By Hosting U.S.-Iran Talks, Pakistan Eyes an Unlikely Rebrand as Peace Broker
Other than a string of coups, mass protests, and terrorist attacks, it isn’t often that the world’s collective gaze falls upon Islamabad. But Pakistan’s 1960s capital will be thrust into an unfamiliar global spotlight this weekend when it hosts arguably the most consequential diplomatic meeting of recent years.
On Friday, top representatives from Washington and Tehran are set to sit down in Islamabad’s lush, tree-lined environs to negotiate a permanent end to the Iran War, which has cost at least 3,800 lives across ten nations while cascading economic hardships across the planet.
Yet on Thursday, it was still unclear whether that meeting will go ahead, given Iran’s reclosure of the Strait of Hormuz in response to Israel’s escalating bombardment of Lebanon threatens the fragile two-week ceasefire agreed earlier. But were negotiations to materialize, it would be extraordinary both for the stakes—global energy, trade, and food security hang in the balance—as well as historical precedent.
The proposed talks between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Iran’s Parliament Speaker and a former Revolutionary Guards commander, would be the highest-level meeting between these adversaries since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. (Vance is expected to be accompanied by U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump’s influential son-in-law Jared Kushner.)
But it is also remarkable for the pivotal role Pakistan has played in getting these ideological nemeses to the negotiating table—not least as the nation of 250 million is better known as a spoiler rather than broker of peace. After all, despite being ostensibly a U.S. ally and receiving $33 billion in American aid since 2001, Pakistan secretly invested heavily in the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden’s discovery at a fortified compound in Abbottabad—20 minutes’ drive from the Pakistan Military Academy, its equivalent of West Point—raises uncomfortable questions about officials harboring the Al Qaeda chief.
Certainly, Pakistan was especially well-placed to act as a mediator given its unique network across rival blocs. Other than good relations with practically all the Middle East, Islamabad maintains close diplomatic and military ties with the U.S., most recently helping to evacuate American personnel following the chaotic drawdown from Afghanistan in 2021.
Islamabad also has a deep relationship with Saudi Arabia and is cozy with Iran, which was the first country to recognize Pakistan following independence in 1947, with the two neighbors sharing a 560-mile border and deep historical, cultural, and religious ties. It also boasts strong links with Beijing, where Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar traveled on March 31 to discuss brokering a truce in the Gulf. “Pakistan and China were in a position to persuade Iran to behave itself and give the U.S. some way out of the conflict,” says Fawad Chaudhry, a former Pakistani Information Minister.
Of course, Pakistan's mediation makes sense given it is highly exposed to spillover from the war. Its economy remains fragile, with falling incomes and sharply rising inflation, making relief from the extra shock of high energy prices especially urgent. In addition, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact in September that risks drawing Islamabad into a full-blown conflict against its western neighbor.
Given that Pakistan is home to over 20 million Shia Muslims—the second largest cohort in the world after Iran—open warfare with the only nation with more would be schismatic internally. Already, Israeli strikes near Iran’s eastern frontier are fomenting instability in Pakistan’s restive province of Balochistan. “The Iranians put trust in Pakistan because they know it has skin in the game,” says Samina Yasmeen, director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia.
But it’s not just about damage control. A U.S. resolution with Tehran that involves sanctions relief could bring major economic benefits for Pakistan, especially via energy projects like a planned pipeline to Iranian gas fields. And given that some 5 million Pakistani migrant workers currently toil in the Gulf, securing peace both safeguards them as well as some of the vital $38.3 billion sent home in remittances each year. In addition, the government of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif could leverage any success on the international stage to push back at India's attempts to diplomatically isolate and sideline Islamabad, while also soothing internal political tensions, especially regarding jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Khan was close to Trump during the U.S. President’s first term but has now spent over two-and-a-half years in jail on dubious corruption charges. The cricket idol’s supporters hoped that Trump might put pressure on Islamabad to set him free, though the elevation of Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir to key interlocutors for the White House looks like bad news for Khan. “What's happened in U.S.-Pakistan relations over the last year really makes Khan supporters’ hopes about Trump look really silly and naïve,” says Michael Kugelman, resident senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council.
That is not least because Trump has found a new bosom buddy in Munir, who enjoyed a rare one-on-one lunch while hosted at the White House in June, and was described as “my favorite field marshal” by the U.S. commander-in-chief during the Gaza ceasefire summit in October. In addition to strong ties to the mercurial U.S. President, Axios reports that Munir has developed a “rapport” with Vance, while he is also close to China, traveling to Beijing in July and receiving Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Islamabad the following month. “Munir is clearly the key guy,” says Cameron Munter, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from 2010-12.
The big question is whether Pakistan can lock down a vital peace in the Gulf that both secures its interests and boosts its international profile. Headwinds are legion. Nobody seems quite sure which of three ten-point ceasefire agreements currently circulating has been agreed upon. Questions are already being asked of Sharif's impartiality after an X post he sent appeared to have been drafted by an outside agency, most possibly the U.S. At time of writing, Iran has reneged on reopening the Strait of Hormuz owing to Israeli strikes on Lebanon, where at least 254 people were killed on Wednesday, according to Lebanon’s Civil Defence, marking the deadliest day of the entire conflict.
Since Pakistan does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, “there are also limits on its mediation efforts,” says Chietigj Bajpaee, a senior research fellow for South Asia at Chatham House. "So it has a somewhat awkward position in the Middle East."
Indeed, while Pakistan has a history of serving as mediator—helping facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Nixon’s rapprochement between Beijing and Washington—that was decades ago and recent experience is scant. Compounding matters, this lack of expertise is mirrored in both visiting negotiation teams: Trump has fired the vast majority of his Middle Eastern experts, while dozens of Iran’s top officials have been slain in the conflict. Munter expects both sides to come to negotiations with maximal demands, meaning it will fall to the Pakistanis to referee and guide both sides towards an acceptable middle ground.
“It's going to be very public. It's going to be probably very belligerent, and both sides are going to be making very large claims that make coming to a real, workable, long-term deal very hard,” says Munter. “The Iranians may be very satisfied to string this out for a very long time. The longer the world economy suffers, or is at least uncertain about the outcome, the more it plays into their hands. Whereas Trump would likely want an immediate deal.”
—With reporting by Callum Sutherland/London