Writing A New Chapter in the Army’s “Jungle Book”: How the U.S. Can Gain Three Birds via Panama’s Hand and Leave China in the Bush
Abstract
This article argues that reacquiring a permanent military base in Panama gives the U.S. three strategic “birds” in hand: (1) enhanced quick reaction capabilities to any Canal threats; (2) a strategic and monitoring position for strikes in Central and South America against designated terrorist organizations; and (3) a more realistic permanent jungle operations training center for U.S. troops. It proposes an old U.S. Army garrison, Fort Sherman, as the best location to accomplish this objective.
“While the United States is looking to the Far East, China is plowing fertile ground to our south.”
-Admiral Alvin Holsey
Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in deliberate and focused analysis of the United States’ Pacific strategy during WWII and has developed several lines of strategic emphasis. Notably, the PRC has developed a perspective that views the U.S. as being in a logistically comparable situation to the Imperial Japanese in the early phases of WWII. Specifically, PRC open-source discussions tend to indicate that the PRC views the United States’ forward operational capability as a strategic weakness, provided that they can close critical logistical choke points at the outset of an engagement. The PRC is looking for strategic birds in the bush. In this race, the U.S. must first secure the Western Hemisphere before it can focus on the Indo-Pacific. As such, the need for a permanent U.S. military base in the Republic of Panama within the old Canal Zone has never been higher. In Panama’s hand sit three strategic birds, and direct U.S. engagement with Panama could allow us to secure these birds and ensure that the PRC is forced to remain in the bush. Good things come in threes. This article highlights the three “birds” gained by an increased U.S.-Panamanian strategic permanent emphasis. These three birds in the hand are: (1) enhanced quick reaction capabilities to any threats to the Canal considering the recent Panama Supreme Court ruling against Peoples Republic of China (PRC)-controlled CK Hutchison’s subsidiary Panama Ports Company (PPC); (2) a strategic monitoring and launching position for strikes against drug cartels operating in Central and South America, which have been designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Government; and (3) a more realistic permanent jungle operations training center where U.S. troops are trained in conditions mirroring those to the most likely theater of operation. This article proposes Fort Sherman, the original location of the U.S. Jungle Operations Training Center, as the prime choice for a permanent U.S. encampment, from which it secures a trifecta of strategic benefits.
Image: A map of the Canal Zone, maintained by NARA, showing Fort Sherman in the upper left quadrant
Panama’s Perceived Negative Position Towards Permanent U.S. Bases
Before we can analyze why the U.S. needs permanent bases within Panama, we must first argue how it is lawful to establish them. Many in Panama argue that the U.S. cannot pursue a permanent base on its sovereign land citing two reasons: Article 310 of the Panamanian Constitution (a 1994 amendment) and the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty of 1977 prohibit it.
I. The Article 310 Argument
The two reasons that many in Panama argue U.S. bases violate Article 310 of the Panamanian Constitution are: (1) the article dictates Panama cannot have an army, so it cannot legally host a foreign standing army and (2) the article dictates that the Panamanian President controls all security forces, but U.S. military permanently stationed in Panama would not be under his control. Opponents of a U.S. presence point to Article 310 of their Constitution, which forbids a Panamanian army, arguing it reflects a broader spirit of demilitarization. One such opponent is a Panamanian lawyer, Mr. Juan Ramon Sevillano, arguing that permanent U.S. military bases violate the Panamanian Constitution and the Neutrality Treaty. “Nevertheless, this interpretation relies on emotion, ignoring the plain language of the law. The “Plain Meaning Rule and Absurdity Doctrine” is a rule of statutory interpretation that states, “[f]ollow the plain meaning of the statutory text, except when a textual plain meaning requires an absurd result or suggests a scrivener’s error.” Article 310 solely states that Panama cannot have a standing army; it does not make any mention of foreign military presence. The second position about the Panamanian President needs to control all security forces is a long leap of legal interpretation. Considering that the first clause within the Article solely applies to a Panamanian Army being prohibited, this final clause is controlled by the language of the first. In conclusion, the Article 310 Argument is a logical fallacy.
II. The Neutrality Treaty Argument
More often cited is Article V of the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty of 1977. This article states that “[a]fter the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, only the Republic of Panama shall operate the Canal and maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations within its national territory.” Nevertheless, included in this treaty is the “DeConcini Reservation” that authorizes the U.S. to intervene in Panama to secure the Canal. It specifically states, “. . .if the Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently have the right to take such steps as each deems necessary, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, including the use of military force in the Republic of Panama, to reopen the Canal, as the case may be.” A stronger argument though lies in Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty as Professor Eugene Kontorovich, a professor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, points out in his testimony before Congress. He testified that “Article IV [of the Neutrality Treaty] provides that each party is separately authorized to ‘maintain’ the regime of neutrality. The Carter-Herrera Declaration, which is part of the full treaty, makes clear that both countries have ‘the responsibility’ to ‘defend the canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality.”
Thus, the U.S. has the right to take such steps it deems necessary to secure the Canal and ensure its operations aren’t interfered with. In fact, considering the PRC’s entrenchment at the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal via CK Hutchison’s PPC, it is not only permissible but essential for upholding the very neutrality and security the treaty was designed to protect.
However, this presumes that the Neutrality Treaty is a valid, binding piece of law. This is the focus of my previous article, “Balloons and Drones: The Least of Our Worries Regarding China.” The interesting question surrounding the “DeConcini Reservation” is whether it was negated by counter-reservations made by Panama’s dictator, Omar Torrijos, in Panama’s instrument of ratification at the behest of President Carter. President Carter never sent the Panamanian instrument back to the Senate for its advice and consent. Thus, this is merely one argument supporting that the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty of 1977 is null and void. In fact, House Joint Resolution 77 was introduced in Congress in 1999 stating this exact argument! Thus, the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty still controls as the Supreme Law of the Land. This would mean that the Canal and the old Canal Zone are still U.S. territory.
III. Joint Operations Utilizing Rotating U.S. Forces Is Insufficient
On April 9, 2025, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by Panama and the U.S. It “allows the U.S. to use Panamanian-controlled facilities such as Rodman Naval Station, Howard Air Force Base, and the Cristóbal Colón Naval Air Base for training, humanitarian missions, and joint exercises.” The article cited above explains that pursuant to the MOU “[t]he parties agree that under Article 310 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama, and in accordance with Panamanian laws, all security installations located within Panamanian territory—including those identified in Annex A—remain Panamanian facilities. The installations and designated areas are made available for joint use, and Panama retains the authority to authorize access to and use of such locations by U.S. personnel and contractors, including the discretion to allow access when deemed necessary. The parties also recognize that the designated areas may require upgrades, including construction or refurbishment, to accommodate planned activities.” This is insufficient as the lack of autonomy regarding the U.S.’s military decision making process creates an inherent danger for securing the Canal, responding to real-world events within the Western Hemisphere, and the safety of U.S. military personnel rotating through Panama.
In conclusion, Panama’s argument that it is not legally permissible via its Constitution or the Panama Canal Treaties for the U.S. to establish permanent bases does not hold merit. However, it is important to note that winning on the metrics of legal analysis is not enough; Panamanian understanding of the benefits of a U.S. permanent basis in the context of increased PRC focus on Panama is an essential element of developing a shared strategic approach for U.S.-Panamanian perspectives. Additionally, rotating U.S. forces to Panama for joint operations is insufficient for the reasons outlined below as the “three birds.”
The First Bird: A Permanent Base Fosters Enhanced Canal Protection
“If they persist in their own way and remain obstinate, they will inevitably pay a heavy price in terms of politics and economics!” Those are the words uttered by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council after the recent decision by the Panamanian Supreme Court holding that Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s license to operate ports at either end of the Panama Canal is unconstitutional. This rhetoric should be very concerning to any follower of international events.
Especially when taking into consideration what former SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Laura Richardson said, “And what I worry about Chinese State-owned enterprises that have capability and infrastructure there is that they can be used for dual use, which means civilian but also military.” GEN Richardson testified before the Senate that “just like the Panama Canal, when you enter and exit and on either side you have Chinese state-owned enterprises.” Even more recently, the Government of Panama decided to oust CK Hutchison’s PPC employees from port operation and giving control to Maersk and MSC. The Canal situation is coming to a boiling point. Even though control of the ports is now out of Chinese hands, there remain Chinese citizens employed by Chinese State-owned enterprises in Panama. These employees can function in a military capacity and are strategically located at both ends of the Canal.
Then one must look to the fact that six ship-to-shore port cranes made by PRC-owned Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited were acquired for the Port of Balboa and seven for the Port of Cristobal (the ports at each mouth of the Canal). What’s the concern? In September 2024, the “House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party released a joint report which showed” that these cranes “create significant cybersecurity and national security vulnerabilities for both the United States and its allies.” These cranes have “remote access” features. In a world where cybersecurity breaches are all too common, remote access espionage and sabotage scenarios are all too plausible.
Additionally, on March 13, 2026, the “state-owned enterprise Cosco, which owns one of the world’s largest tanker fleets, said it would suspend operations at the Balboa port after a court annulled a contract that had allowed a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings to operate two terminals in the canal since 1997.” The PRC is playing political hardball with Panama’s finances and Panama is teetering on falling back in with our near-peer adversary.
For these reasons, former SOUTHCOM Commander ADM Holsey was rightly concerned when he told Congress in SOUTHCOM’s 2025 Posture Statement that “. . . Chinese access, presence, and influence across the region and at strategic choke points such as the Panama Canal imperil the United States’s ability to rapidly respond in the Indo-Pacific should a crisis unfold.” The PRC may view Panama as a way to tighten U.S. strategic logistical power and, in that, force the U.S. forward personnel into increased isolation in the event of a major conflict. In that, the PRC can view Panama as a forward operational hub, concurrent with its value as a U.S. chokepoint. Viewing Panama through this lens lets the PRC choke U.S. forward-deployed forces analogously to how the U.S. choked the logistical support for Imperial Japanese forces.
The Second Bird: A Permanent Base Fosters Enhanced Counter-Terrorism Operations (CTO)
Considering the U.S. Government labeled drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, permanent bases in Panama both secures a strategic monitoring position and stage a launching point for QRF against cartel activity in Central and South America. The cartels are not just in the business of smuggling drugs; they have diversified into human and weapon trafficking, finding them to be very profitable businesses as well.
I. Enhanced CTO Against Clan del Golfo (CDG)
“The migrant route is a multi-million-dollar business and an increasingly lucrative sideline for the notorious Gulf Clan.” These words come from a Reuters News article discussing Panama’s Darien Gap and the Clan del Golfo (CDG), a cartel involved in drug smuggling and human trafficking. Both the DEA and Treasury Department identify the CDG as the “gatekeeper” of the Darien Gap. CDG is a Colombian-based cartel that primarily focuses on cocaine smuggling and human and weapon trafficking as revenue generators. Additionally, “[t]he city of Colón is a major launching point for shipments to Europe.” Colon is Panama’s main Caribbean (Atlantic side) port and the mouth of the Canal. A permanent base in Panama gives the U.S. the ability to monitor these routes via the Darien Gap and interdict CDG illicit activity.
II. Enhanced CTO Against Tren De Aragua
Tren de Aragua began in Venezuela and branched out to other nations such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. It was specifically named in the White House’s January 20, 2025, Presidential Action as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In fact, there have been a number of drone strikes in recent months against Tren de Aragua drug smuggling boats. A SOUTHCOM news release confirms “Operation Southern Spear is providing deterrence against narco-terrorism threats in the Americas. Since the operation began, there has been a 30% reduction of drug vessel movements in the Caribbean and a 25% reduction in the Eastern Pacific.” Additionally, this cartel killed a Venezuelan army officer who conspired against recently deposed Nicolas Maduro. The Venezuelan government is now in a period of transition from his dictatorship, and with transition comes instability. It is very plausible that this organization will try to fill the power vacuum left by the toppling of the Maduro regime. Again, permanent bases in Panama give the U.S. the ability to launch drones for strike missions against Tren de Agua and other cartels and adds an invaluable quick response point to any insurrection put into play by Tren de Agua and any other cartels against the new Venezuelan government. Notably, cartel trafficking inherently supports PRC interests as a means and mode to affect U.S. will in the event of future conflict. In addition, it is a constant political distraction in U.S. domestic policy considerations.
The Third Bird: A Permanent Base Fosters Enhanced Jungle Operations Capability
It is likely that if hostilities erupt between the United States and the PRC, it will be in the tropical, jungle climates of Indochina. In his book Asia’s Cauldron, Robert Kaplan predicts that engagements in the South China Sea with the PRC will be sea battles for control of smaller islands and sea routes. Nevertheless, control of the sea routes ultimately rests on the ability to control the land masses around said route. These smaller islands are tropical with jungle forests. Smaller units specifically trained in jungle warfare will almost inevitably be utilized to secure them.
At this moment, the official jungle operations training center is located at the Lightning Academy at U.S. Army Garrison Hawaii. This poses a problem for our troops;Hawaii’s ecology and geography are not comparable to the jungles of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Panama is a land bridge between two continental shelfs and has some of the most diverse flora and fauna on the planet. Much like the jungles of Southeast Asia, Panama’s jungle has fauna such as jaguars, crocodilian species, venomous snakes, poisonous amphibians, and large primates. Additionally, Panama has dangerous flora very similar to that of Southeast Asia. Both jungles rest on a continental shelf, causing grueling, uneven terrain that is difficult to traverse.
Sherm’s The Word
Image: Fort Sherman as of March 26, 2025
Fort Sherman was “lovingly” referred to as a “Green Hell” by all of the Soldiers and military personnel who trained at its JOTC. Panama now calls it Base Aeronaval Cristobal Colon, and it is currently where the Combined JOTC is being held. The fort was located at the mouth of the “Atlantic side” of the Canal on the north shore from Cristobal and Colon. However, since its closure in 1999, this land has fallen into disarray. Buildings are decrepit, and Panama has essentially limited development to a marina in the old lagoon. There is a small airfield that could very easily be expanded by clearing some of the surrounding jungle. An expanded airfield would facilitate larger transport and cargo planes, as well as fighter jets facilitating quick reaction to real-world events in the Western Hemisphere. It is located across the Canal from Colon, where much of the drugs smuggled to Europe are launched. As such, joint interdiction operations with DEA and Panamanian law enforcement could quickly stage and launch from the site. In conclusion, pursuing Fort Sherman as a permanent base for stationing U.S. forces is “three birds” in hand and keeps the PRC in the bush.
The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not represent nor constitute endorsement by the Department of War, Department of the Army, or the U.S. government.
The post Writing A New Chapter in the Army’s “Jungle Book”: How the U.S. Can Gain Three Birds via Panama’s Hand and Leave China in the Bush appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.