Understanding the Iran Ceasefire

No shortage of surprises around here. President Donald Trump, less than half a day after announcing his intention to destroy “a whole civilization” if the Iranians didn’t reopen the Hormuz, declared via Truth Social that the Pakistanis had brokered a two-week ceasefire on the premise that the Iranian 10-point framework is a “workable basis” for a peace deal. 

This is a bit of a headscratcher to everyone who has actually seen the Iranian framework, which, among other things, asserts the Islamic Republic’s right to uranium enrichment, institutionalizes an Iranian-Omani toll system in the Hormuz, and demands immediate sanctions relief. The rollout of the ceasefire was itself extremely strange: a choreographed-looking request on Twitter from the Pakistani prime minister and a quick acceptance from Trump on the strength of negotiations that nobody has actually been sure are actually happening. But, assuming all goes well, the war is on pause today, and that is in itself a good thing.

The Iranian media are spiking the football about how this is an American “retreat” and so on and so on (and on and on: The prose style of Persian TV is pretty longwinded). And, if Trump is actually sincere about the use of the 10-point framework, they may be forgiven for seeing things that way; if the final deal is within sniffing distance of the framework, it concedes several American redlines of yesteryear and throws in some extras that weren’t even on the table before the war started, like Iranian suzerainty in the strait. 

Here is the analytical sticking point, and there are three ways of interpreting it, each unsatisfactory in its way. First option: Trump doesn’t know what is in the Iranian framework and negotiations will bog down as soon as the team in Islamabad gets around to reading the one-pager. There is some recent history of the American team not really seeming to grok negotiation premises, but the 10-point framework is not highly technical or ambiguous. Second option: The negotiations are in bad faith on the American side. The last two rounds of diplomacy with the Iranians have been nothing more than a way to buy time to move military assets into range for a surprise attack. On the other hand, it isn’t immediately clear this time what concrete measures we would take with the time so bought. Third option: The cost of the war was, by Trump’s lights, becoming untenable relative to its benefits, and cutting a deal that concedes much to the Iranians is better than chasing losses. This is a tacit admission that the war was a strategic loss, even as it was a military victory; the question is whether the administration can use the latter to spin away the former in selling this to the public.

Of course, the ceasefire does not exist in a vacuum. Israel is engaged in a ground war in Lebanon, the cessation of which is one of the Iranians’ 10 points; so far from pulling back, they have decided to dub it “Operation Eternal Darkness” and to start pulverizing Beirut under that auspicious moniker. (The Iranian government is already threatening to withdraw from the ceasefire over this.) Various reports have suggested that the Netanyahu government is uninterested in a ceasefire, and it is difficult to believe that they will just go along with it this time. The U.S. has real difficulty telling the Israelis to go play by themselves, so, even if negotiations are serious and in good faith, the context for a peace deal is not encouraging. At the same time, it seems simply true that the costs of continuing are disproportionate to any notional gains, and reality has a way of making itself heard. 

This war has been very stupid. So far from prompting regime change (which, let us recall, was in fact literally one of the selling points for this war in the president’s own words, which is why he has to keep insisting that “regime change” has already happened), the clerisy and IRGC remain intact and in control; Iran now exerts de facto (and perhaps soon de jure) control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the arteries of the world economy, which it was not doing on February 27; Iran continues to have the ability to launch missiles and drones at its neighbors and American assets. Our bases and radar systems across the Middle East have been immolated, our munitions have been depleted, and we have cannibalized our force posture in East Asia. So when the usual suspects start tooting about how this war was a great triumph, fine, let them, if that’s what it takes to get them to sign on to the peace; but you are under no obligation to believe a lie. Nor are you under any obligation to take them seriously in the future. Don’t get fooled again.

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