Why Benjamin Netanyahu needs the Iran conflict to continue

Before Donald Trump delivered his prime-time address to the American people on April 1, many commentators predicted he would claim victory and signal that the US air campaign against Iran would be wound down – even without a deal with Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz. As it turned out, Trump said he would double down on the violence, promising to hit Iran “extremely hard” in coming weeks.

The White House simultaneously released a document headlined: President Trump’s Clear and Unchanging Objectives Drive Decisive Success Against Iranian Regime. “From day one,” it stated, “the objectives have been clear: obliterate Iran’s missiles and production, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure it never acquires a nuclear weapon.” These objectives, Trump said, were nearly complete and he expected to finish the job “very fast”.

For the US president, the key marker of the success or otherwise of this foreign policy gambit will come in November’s midterm elections. So his strategic decisions are likely to be heavily influenced by the need to be able to claim victory, while also limiting any negative outcomes from the energy price shock engulfing the world. To do this, he must declare victory fairly soon.

But Trump’s partner in the war, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has a markedly different set of strategic priorities (although electoral politics will also play a big part in his thinking).

Launching Israel’s air campaign on February 28, Netanyahu said the goal was to “put an end to the threat from the Ayatollah regime in Iran”. He framed this as having been an existential threat to Israel for all of the 47 years that the Islamic Republic had been in existence, insisting that regime change was “not the objective, but … could certainly be the result”.

In the five weeks of the conflict, Israel’s strategic goals have both widened and lengthened. In Iran, while clearly working in partnership with the US, it wants to reserve the right, unilaterally, to “go back and hit Iran every time the nuclear and missile programmes are being rebuilt”.

Meanwhile, Israel has responded to attacks from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon by occupying the southern part of the country up to the Litani river. This area was designated by UN security council resolution 1701 in 2006 as a buffer zone in which only the Lebanese national army and UN peacekeepers were authorised to operate.

The Israeli defence minister, Israel Katz, has warned that Lebanese citizens who had fled would not be allowed to return “until the safety and security of northern Israeli residents is ensured”.

It appears that Israel plans a long-term occupation of the region. It already maintains a buffer zone in southern Syria, which it occupied after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. This, it says, is also to deter Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.

Netanyahu’s war aims

The focus of Netanyahu’s security policy has consistently been directed at Iran and its proxies. My research with Amnon Aran has demonstrated that in perpetuating an “Iran-as-evil” framing, the Israeli prime minister effectively precluded any possibility of engaging with the regime diplomatically.

Netanyahu’s political worldview has been enormously influenced by the founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Under Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall doctrine”, reinforcing the might of Israel is the only responsible response to the threat posed by Iran and its proxies. It is a strategy of strength first, diplomacy second.

In the past, Netanyahu has talked of defeating Israel’s enemies as his “supreme objective”. But more recently, analysts are describing what they refer to as the “Netanyahu doctrine”. According to this security stance, Israel must be prepared to launch “pre-emptive” attacks against any perceived threats, maintaining a permanent readiness for war.

So regime change of the Islamic Republic is not a direct goal – even if, as noted, the Israeli prime minister believes it might result from the pressure he is putting on Tehran. He is aiming to “create conditions that will enable the brave Iranian people to cast off the yoke of this murderous regime”.

But there is another important dimension to this “permanent conflict”. Netanyahu must call a national election before October. Polls suggest Israeli public support for the war in Iran could give him a boost in time for the election. Unlike the war on Gaza, which polls showed a majority of Israeli citizens wanted to end, there has been overwhelming support in Israel for the war on Iran.

Even ministers in Netanyahu’s government recognise that domestic politics has formed a big part of his motivation for launching this conflict now, saying that – as far as Netanyahu is concerned – “the road to the polling stations runs through Washington and Tehran”.

So far, however, there is little evidence that support for the war is translating into electoral support for Netanyahu. A lot depends on how the conflict plays out. A long war with heavy casualties and significant damage to civilian areas in Israel has the potential to damage Netanyahu’s election chances.

A poll taken on March 19 found that while the prime minister’s Likud party would receive the most votes, he would find it difficult to form a ruling coalition. And if he loses power, there is the prospect of his corruption trials proceeding.

So, a lot hangs on the outcome of this conflict. An early and decisive victory might have given Netanyahu the confidence to call a snap election. But this now looks unlikely. And if Trump decides to bring an end to hostilities without achieving the far-reaching change Netanyahu has promised, things could go badly for Israel’s longest-serving leader.

Leonie Fleischmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.