The Iranian Opposition’s Urgent Task
The Iranian opposition has never lacked for a common enemy. The Islamic Republic has furnished no end of shared grievances, frustrated hopes, and collective traumas. And yet, its adversaries have long sorted themselves into mutually hostile subgroups. Now the deepest rupture is between those who support former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a transitional figure and those who oppose him.
Perversely, this division might prove to be the one that heals.
Last Saturday, in Grapevine, Texas, Pahlavi spoke to throngs of his supporters at the Conservative Political Action Conference. Iranians made up a large proportion of CPAC attendees this year, and they greeted Pahlavi with passionate cheers.
In his speech, Pahlavi pledged to lead a transition to a “free and democratic Iran.” He called on President Trump to continue the American-Israeli military operation against Iran, in the hope of displacing a regime he decried for placing a “sea of blood” between itself and its people. “President Trump is making America great again,” he concluded. “I intend to make Iran great again.”
[Arash Azizi: The ‘existential anxiety’ of the Islamic Republic]
Pahlavi’s star turn in Texas showcased both the appeal and the limitations of his project.
He rallied an impressive number of supporters, who shouted his name at CPAC just as their counterparts did in street demonstrations in Iran. But his unbridled support for the war and his chumminess with the American right have made him a polarizing figure among Iranians. Worse, the American president he praised and beseeched has shown little trust in Pahlavi and seems much more interested in dealing with the current leadership in Tehran.
The day of Pahlavi’s CPAC speech, I was in London, where about 400 Iranians who opposed the regime but were skeptical of Pahlavi had gathered for the launch of something called the Iran Freedom Congress. The groups represented in London had spent years in bitter arguments with one another. The task of the congress was to explore the possibility of building a shared political vehicle.
In the two decades I have spent observing and participating in Iranian opposition politics, I had never seen a meeting so broadly representative as the one in London. Perhaps that was in part because the event’s main organizer was not himself a member of any one diaspora activist group; rather, he was a tech entrepreneur and former World Bank analyst named Majid Zamani, who had spent more than five months in prison for supporting street protests in 2009.
Zamani’s organizing team included such diverse partners as Shariar Ahy, a monarchist and disgruntled former adviser to Pahlavi; Reza Alijani, a religious-nationalist writer; the filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf; Esmayil Abdi, a former teacher and a trade unionist; Mahdie Golrou, a former student activist and a secular feminist; and the leaders of some of the political parties of Iran’s ethnic minorities.
Some of those who came to London were seasoned exiles, but others, including Zamani himself, were more recent arrivals from Iran and had robust links to political figures inside the country. Among the participants were socialists, ex-royalists, liberals, feminists, and nationalists. (I’d been invited as an academic and paid my own way, though the organizers had offered a full ride to all). Many of us had faced one another in online or televised debates in the past. In London, we listened to one another’s speeches and sipped coffee together during breaks. The notion that we might one day be part of the same coalition did not seem so far-fetched.
The London conference was not the first of its kind. More than 700 Iranians came together in Berlin in 2004 to found the United Republicans of Iran. That organization still exists (and its leaders attended the London meeting), but many of the original participants dropped out of it because of differences over tactics and strategy, and the group that remains is small and ineffectual.
The conditions of this moment, however, confront the non-royalist Iranian opposition with a new urgency. Iran is at war, and its regime, after massacring protesters in January, has now hardened in combat. And then there is Pahlavi. The former crown prince has shown little interest in working with others unless they first accept his mantle. Last year, his group organized a meeting in Munich where speakers professed their loyalty to the would-be king; one even prostrated himself before Pahlavi in the style of the Muslim prayer, declaring that he had “no religion” but that Pahlavi was his “Mecca.” Many in the former crown prince’s camp take a sharply antagonistic stance toward the rest of the opposition.
As a result, people in rival groups seem now to understand that they need to come together if they are to offer an alternative. (Zamani’s organizers invited Pahlavi to the London gathering, but there was never a real chance that he would show up.) London was a step in that direction.
[From the May 2026 issue: Someday in Tehran]
Bringing the non-monarchist opposition together was a feat. But uniting it around a common program will be harder. The congress avoided pushing resolutions or holding debates on the most contentious political questions. Chief among these was the war, which many of those present, particularly those on the left, strongly opposed; others, including some from the Kurdish parties, argued that ending the war under current conditions might help prolong the regime. The attendees also differed over the future of the congress itself—whether it should simply provide a forum for discussion among activists or become a membership organization and a united political front.
The Iranian regime is deeply unpopular with its populace. Four waves of protest since 2017 have explicitly demanded its overthrow. But the opposition has lacked an organization and representative leaders. If it wants to have any chance of dislodging the regime, it must build a disciplined force that can overcome its differences to unite around a common agenda. It must also forge links with the opposition inside Iran and perhaps even with elements within the regime who could help ease an eventual transition.
The London meeting made me hopeful that such a trajectory just might be possible. But obstacles remain. As if to remind us of this, as the meeting wrapped up, Pahlavi supporters surrounded the building to protest the congress. Fearful of a violent confrontation, the London police escorted us out a back door.