Despite the conflict around them, Syrians simply have no choice but to continue rebuilding their own country.

Once again, Syria finds itself caught in the middle of a region-wide conflict in the Middle East. As the United States, Israel, and Iran face a shaky ceasefire and the possibility of returning to war, broader questions of regional stability continue to dominate the airwaves, with little attention paid to Syria’s situation. Yet as the country continues to struggle after nearly 14 years of a brutal civil war that fractured the diverse country along ethnic, sectarian, and political lines, Syria’s decision to avoid partaking in the war—despite rumors to the contrary—makes strong strategic sense that will prove wise.

Even if they wanted to, the new authorities in Damascus lack any meaningful capacity to participate in the regional conflict. The war that witnessed former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapse in December 2024, following a shock opposition assault, did not suddenly resolve the country’s problems. Indeed, in many ways, the “new” Syria’s capacities reflect much of the old’s—hardly surprising given the scale of the challenges facing the country.

First and foremost, the country’s military is largely a shell of what was already an aging, weak, and corrupt institution. The Assad regime’s poor governance and corruption, international sanctions that wreaked havoc on Syria’s economy, decreased international support, and combat against relatively formidable Syrian opposition forces left it reeling by the time of the collapse. Desertion among soldiers and the evasion of compulsory military service among the youth were widespread. What remained was destroyed in Israeli strikes not long after the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction took control of the government alongside opposition groups that rallied to its side.

While not necessarily toothless, the new Syrian Army is not a threat to its neighbors and cannot be for years. Realistically, it hardly retains control over Syria’s sovereign territory, as Israeli incursions and its illegal occupation of parts of the Quneitra Governorate and all of the Golan Heights in the southwest demonstrate. The same goes for fighting against the Islamic State (IS) and other non-state groups, although it managed to defeat the previously US-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January. That process remains ongoing and consumes a substantial share of Damascus’ time and resources.

Importantly, President Ahmed al-Shara has said that his government will seek peaceful relations with all states and will avoid the Iran War. While this failed to stop Israel’s assault on his country, such repeated statements highlight Damascus’ strategic thinking. Indeed, al-Shara aims to foster friendly relations with the region’s states out of a desire to rebuild the country, an objective in which he has little strategic choice in the first place.

That economic component is the second reason why Syria has avoided the regional war. Syria’s economic and humanitarian situation remains dire, with at least 25 percent of the population living under the low-income country international poverty line and 67 percent living below the lower-middle-income poverty line of $3.65 per person per day. Jobs remain scarce at best. The energy infrastructure and manufacturing base will take years to rebuild. Multiple droughts have decimated the country’s agricultural industry. Civilian infrastructure is largely wiped out.

While the central government has worked to dismantle the economic system of the Assad regime—one that mimicked socialism but ultimately proved to be a highly corrupt form of state capitalism—its people are feeling the pain of such reforms. Damascus has cut back on numerous subsidies over the last year, continuing the previous regime’s policies, recognizing that state revenues could not keep up. Thus, a dual crisis continues in which the people suffer under a system that is not prepared to support them, as skepticism about new investments and reconstruction needed to bring Syria out of its precarious position hampers reconstruction and growth.

Ongoing impoverishment only serves to worsen the country’s fracturing along ethnic and religious lines, as communities have looked inward for support and answers long before the end of the war. Massacres in the Alawite-majority northeastern coast governorates and in the south’s Druze-majority Suweyda Governorate, alongside divisions between Kurds and Arabs across the former SDF-held territories in the east and northeast, highlight how the wounds of Syria’s long war remain fresh. Damascus cannot afford to engage in another war, as its people struggle to see themselves as part of a united nation, with each ethnic or sectarian faction seeking to dominate the others.

Thus, while some reports suggest the new Syrian government could participate in the war’s hostilities—most notably in Israel’s ongoing and illegal invasion of Lebanon to defeat and disarm Hezbollah—the reality of the matter is that this state struggles to manage its own affairs, let alone those of the region. President al-Shara understands this reality and will continue rebuilding relations across the Middle East to support Syria’s revitalization. Hopefully, the region recognizes this dynamic as well and understands that “the heart of the Middle East” must heal before the region can do the same.

About the Author: Alexander Langlois

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst, the senior editor at DAWN, and a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets, including The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, the Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, the Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, The Nation, and Inkstick. Follow him on X:@langloisajl.

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