Iran: Relearning the Importance of Waging a War, Not Just Fighting One

Michael Dubik argues in his latest CSIS article, “Iran: Relearning the Importance of Waging a War, Not Just Fighting One,” that US military success in tactical combat does not translate into strategic victory because American leaders fail to wage war effectively. Dubik explains that while the US military excels at synchronizing battlefield functions, the United States consistently neglects the political, economic, and informational dimensions required to achieve war aims.

Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting. Wars must be fought and waged. Fighting is a necessary part of war, and the U.S. military is very good at it. Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited? And will the same thing happen in Iran?

He identifies three core failures: lack of strategic coherence, weak organizational decision-making capacity, and insufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the American public. Without integrating military operations into a broader war-waging strategy, the United States risks repeating past failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan in its current approach to Iran.

Article Highlights

Skill One: Is Our Strategy Coherent?

Judging from the outside, the short answer is ‘not sufficiently.’ The most glaring deficiency is agreement on what the war is meant to achieve… Reduction of Iran’s military capacity? Destruction of their nuclear capacity? Elimination of their ability to govern? Regime change? All of the above? Some of the above?… Without clarity of purpose, aligning ways and means and acting coherently is nearly impossible… Where are the non-military campaigns that are a necessary component of waging war?

A well-executed and successful military campaign will not, by itself, guarantee wartime success… Fighting a war is just one dimension necessary for wartime success, but alone it is insufficient. The non-military campaigns mentioned above—as well as others—are equally necessary, but as absent now as they were at the start of our post 9/11 wars.

Skill Two: Is There Organizational Decision-making Capacity to Adapt as the War Unfolds?

At this point, it’s probably too early to tell. But given the variety of explanations for why we went to war presented by the various principals in the administration in the first hours, days, and weeks of the war, skepticism about initial and adaptive decision-making is understandable… Without a clear set of war aims and a coherent set of military and non-military campaign plans, adaptation is more likely to be ad hoc than well-thought-out, well-coordinated, and intentional… Little or no adaptation for over two years in a war as dynamic as it was in Iraq is a sign of weak organizational capacity… Will the American people see similar weakness concerning the war in Iran?… the possibility—maybe even the probability—is present.

Is There a Vision, Concept, or Idea About How to Bring the War to an End and Establish Durable, Political Conditions Necessary for “a Better Peace?”

Again, judging from the first weeks of this war, the short answer is ‘not immediately apparent.’… But toward what end?… A devastated Iran with a destroyed security structure; a significantly damaged economy; and untested leadership—but more hardline and repressive—striving just to stay in power and willing to act asymmetrically within the region and globally—this will be the direct products of our extensive bombing campaign. Do we then walk away from an Iran laid to waste?

Will a Syrian-style civil war emerge? Will we turn our heads to allow such a civil war to exhaust itself? These kinds of visions of the end of fighting are strategically and morally vacuous.… Ending wars by establishing a durable political solution is not an American strength… The war-waging pattern seems to be this: The United States demands sacrifices from those who fight and from their families, but is unwilling to demand rigorous thinking and consistent action from those who send them to fight.

Skill Three: Is the War Legitimate in the Eyes of the American Citizenry?

At the outset, the answer seems to be ‘not yet,’ at least not with the majority. Polls at the start of the war with Iran are suggesting that the American people are not yet behind this war. Legitimacy, according to political scientists Christopher Gelpi, Peater D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler is a complex product.…  the American people consider the human costs of war “worth it” and the use of military force legitimate if they (a) understand the use of force as righteous, (b) understand its aims to be achievable, and (c) progress is being made toward achieving those aims… Views concerning the righteousness of the war, its aims, and its strategy, however, appear to be a different matter… Such uncertainty erodes legitimacy, especially the longer it goes on.

Conclusion

War unfolds to its own logic… Ending fighting does not necessarily mean ending a war… none of us knows what winning in this case entails… whether we have strategies, policies, and campaigns in place that will increase the probability of winning… American warfighting prowess helps, but it is not enough… U.S. war-waging prowess remains decisive… U.S. senior leaders continue to equate war with fighting, leaving war-waging requirements as afterthoughts.

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