Iran’s missile strikes on its Arab neighbors might lead those neighbors to seek closer ties with the United States—but could also cause them to distance themselves from it.

On March 10, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claimed that Iran had made a major error by launching drone and missile attacks against its Arab neighbors across the Persian Gulf. Hegseth argued that Iran had revealed who it was and what it represented through those attacks—and claimed that its Arab neighbors could not rely on appeasing Tehran in order to avoid future attacks. Alongside Hegseth, many other analysts also concluded that Iran’s attacks on its neighbors were a costly strategic mistake, arguing that they would push the Arab states of the Persian Gulf closer to Iran’s adversaries, Israel and the United States.

Rhetoric from the Gulf has matched this perception. On March 18, senior Emirati officials, including Anwar Gargash, an advisor to UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, argued that Iran’s attacks on the Persian Gulf states had pushed them closer to Israel and the United States. It is unclear what motivated Gargash’s rare public assessment. On the one hand, he may genuinely believe that this is the direction in which Iran’s Arab neighbors are heading as a result of these attacks. Alternatively, he may be using this claim as a shot across the bow to Iran, suggesting that an expanded American-Israeli alignment that includes Arab states could emerge in order to pressure Iran to halt its attacks.

Still, none of these warnings stopped the continuation of Iranian attacks. It is fair to say that, in the post-war era, if the regime survives, Iran’s attacks against the Gulf states will carry strategic costs. Iran has invested significant time and effort in pursuing détente with Arab states, including its China-brokered rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. The attacks carried out by Iran against its neighbors have set back these efforts and are likely to sour relations for a prolonged period, particularly given the scale of the attacks and the damage inflicted.

Given these clear strategic disadvantages, why is Iran continuing these attacks? For Tehran, the benefits of continuing these operations appear to outweigh the risk of pushing Arab states closer to Israel. From Iran’s perspective, the war is both existential and asymmetric. Lacking the military capability to directly confront the United States and Israel, Iran relies instead on economic means to respond to their pressure. In practice, this means exerting pressure on global energy markets by closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting its Arab neighbors—leading to economic chaos and fear, prompting Westerners to flee those countries, and ultimately inflicting substantial second-order costs on the United States.

Yet this strategy comes at a significant cost. If the Islamic Republic survives the war, it will face the consequences of undermining years of diplomatic effort aimed at achieving détente with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This includes the China-brokered rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023, as well as the gradual expansion of ties with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. These gains have now been severely damaged, and relations are likely to remain strained for the foreseeable future.

How the Iran War Could Reshape Arab Politics

Iran’s actions raise a critical follow-up question: while the attacks are clearly damaging Iran’s relations with the Arab states, how will they shape those states’ alignment with the United States? Will they strengthen these ties, leave them unchanged, or push them in a different direction?

There are multiple scenarios one might envision as a result of the strikes. One is the continuation of the status quo in relations between Arab states and the United States, or even its strengthening. Iranian attacks against its Arab neighbors may reinforce their perception of Iran as a serious threat and underscore their need for US support. As a result, these states may choose to double down on and expand their military alliances with Washington. After all, the United States remains the most powerful actor in the region, and its capabilities can deter a significant portion of Iranian attacks.

However, this is not the only plausible outcome. An alternative scenario is that Arab states may seek to distance themselves from the United States—not by weakening political or economic ties, but by reducing their military dependence on Washington, and in so doing signaling to Tehran that they are not US proxies and should not be caught up in a US-Iran war. In this case, they would limit further expansion of military cooperation while maintaining existing political and economic relations.

This outcome, of course, would effectively mean granting Iran its policy aim through its unprovoked attack—a thought that may be difficult for Arab leaders in the Gulf to stomach. However, these leaders must also contend with the fact that the United States bulldozed ahead with the war in defiance of their objections, raising questions about Washington’s reliability as a partner. Prior to the conflict, the Gulf states made serious diplomatic efforts to prevent it. In mid-January, when discussions of renewed US military action against Iran first emerged, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia coordinated diplomatic efforts to discourage Washington from entering another war. The Trump administration ignored their entreaties, and they were drawn into the conflict due to their ties with the United States.

Tehran has made it clear that it views its neighbors across the Persian Gulf as an extension of the United States and Israel, and targeted them accordingly. For example, Israel’s March 18 strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field triggered Iranian retaliation against Qatar’s LNG facilities, reportedly disrupting around 17 percent of its exports. Repairs could take 3 to 5 years, with estimated annual losses of about $20 billion. In response, Qatari officials expressed strong frustration to President Trump, questioning the logic of the initial strike given the predictable retaliation. This led to an unusual statement from Trump on March 18, criticizing Israel’s actions and emphasizing that the United States neither supported nor had prior knowledge of the attack.

While some damage may be contained through de-escalation, other consequences will be longer-lasting. The economies of the Gulf states depend not only on oil and gas but also on their role as hubs for global investment and tourism. Their appeal has rested on stability, safety, and predictability. The current war has undermined these advantages. Reports indicate that expatriates are leaving hubs such as Dubai in response to the conflict—some of them permanently—concluding that they and their investments are no longer safe there. As a result, some of the costs imposed on Arab states by a war they did not initiate may prove irreversible.

In this context, Arab states may find themselves in a position where military ties with the United States impose significant costs. Might reducing those ties also reduce their exposure to risk? One may argue that weakening military ties with the United States would also reduce the support Arab states receive. But skeptics in the Gulf could argue that such support became necessary in the first place because of those same military ties. It is easy to envision a vicious circle: souring relations with Iran drive its Arab neighbors further into the US-Israel camp, but make those states an even more likely target for retaliation in the next conflict.

The Arab World’s Three Security Alternatives to the United States

If the Arab states wish to diversify their foreign partnerships away from the United States, they have three plausible options. 

The first is to pivot to the East by moving closer to China and Russia, the world’s other major powers. This is possible, and in the past some states have explored it, but it has also triggered strong backlash from the United States. For example, when the UAE allowed China to establish facilities at Khalifa Port, it faced extreme American pressure. In addition, the recent Israeli attacks on Iran and earlier American attacks on Russian systems in Venezuela have raised doubts about the reliability of Chinese and Russian military equipment as an alternative to the US-made gold standard. And while Arab states may want to reduce their military dependence on the United States, they have no interest in weakening their political and economic ties with Washington. A full pivot toward China and Russia could jeopardize those ties. For that reason, this is not necessarily the most attractive option.

A second, more likely option is for the Arab states to deepen regional military cooperation among themselves, pushing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) further toward something like an Arab NATO. This step is far easier to take—and would face no opposition from Washington, which has advocated for stronger intra-Arab security ties for years. Yet this option alone may not provide them with a sufficient sense of security. Even now, despite existing cooperation among themselves and continued US backing, they are still being targeted. This suggests that regional cooperation by itself may not be enough, and that some form of external support would still be needed.

The third option is to move toward third powers that, on the one hand, still have meaningful military capabilities to offer, but whose presence would not provoke the United States. There are a number of countries that could potentially play this role. The security of the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil exports matter to many states, and some of them do possess useful military capabilities. These nations include:

• Certain European countries, particularly the middle powers of western Europe (e.g. the UK, France, Germany, Italy);
• Australia, which has maintained a base in the UAE since 2009;
• India, a rising military power that already enjoys close relations with the Gulf; and
• East Asian states, such as Japan and South Korea.

India, Japan, and South Korea are especially important cases because they also maintain relatively good relations with Iran, and Iran benefits from those relationships. That reduces the likelihood that Tehran would jeopardize those ties by attacking the Gulf states, where many of their nationals live and work and where joint facilities might be headquartered in the future. It is noteworthy that Iran’s strategy is not limited to economic pressure; it also seeks to raise the cost of US presence in the region to a level that could eventually force Washington to scale back or withdraw. This works because of the dominant American presence in the region. But if other, more neutral nations were present as well, the costs for Tehran could quickly rise as well.

Beyond these three options, there is also a hybrid approach. Under such an approach, Arab states would reduce their military dependence on the United States while preserving, and possibly even strengthening, their political, economic, and financial ties with Washington. They could offset any reduction in military dependence, for example, by continuing to buy more American products. At the same time, they would deepen military coordination among themselves through greater regional alignment, stronger command structures, and more integrated control systems. Alongside that, they could bring in third powers such as India, certain Southeast Asian states, and some European countries—states that still have something to offer militarily but are less likely to become direct Iranian targets.

Whichever option—if any—the Arab states choose will be highly dependent on how the war ends. What is clear, however, is that once the fog of war lifts, they will have to rethink their military posture and alliances in light of the war. They will either double down on the current arrangement, seeking greater American protection, or move to change it. If such a change occurs, the direction of that shift will come to define the Gulf’s security partnerships for the next generation.

About the Author: Arman Mahmoudian

Dr. Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the USF Global and National Security Institute. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security. He holds a PhD in Politics and International Affairs from the University of South Florida. He earned his Master’s in International Relations in Russia and his Bachelor’s in Law in Iran. In addition to his professional roles and publications, he is a member of the editorial board at the Joint Special Operations University. His research and commentary on Middle Eastern and Russian affairs have been featured in leading outlets, including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, the Stimson Center, the Atlantic Council, the Gulf International Forum, and other platforms. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @MahmoudianArman.

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