a Growing Threat Network

The UN Security Council Monitoring Team’s 37th report (S/2026/44), covering June 23 to December 15, 2025, describes the global threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda as multipolar and increasingly complex, intensifying across multiple theaters simultaneously, with no single country or region constituting the sole epicenter.

Al-Qaeda’s leadership remained cohesive but isolated. Sayf al-Adl served as de facto leader despite growing dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members. The group retained ambitions for large-scale “spectacular” external attacks aimed at global media impact. It also continued to act as a service provider and force multiplier for affiliated groups in Afghanistan, particularly Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

With senior leadership isolated, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), under leader Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, increasingly asserted ideological and operational leadership of the broader network. AQAP’s estimated strength stood between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters. These forces were primarily located in remote areas of Yemen’s Abyan, Shabwah, Ma’rib, and Hadramawt provinces.

Between June and October, the group conducted at least 14 attacks employing weaponized drones, double suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and thermal-sighted sniper rifles. AQAP also explored maritime operations, including uncrewed boats, and took interest in liquid explosives.

The Houthis paid AQAP approximately $65,000 in June in exchange for an attack and participated in joint operational planning in August. Meetings in October aimed at forming a joint unit comprising Houthis, AQAP, and Al-Shabaab were reported. AQAP also profited from Al-Shabaab piracy by receiving a share of revenue from vessels paying to transit safely through high-risk waters and used encrypted platforms, including Telegram, to solicit funds and connect supporters to financial intermediaries.

West Africa and the Sahel represent the most alarming theater. JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin), al-Qaeda’s West African affiliate, continued to expand territory under its control across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger while pressing southward toward coastal states. In October 2025, JNIM carried out its first documented attack in Nigeria, killing a soldier in Kwara State near the Benin border. A new senior leader, Sekou Muslimu, was appointed to expand JNIM’s presence into Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Togo, with a separate emir appointed for Benin.

JNIM’s Katiba Hanifa faction targeted security forces, attacked posts, and intimidated and abducted villagers in Benin’s Alibori, Borgou, and Atacora Departments. In Mali, JNIM launched large-scale coordinated attacks on mining sites, industrial facilities operated by foreign investors, and key logistics routes. Beginning in September, JNIM implemented a fuel blockade on Bamako, mobilizing fighters along highways from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal and systematically destroying hundreds of fuel tankers.

The report assesses that, while JNIM lacked the capacity to overrun Bamako, the blockade was designed to force the Malian government into negotiations. Malian security forces killed several JNIM leaders, including Ridwan al-Ansari, a close associate of top JNIM leader Iyad Ag Ghali, and Abou Salam Oumarou in Soumpi, Timbuktu Region.

JNIM’s finances were described as swollen. The report notes a single ransom payment of approximately $50 million, reportedly for a Gulf royal family member abducted in September, with unconfirmed reports that prisoner releases and arms shipments were part of the deal. From May to October, JNIM nearly doubled its kidnappings of foreign nationals to 22 cases. The group raises revenue through territorial control, gold mining taxation, road tolls, livestock rustling, smuggling, and zakat collection, which the report notes can be raised to extortionate levels when communities resist. JNIM was identified as the wealthiest al-Qaeda affiliate after Al-Shabaab.

Violent incidents involving Islamist groups in the Niger-Benin-Nigeria tri-border area rose 90 percent between 2024 and 2025, and deaths more than doubled to over 1,000. Fighters aligned with al-Qaeda and ISIS deepened their presence in Benin’s Alibori and Borgou Departments, Niger’s Dosso Region, and Nigeria’s Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, and Kwara States.

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) carried out more than 500 attacks between January and October 2025 in Borno State, with drone attacks rising from one in 2024 to seven. ISWAP reinforced its bases in Gargash and Sambisa with approximately 100 additional fighters each following specialized training and elevated Sambisa to the status of a formal ISIS administrative province headed by a wali, signaling a shift toward territorial governance. Active ISWAP cells operated in Kogi, Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina States, as well as Cameroon’s Far North, Niger’s Diffa Region, and Lake Chad’s Lac Province.

Following the death of ISIS deputy leader Abu Khadija in Iraq in March 2025, Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki, head of the al-Furqan office in West Africa, assumed a more prominent role in global ISIS leadership, with some Member States suggesting he may have become head of ISIS’s General Directorate of Provinces.

The resurgence of Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) was documented in Nigeria, with bases in Kwara and Niger States collaborating with JNIM. The Lakurawa group, linked to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, gained a foothold in northwest Nigeria through illegal tax collection and cattle rustling.

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara remained active in Niger’s Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Dosso Regions, with ISGS and JNIM clashing between August and October in Yagha Province, Burkina Faso, and in Tillabéri and Ménaka over territorial dominance, ending a détente established earlier in 2025.

Across all theaters, both ISIS and al-Qaeda expanded their use of commercial satellite communications, enabling cheap, fast, and secure communication in remote areas. Both organizations demonstrated greater proficiency with artificial intelligence in propaganda, using AI-enhanced translation tools for rapid multilingual content deployment.

The Cyber Jihad Movement pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda’s Sayf al-Adl in August, potentially expanding al-Qaeda’s cyber capabilities.

In Canada, nearly one in ten terrorism investigations included at least one person under the age of 18. In Indonesia, 110 minors were recruited through gaming platforms, including Discord and Roblox, in 2025. In Tunisia, ISIS prioritized online recruitment of minors, recruiting over 30 youths during the year.

ISIS propaganda showed a clear shift toward Central Africa, with references to Mozambique and targeting of Christian communities increasing in Al-Naba over the reporting period, while references to Nigeria and Cameroon declined. ISWAP expected delivery of 25 drones from parties in Sudan in September 2025 for reconnaissance and offensive operations. ISIS’s Al-Karrar office in Somalia generated approximately $360,000 a month, facilitating transfers to branches worldwide through mobile money platforms, hawala, and money laundering.

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