Zimbabwe’s diaspora as sovereignty in exile: A conversation with Jacob Ngarivhume

For more than three decades, the daily survival of most Zimbabweans has not been scripted by the state alone. It has been quietly underwritten by citizens scattered across the globe who remit billions of dollars back into the country each year. What was once condemned as betrayal, the mass departure of Zimbabweans in search of dignity, stability, and opportunity, has evolved into the nation’s most reliable system of economic and social support. Through remittances, professional networks, and civic resilience, the diaspora has become an unofficial architecture of governance: a transnational lifeline that sustains households, finances education and healthcare, and stabilises communities where public institutions have been hollowed out by corruption, policy failure, and political inertia. In recent op-eds published in the Mail & Guardian and NewsDay Zimbabwe, I argued that the ‘diaspora’ is more than an economic story; that it represents governance by other means, an improvised but powerful system of solidarity that substitutes for a retreating state.

These arguments sparked robust engagement across multiple platforms, including a thoughtful intervention from Jacob Ngarivhume, a Zimbabwean opposition politician, the founder of Transform Zimbabwe, who is known to have an interest in tackling corruption, economic collapse, and human rights issues.  Ngarivhume proposed that we extend the discussion into a deeper exchange probing the contradictions at the heart of Zimbabwe’s diaspora politics: the paradox of remittance capture without political representation, the unrealised promise of diaspora investment instruments, the mechanics of global remittance systems, and the structural exclusion that continues to define governance in Zimbabwe. What follows is not a polite exchange but a necessary interrogation, an attempt to map the contours of Zimbabwe’s unofficial state of survival and to insist that the diaspora be recognised not merely as exiles sending money home, but as citizens whose ideas, resources, and political voice must help shape the nation’s future.

Question 1. Your article, The Diaspora Dividend, appeared in the Mail & Guardian in January. It’s subtitled ‘Zimbabwe’s Unofficial State of Survival’. What motivated you to write this article? 

Read here:  https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/opinion/2026-01-12-the-diaspora-dividend-zimbabwes-unofficial-state-of-survival/  and https://www.newsday.co.zw/opinion-analysis/article/200051146/the-economics-of-survival-diaspora-remittances-as-africas-lifeline 

For years, Zimbabwe’s ruling elite treated migration with satire and disdain. Robert Mugabe and sections of ZANU-PF mocked migrants as “British Bum Cleaners” for taking low-status jobs abroad, portraying their departure as a betrayal of the national project. Yet history has produced a striking reversal. The diaspora, once ridiculed, now sustains Zimbabwe’s survival, remitting billions and supporting millions of households. What was framed as abandonment has become resilience. Beyond finance, the diaspora functions as governance by other means, funding education, healthcare, and community welfare, forming a transnational civic infrastructure that compensates for weakened state institutions.

Question 2. You suggest that migration from Zimbabwe has evolved into a parallel system of governance or ‘shadow state’. In what sense do you make this claim?

I use the term “shadow state” not in the conventional sense of a criminal power structure, but to describe a parallel architecture of survival operating beyond Zimbabwe’s formal institutions. As public systems have weakened over the past three decades through economic collapse and institutional erosion, the diaspora has steadily filled the vacuum. What began as household remittances has evolved into a broader ecosystem sustaining livelihoods, education, healthcare, and local infrastructure. Unlike predatory shadow states discussed in political science, this is a civic one, anchored in solidarity, kinship, and community networks, through which citizens abroad perform functions traditionally associated with the state, creating a resilient form of bottom-up, transnational governance.

Question 3. The term ‘shadow state’ usually refers to corrupt elites involved in criminal activities in collusion with foreign syndicates. How much of the Diaspora’s remittances are actually illicit funds being reinvested from gold and diamond smuggling?

Illicit financial flows exist, particularly in gold and diamond smuggling, but reducing Zimbabwe’s diaspora dividend to illicit capital is analytically misleading. The vast majority of remittances come from legitimate labour abroad, nurses in the United Kingdom, teachers across Southern Africa, engineers, entrepreneurs, and traders whose earnings sustain families and communities back home. The diaspora dividend must be understood within the broader political economy of migration, where mobility becomes a rational response to limited domestic opportunity. In effect, Zimbabwe has exported labour while importing resilience, as migrant wages and networks stabilise household economies, finance education and healthcare, and cushion communities against economic volatility.

Question 4. We see massive investment of remittances in private sector investment in homes and business property, but precious little public sector investment. Alongside impressive private homes, we find gutted roads, dilapidated schools and dysfunctional hospitals. Yet you also suggest that the Diaspora helps fund schools, clinics and infrastructure. What evidence supports this claim?

Remittances are often dismissed as private transfers used for homes, family support, or small businesses, but this view underestimates their broader developmental role. Across Zimbabwe, diaspora resources extend beyond households to finance schools, clinics, boreholes, and essential local infrastructure. Although these initiatives rarely pass through formal state channels or receive official recognition, they represent a steady stream of community-level investment where public provision has weakened. Organised through church networks, hometown associations, and community committees, diaspora contributions function as grassroots development finance, transforming dispersed migrant incomes into public goods and sustaining communities through transnational solidarity rather than formal state intervention.

Question 5. Do we have any data to show how much the Diaspora pours into various economic activities, or their impact on people’s livelihoods and the economy? 

According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, diaspora remittances exceeded US$1.7 billion in 2024, making them one of the country’s most significant sources of foreign currency and a stabilising pillar of the economy. Yet the headline figure conceals a major analytical gap. Existing data captures the scale of inflows but offers little insight into how funds are allocated across consumption, education, healthcare, housing, or productive investment. What Zimbabwe lacks is a rigorous mapping of these financial flows. A comprehensive national study is urgently needed to trace how diaspora capital circulates through communities and contributes to development, household resilience, and broader economic stability.

Question 6. On the one hand, you accuse Zimbabwe’s repressive ruling elite, compromised by corruption and patronage, of the country’s economic mismanagement and decay. Yet, on the other hand, you expect the same Zimbabwe regime to implement the 2016 National Diaspora Policy. Is this realistic?

Expecting Zimbabwe’s political elite to fully implement the 2016 National Diaspora Policy is paradoxical. Governance structures often criticised for corruption and exclusion are unlikely to empower a constituency they frequently view with suspicion, one that is economically independent and politically vocal abroad. The diaspora thus occupies an uneasy position: indispensable as a source of foreign currency yet politically inconvenient because it lies beyond the state’s immediate control.

Nevertheless, dismissing the policy would be short-sighted. Even imperfect frameworks establish benchmarks for accountability and engagement, providing advocacy tools and institutional entry points through which diaspora organisations and civil society can pressure the state to recognise and integrate the diaspora into national development.

Question 7. The Government has consistently tried to capture remittances without granting voting rights to Zimbabweans living abroad. What should be done to change their policy?

This situation represents a fundamental contradiction in Zimbabwe’s governance framework. The state actively seeks to capture diaspora remittances while simultaneously denying the diaspora political representation. Such an arrangement reduces citizens abroad to economic instruments rather than political stakeholders. Addressing this injustice requires sustained advocacy from civil society, regional institutions, and diaspora organisations to link financial engagement with democratic rights. Diaspora enfranchisement must be non-negotiable.

Question 8. You mention that Ghana introduced Diaspora Bonds. What are diaspora bonds, how do they work, and who benefits from them?

Diaspora bonds represent an important instrument in development finance. These government-issued securities allow countries to mobilise diaspora savings for national infrastructure and development projects. Ghana and several other countries have successfully experimented with such instruments. When properly structured, diaspora bonds can create a mutually beneficial arrangement: governments gain access to long-term capital, while diaspora investors gain secure opportunities to contribute to national development.

Question 9. What are the main channels used by the Diaspora to remit funds to Zimbabwe? To what extent are they secure, efficient and affordable? How can they be improved?

Most diaspora remittances flow through formal financial channels, including banks, international money transfer operators such as Western Union, Mukuru, and WorldRemit, and increasingly digital and mobile money platforms. While these systems have improved efficiency and transparency, transaction fees remain relatively high, encouraging the persistence of informal channels. Improving affordability and security requires regulatory reform, competition among service providers, and technological innovation in digital finance.

Question 10. What is the main problem facing the Diaspora? What policy change is needed most to help the Diaspora?

The diaspora’s greatest challenge is structural exclusion. Zimbabweans abroad remain politically disenfranchised, lack secure investment channels, and are often viewed with suspicion by the state. The most urgent reform is therefore diaspora enfranchisement and integration into national development planning. Without political rights and institutional recognition, the diaspora will continue to be treated merely as a source of remittances rather than as citizens actively shaping Zimbabwe’s future.

Wellington Muzengeza is an Independent Journalist, Political Risk Analyst, and Urban Strategist, offering incisive insights into urban planning, infrastructure, leadership succession, and governance reform across Africa’s evolving post-liberation and urban landscapes.