The Trap Of Stagnation – OpEd
Introduction
In spite of the massive systemic corruption on flood control projects in the Philippines in 2024, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (aka BBM) remains in power. He has relatively dodged any responsibility over the wanton corruption in government. It appears that corruption alone, is not enough for people en masse to stage a “people power” comparable to what the country witnessed in 1986 that toppled down the Marcos Sr. While several attempts were made by a number of disparate groups opposed to corruption and those that advance good governance from mid-November 2025 and the latest on 25 February 2026, none had succeeded.
This is unlike what anti-corruption demonstrations that took place in South Asia (Bangladesh in 2024, Nepal in 2025, and Sri Lanka in 2022), Indonesia in 2024, and Mongolia in 2025. The outpouring of massive non-violent protests in the streets caused by profound frustration with systemic corruption, dynastic politics, and a lack of economic opportunity led to a wide range of political outcomes and remarkable victories, from the dramatic toppling of governments with abusive leaders, election of a reformist government, to protests that secured key concessions.
In the Philippines, the changing the political landscape and dynamics, political culture, and deep-seated socio-economic structural malaise that transpired in the last 40 years have contributed to the resiliency of the system that maintained the structure of bad governance. What follows are some of the key factors that hindered not only the outbreak of popular mobilization of the multitude in marching to the streets to demand transparency and accountability over the immense corruption in government but also the inability of the country to advance any fundamental structural change.
Renewed patronage system and the elite class
When Corazon Aquino was installed as President of the Philippines because of the 1986 February EDSA (Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue) “People Power Revolution,” she promised to restore the democratic institutions and bring back the democratic rights of the people which were taken away during Marcos’s martial law years. To legitimize Aquino’s presidency, the 1987 Constitution was enacted in place of Marcos’s 1973 Constitution. Among the key features of the new Charter are the advancement of democracy, emphasis on civilian supremacy, strict checks on executive power (preventing martial law abuse), a robust Bill of Rights, and social justice among others.
Aquino however struggled to democratize the country’s government institutions and democratic processes. The former cronies of Marcos Sr. as well as the elite class of Aquino’s supporters joined together to redeem their lost political and economic power during the Marcos 21 years in power (1965-1986). Nonetheless, the new “democratic” regime of Aquino failed to dismantle the entrenched system of patronage and elite interests. Political dynasties quickly returned, and the architecture of traditional power remained intact. Her successors -- Ramos, Estrada, Macapagal-Arroyo, Aquino III, and Duterte -- each promised reform but presided over administrations plagued by unfettered cronyism, corruption, and scandals (Buendia 2022).
In late 2024 study by the Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department (CPBRD) it found that roughly 54% of local government positions are held by dynastic families. In 2025, approximately 80% of provincial governors belong to “fat dynasties,” As of March 2026, approximately 67% of the House of Representatives are held by members of political clans from 40% in 2004. In the 2022 Senate election, at least 12.5% (3) of the leading candidates had relatives already in the 24-seat chamber. Notably, 4.5% (800 out of 18,000) positions contested had single candidates from warlord clans whom no one dared contest.
The concentration of political and economic power on the hands of the clans and dynasties has contributed to dysfunctional Philippine democracy and electoral system reminiscent of the pre-Marcos and martial law years. Mendoza et.al. (2022) say that political dynasty can foment negative socioeconomic outcomes if the attendant concentration of political power is utilized mostly for the benefit of the family and its retainers.
Fifty-seven (57) years of governance from Presidents Marcos to Duterte, inclusive of forty (40) years of a regime professed to be democratic, the country’s personalistic governance has largely contributed to the growing corrosion of political institutions. The political landscape persists to be dominated by a relatively small number of powerful families and clans. Social scientists explain this tendency to cling to old political traditions as emanating from the old feudal structure of Philippine society; dynasties are accepted as givens in Philippine politics.
Dynasties have not been dismantled in spite of the constitutional provision (Art 2, Sec. 26, 1987 Constitution) to prohibit them, until a law is passed which define the details of its pro-scription. In as much as members of Congress are direct beneficiaries of political dynasties, it is unimaginable that such law would be promulgated in the near future.
This is evident with the current debate on the proposed bill on anti-dynasty, House Bill No. 8389, filed in the 19th Congress of the Philippines aimed at restricting familial succession in national and local elective offices. The bill filed jointly by the House Speaker Faustino “Bojie” Dy III and the President’s son, Ferdinand Alexander Marcos (aka Sandro) had drawn sharp criticism as weak and ridiculous. The proposed is deemed a "watered-down" or "diluted" version of reform that would actually legalize and institutionalize political dynasties rather than prohibit them.
Political dynasties are a dominant and deeply entrenched feature of the Philippine political landscape, where power is concentrated within a small number of families across generations. These dynasties are strong enough to block each other but too weak to impose lasting reform on the entire system . Salipsip Jr. says that this creates a "negotiated balance" among elites where no single group pushes too hard because the system ultimately protects them all.
The oligarchy - wealthy families and political dynasties – rules the country. The oligarchs have captured the state, making it nearly impossible to distinguish between the government's interest and their own. Institutions meant to fight corruption, like the Ombudsman and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), are either under-resourced, politicized, or led by presidential appointees, ensuring that the powerful remain untouchable.
The deep-seated public anger over an entrenched oligarchic system stem from a political and economic system widely perceived as being captured by a small, powerful elite, leading to systemic corruption, deteriorating public services, and a bleak future for ordinary citizens for decades. And people who had been suffering from “People Power fatigue” are sceptical that another mass movement would make any substantial difference; citizens are frustrated by cycles of outrage that do not lead to concrete institutional and structural change.
Fractured opposition
Contrary to the 1986 “People Power Revolution,” when the opposition stood united against Marcos Sr.’s dictatorship and rallied behind the wife of assassinated leading critic of the government, Benigno Aquino Jr., the opposition today is divided across liberal, leftist, religious, and youth groups. The opposition lacks a single unifying figure or agenda.
What seemed to bring together the two most prominent political dynasties in the 2022 presidential election – Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte – who ran for President and Vice-President respectively, was the vision of “one nation, one future.” The alliance labelled “UniTeam,” aimed a collective, long-term vision of prosperity, moving past the perceived divisions of previous political administrations. The partnership between Marcos Jr. (representing Ilocos Norte, north of the country) and Duterte (Davao, Mindanao of the south) intends to unite Filipino political forces for the nation's benefit.
The 2022 election saw the highest turnout since 1998, with about 56 million voters participating. Marcos received roughly 56.4% (31.6 million) votes, the most votes ever cast for a candidate in a presidential election in the Philippines, while Duterte received 57.5% (32.2 million) votes, the most votes ever cast for a candidate in the country. Both candidates won by a landslide in a relatively fair and free election.
In less than two (2) years, the “UniTeam’s” vision turned into a nightmare. The party slowly broke down in early 2024, culminating with the resignation of Duterte as the Secretary of the Department of Education (DepEd) and from other cabinet posts, marking her formal exit from the Marcos administration in June 2024. In as much as the 2022 votes had shown that almost half of the voters have given both Marcos Jr. and Duterte the mandate to rule, the separation of the alliance into two distinct parts has likewise polarized the public. It has separated the people into opposing camps composed of groups supporting Marcos Jr. on one hand, and Duterte on the other hand.
The cracks between the two (2) factions widened after Marcos Jr.’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) a year after the split, in 2025. On this address he condemned the wanton corruption in flood control projects caused by the July 2025 southwest monsoon and typhoons. In Congress’s investigation, it was revealed that 545 billion pesos (US$9.54 billion) spent on flood control since 2022 was caused by systemic corruption that drew in the participation of some legislators (Senators and Representatives both District and Party-list Representatives), high-level bureaucrats of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Commission on Audit (COA) (part of the Executive branch of government and a constitutional commission respectively), and private contractors. The massive and brazen corruption did not absolve Marcos Jr.’s culpability being the President and Commander-in-Chief.
The investigation into the Philippine flood control project scandal has created deep divisions within the opposition, manifesting in strategic legal manoeuvres, accusations of selective justice, and a fragmented approach to holding the government accountable. Rather than presenting a united front, different opposition groups and individuals are pursuing distinct, and sometimes conflicting, strategies. The audacious and ostentatious corruption nevertheless did not consolidate peoples’ opposition against wanton thievery of public funds in spite of Marcos Jr.’s decline in popularity in late 2025 and first quarter of 2026 compared to Sara Duterte.
The opposition has not consolidated into a coherent alternative. It remains today divided across liberal, leftist, religious, and youth groups, lacking a single unifying figure or agenda. The opposition is but a collection of factions with differing motivations – from principled anti-corruption advocates to political opportunists seeking to weaken the Marcos administration and replace it with its own political interest.
Among the key factions are the so-called People’s Movement Against Corruption (Kilusang Bayan Kontra Kurakot or KBKK). This is a broad coalition of various groups, organisations, and multi-sectoral; a mixture of strange bedfellows of pro-US and anti-China, leftists and communists, including left-of-center party list groups so-called “Makabayan” (Nationalist) bloc at the House of Representatives (HoR), and left-leaning Catholic clergy. KBKK is vehemently against the Dutertes and supports BBM on certain conditions.
Another is the United Peoples’ Initiative (UPI). This is an umbrella organisation of activist and civil society groups led by retired military officials aligned with the Vice-President Sara Duterte and her father, the former President Rodrigo Duterte. It calls for BBM’s unconditional resignation and calls on the military to withdraw its support from Marcos Jr. This led the government to interpret their statements as potentially seditious, an act of rebellion or insurrection.
In addition is the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) (Church of Christ). This is one of the religious denominations in the Philippines established in 1914 by a Filipino. It is a recognised political force which politicians have habitually courted in every national election due to its practice of bloc voting, where the leadership endorses specific candidates. In mid-November 2025, it spearheaded a demonstration dubbed as a “rally for transparency, accountability, justice and peace” to denounce the massive corruption on the flood control project under the Marcos Jr. presidency. Participated by an estimated over half a million people (peak estimates at 650,000 people, it had publicly withdrawn its support from BBM, aligning more closely with Sara Duterte.
Philippine opposition against corruption is not a monolith but a collection dissimilar group with conflicting interest. Antagonism between opposing camps exists. This division has hindered a unified front against the administration, allowing Marcos Jr. to gain much-needed “breathing space” despite public anger over “ghost” projects and billions if not trillions of pesos in misused funds in the filthy and bloody hands of politicians, bureaucrats, and private conglomerates. Moreover, the opposition's alignment with the rival Duterte faction makes it easy for the administration to dismiss the protests as political theatre or squabble between two (2) dynasties rather than a spontaneous people’s movement.
The corruption scandal is being seen through the prism of this polarizing war. This rivalry has turned the issue into a struggle for political power rather than a strive to take forward the people’s interest. In essence, the transparency debate is less about policy and more about political survival that run across different political and organizational interest and ideologies rather than the interest of the nation and people.
Daily bread
While the scandal is about corruption, the immediate daily struggle of poverty and inflation often takes precedence over protest politics for many citizens. For the average Filipino, the immediate challenges of everyday life often take precedence over the abstract goal of systemic change.
In a national survey conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) between 24 and 30 of September 2025 it found out that 50% of Filipino families rated themselves as poor. SWS translates this to an estimated 14.2 million families. For many, the primary concern is survival—earning a daily income, keeping a job, and feeding their families. This reality reflects a shift from thriving to merely staying afloat, driven by the rising cost of for essentials like food, clothing, utilities, and housing. Many households are into a "survival mode," where income is immediately consumed by basic needs.
Furthermore, considering that over 10 million Filipinos (roughly 10% of the population) are estimated to be working or living overseas, with the majority coming from the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other parts of the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, millions of Filipino families rely on remittances for their daily consumption, education, healthcare, housing, and debt repayment rather than the state.
Hence, participating in protests or “revolutionary” activities is a luxury they cannot afford when their focus is on day-to-day existence. They prioritize economic and survival needs over participating in anti-corruption rallies. This choice does not necessarily mean they condone corruption but rather reflects a pragmatic allocation of limited time and energy toward immediate, existential concerns. This is a key reason why public outrage over scandals often stays on social media and doesn't translate into massive street protests.
Reluctant military intrusion
In contrast to the People Power 1 (1986) and 2 (2001) when the military withdrew its allegiance to the sitting President (Marcos Sr. and Joseph Estrada respectively) as a result of peoples’ indignation over the corruption in government, the current military maintained its unwavering support to Marcos Jr. despite the allegations on unprecedented corruption on flood control projects in particular and perverse governance in general. The calls for military intervention coming from retired military officers, including generals, especially members of the UPI, have been unheeded. Romeo Brawner, Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), has publicly stated that he rejected these overtures from retired officers.
Regardless of any outcome of impartial investigation on corruption (if any to be done), the AFP has committed its loyalty to the President. In exchange for the AFP’s support, BBM created a strong incentive for loyalty. In the country’s 2026 national budget the AFP was allocated with ₱40 billion (US$ 673 million) in capital outlays for its modernization program, with additional ₱50 billion (US$ 842 million) in authorized unprogrammed appropriations. This tangible resource flow contrasts sharply with the instability that would accompany a change in leadership.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the failure to translate immense corruption and a clear inability to govern into a successful movement for fundamental structural change is not a sign of public apathy, but rather the result of a sophisticated, interlocking system of constraints. These are: the return of patronage politics and elitism, a fractured opposition, pervasive poverty and powerlessness, and the military’s non-intervention. These factors do not operate in isolation. They function as mutually reinforcing mechanisms. Together they form a near-impenetrable barrier to mobilization and lethargic response to systemic corruption and bad governance. They create a state of low-intensity equilibrium.
Corruption remains endemic, structural change remains elusive, and popular mobilization is rendered episodic and ineffective. The system is not static but is resilient, possessing the ability to absorb shocks, co-opt dissent, and outlast its opponents. Until one of these four pillars—the economic grip of patronage, the unity of the opposition, the depth of popular poverty, or the military’s institutional calculus—fundamentally shifts, the country will remain trapped in a cycle of stagnation, where the demand for change is loud enough to be noticed but never strong enough to be realized.
Note:
- EDSA is the main artery of Metro Manila where demonstrations were held, from February 22 to 25, 1986 that sparked the “People Power Revolution.” Hundreds of thousands, eventually millions, of ordinary citizens, including students, workers, and religious groups, formed human barricades to protect military reformers who had broken away from the Marcos regime.
References:
- Buendia, R.G. (2022).“Lessons and Prospects in Philippine Political Governance: Cutting Across Regimes from Marcos to Duterte,” in Victor Andres ‘Dindo’ Manhit (ed.) Beyond the Crisis: A Strategic Agenda for the Next President. Stratbase ADRi Publications, Philippines. (pp. 323-357). ISBN: 978-621-8167-26-1.
- Mendoza, R.U., Yap, J.K., Mendoza, G.S., Jaminola, L., III, & Yu, E. (2022). Political dynasties, Business, and Poverty in the Philippines. Author links Open overlay panel. Science Direct. Journal of Government and Economics, Vol. 7. Retrieved November 4, 2024, from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S2667319322000246