French nuclear plans are not a panacea for European deterrence
On March 2, French President Emmanuel set out to redefine French nuclear doctrine for the ‘Third Nuclear Age’. Nuclear deterrence has been high on the European agenda for several months, including at the recent Munich Security Conference, where many spoke of how a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ might come to replace the U.S. nuclear forces on the continent.
Macron’s speech links into this debate, and some of his announcements may have merit. Allied participation in French nuclear exercises and the creation of a nuclear steering group are all well and good, so long as they do not attempt to interfere with NATO’s existing nuclear planning and force posture. In this respect, it is promising to see the Élysée engaging more substantively in European deterrence.
However, Macron’s announcements do not amount, as some have claimed, to a ‘new French nuclear doctrine.’ The purpose of these changes is to try and support a more ‘European’ nuclear deterrent without significant new investment or major alterations to France’s posture. France remains, and intends to remain, outside of NATO nuclear planning structures. Putting the rhetoric to one side, deterrent ‘guarantees’ are worthless if they are not integrated into NATO’s planning process. As such, whilst the force de frappe maintains credibility to deter attacks against France, it is not credible to support NATO because it is not within the primary nuclear security structure of the Alliance.
Equally, France has a longstanding and well-known attitude toward nuclear sovereignty and self-sufficiency. Previous iterations of nuclear cooperation, such as in the 1980s with Germany, have fallen foul of this attitude. The lingering effects of this philosophy have been evident in recent months, too, during the breakdown in relations with Berlin over the FCAS fighter jet program. Neither does French domestic politics give much cause for comfort on long-term strategic decision-making.
As such, while Macron’s speech made a good start on these issues, it does not fundamentally alter the hard facts of European deterrence. This raises questions about how the United Kingdom – Europe’s only other nuclear power – might go about strengthening European deterrence?
London already plays an important role within the Alliance, as its nuclear arsenal is explicitly assigned to NATO. As the UK looks to strengthen European security, it may choose to cooperate more closely with France, if France is genuinely willing to assist it. However, French co-operation is not a prerequisite. There is much more that the UK really ought to be doing by itself anyway, regardless of what Paris does in the months and years ahead.
For example, the UK could push to develop of a nuclear-tipped or dual-capable standoff missile for those NATO nations already sharing the Alliance nuclear mission. This would greatly enhance European deterrence. Exploring the options for an Anglo-French, Anglo-German, or Anglo-American system of this kind, for use on allied dual-capable fighter jets, would be a valuable contribution to sustain deterrence into and beyond the next decade. The fact that some nations may be willing to help finance this should assuage concerns in London over costs or delivery timelines. With enough capital, issues could be overcome.
And London can easily play a role on its own. In 1962, just months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the UK partnered with the US to develop its submarine-based nuclear deterrent, to the significant advantage of both nations. The agreement delivered an invulnerable second-strike capability at a fraction of the cost of a national UK solution, which the UK still operates on a follow-on class of boats today (and is building a new generation to serve in the next several decades). For critics who suggest that this move made the UK dependent on the US, or ‘less sovereign’ than the French, it is worth noting that, according to declassified U.S. files, the French, who have long claimed their arsenal is fully independent of outside support, received extensive secret assistance from the US starting in the early 1970s. The Élysée has never publicly admitted this assistance.
The UK retains a first-class nuclear capability in Trident, but it must radically reassess whether that system alone is sufficient to deter small scale regional nuclear strikes which Russia has prepared. Beyond cooperation with the French and other European allies, this necessarily involves considering how to work more effectively with the United States.
This is perhaps a difficult point to make in the current political environment. London and Washington have disagreed quite publicly on several major international issues over the last twelve months. However, neither have their foreign policies always neatly aligned: Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, and Grenada are but a few examples where one was, at best, ambivalent about the actions of the other. Despite this, the transatlantic alliance has long been the closest and most important military partnership in the world and has also endured severe strains in past decades. It is unserious to think this will not continue to structure British foreign policy for the long-term, both through the nuclear sphere and through technological alliances such as AUKUS.
As such, beyond cooperating with the French, the UK should explore developing and deploying an Anglo-American or Anglo-German air or sea-based regional nuclear-delivery system to strengthen and support the NATO alliance. These systems could be shared under agreements similar to existing NATO arrangements, but without the difficulties incurred by French reluctance to join NATO planning groups, or to formally assign its arsenal to the alliance. Developing and deploying a limited number of sovereign UK nuclear warheads to mount on such a system would strengthen a Prime Minister’s ability to deter the various small scale regional nuclear threats Putin is known to have fielded.
France’s nuclear proposals are all well and good, much needed, and long overdue. But, when it comes to deepening European deterrence, perhaps the most obvious question is how we strengthen the transatlantic partnership on which it has, in practice, long rested. Amidst renewed great power conflict and active wars in Europe and the Middle East, Britain can play a much more active role in shaping allied nuclear security. Paris’ proposals are not a panacea for European deterrence, and London should not let them be seen as one.
Franklin C. Miller served for three decades as a senior nuclear policy official in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council Staff. He is a principal at the Scowcroft Group.
Daniel Skeffington is a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Statecraft and National Security in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, and a Senior Fellow at Policy Exchange in London.