Communicative Deterrence in the Information Environment | Irregular Warfare Center
“Communicative Deterrence: A Theoretical Concept for Deterrence in the Information Environment” from the Irregular Warfare Center’s Perspectives (March 2026).
Dr. Rupinder Mangat, a Defense Scientist at Defense Research and Development Canada, argues in this article that adversaries exploit the Information Environment (IE) to weaken democratic societies and reduce political will. Dr. Mangat explains that deterrence must extend beyond military power and focus on civilian populations who serve as key targets in information operations. The article defines resilience as a core mechanism of deterrence by denial and shows how communication strengthens that resilience.
Mangat introduces communicative deterrence as a framework that uses communication to build societal resilience and reduce the effectiveness of adversarial information operations. The framework also applies the Communication Theory of Resilience to outline processes that help societies adapt to disruption and maintain stability. Western governments must engage continuously with the public and shape narratives that support recovery and trust. Ultimately, communication-driven resilience deters adversaries by limiting the impact and value of their actions.
Mangat’s concept of communicative deterrence aligns closely with Winning Without Fighting (Cambria Press, 2025), emphasizing resilience and influence as central to modern competition rather than relying solely on kinetic force. As discussed further in the SWJ’s book review on Winning Without Fighting, both argue that adversaries operate in the gray zone using information and non-military tools, and that states must strengthen societal resilience to deny adversaries meaningful impact. Taken together, Mangat’s focus on communication-driven resilience operationalizes the broader strategic argument in Winning Without Fighting that resilience and narrative shaping are key to “winning” without direct conflict.
Article Highlights
Deterrence: “Deterrence works by discouraging adversarial actors from causing harm. It usually follows two pathways—deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial…Deterrence by denial is arguably deterrence through resilience because adversaries pause their actions when they expect insufficient disruption of their opponents’ routines. Resilience turns deterrence by denial inwards by focusing on the state and domestic population. Over time, resilience can show adversaries that their disruptive actions lack impact and therefore value.”
Resilience: “Resilience is about being prepared for and dealing with disruptions and returning to ‘normal’ afterwards… Disruptions often affect complex systems. International and domestic social, political, economic, and technical systems interact, sometimes in unexpected ways with unpredictable effects. This complexity and uncertainty make deterrence difficult. Resilience is “a unique paradigm for managing predictable unpredictability” in a “complex risk and threat landscape where preventing threat is less successful than establishing coping mechanisms.”
The IE: “With ubiquitous connectivity and democratization of information acquisition, generation, and propagation, the IE has become all-encompassing. Unfortunately, this has made publics a target for adversaries… Disinformation is one type of civilian—or public-targeting IO that has proliferated and succeeded… The lack of accountability and relative untraceability make the IE even more attractive as a vector of influence… The IE thus provides asymmetric advantage to adversaries in disrupting democracies.”
Communication and Deterrence in the IE: “The complexity of the IE grows exponentially: “Contemporary social technology means that we are witnessing something new: information pollution at a global scale…” The average individual cannot critically evaluate and consume information accordingly. Adversaries leverage this ‘fog of information’ to spread their ideology and sow chaos… Communication is a foundational process in IO because information must be communicated to achieve effects… Communication can help strengthen population resilience… the public is a target, it should be part of the deterrence calculus.”
“CTR [Communication Theory of Resilience] focuses on how communication enables resilience, identifying five overlapping and non-linear foundational processes: (1) crafting normalcy; (2) foregrounding productive action and backgrounding negative feelings; (3) affirming identity anchors; (4) maintaining and using communication networks; and (5) putting alternative logics to work.”
Communicative Deterrence: “If communication enables disinformation and resilience, where resilience is also deterrence by denial, then communication can help deter adversaries in the IE… Communicative deterrence is the use of communication to build public resilience in the IE as a deterrent to AIO… As the targets of AIO i.e. the public become increasingly resilient, the return of investment for adversaries decreases to the point where operations yield limited or no results, which deters adversaries… Communicative deterrence leverages CTR’s five foundational processes to better understand deterrence in the IE.”
Conclusion: “Communication is a factor for conventional deterrence, and this paper makes a case for communicative deterrence in the IE. AIOs are enabled through communication, so is resilience, and the latter works as deterrence by denial. Communicative deterrence can leverage communication as a resilience enabler to deter AIO. The five pillars of CTR have been adapted to communicative deterrence with the aim to establish CTR’s five foundational processes as a way to develop resilience in the IE.”
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