The march of folly
SINCE he launched a war of choice President Donald Trump has kept shifting the objectives of the joint US-Israel attack on Iran. This has compounded his dilemma of when to call it quits and unilaterally declare ‘victory’ especially as the war has not unfolded according to US expectations. If he sought regime change, as he frequently said, that is not happening. If anything, the smooth installation of the new Supreme Leader in Tehran, who symbolises defiance, indicates the regime has consolidated itself while it continues its asymmetric response by strikes on American bases, Israel and targets in GCC states.
Iran has experienced heavy losses but shown resilience in its fightback to what it regards as an existential threat. Its strategy of raising the costs of war by striking at the energy infrastructure of Gulf neighbours and blocking the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz has sent the oil price soaring and thrown global energy markets into turmoil. Iranian leaders have rejected Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender” and said Tehran will not end the war on Washington’s terms.
Meanwhile, Trump has come under mounting pressure at home and abroad. Opinion polls show most Americans oppose the war. With his MAGA base divided over the war, the political pressure is evident, especially as his supporters fear a backlash in the midterm elections later this year. The widespread view is that Trump was talked into a costly, ill-defined course of action by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which is contrary to American interests. The economic consequences of the conflict, miscalculated by Washington, are kicking in and can even bring the global economy to a halt. That is why Trump’s advisers are urging him to find an exit ramp. Iran’s strikes on Gulf countries have exposed their structural vulnerabilities and involved significant damage to their oil and gas facilities. The economic and security fallout will be hard to manage in a prolonged, destructive conflict. That explains backchannel lobbying of Washington by GCC countries for cessation of hostilities. Pressure is also growing from the rest of the international community to terminate the conflict.
This raises the question of when ‘Taco’ (acronym for Trump always chickens out) will come into play. There are contradictory signals. One day Trump declares the war will be over “very soon”. At other times, he says the war will continue until Iran surrenders. Then he claims “We have won in many ways but not enough.”
Trump failed to anticipate the war’s economic repercussions and has no endgame.
It is uncertain how Trump will extricate himself from a crisis of his making. All indications are his reckless action will prove to be a disaster like past US military interventions in the Middle East and elsewhere. The episode brings to mind a seminal book written in the 1980s but which has lost none of its relevance for current geopolitical events. Titled The March of Folly, the internationally acclaimed work examined one of the most intriguing power paradoxes in history — why countries, governments or groups pursue a course of action contrary to their self-interest. In her book, American historian Barbara W. Tuchman presented a penetrating insight into several historical events that characterise folly in government.
From the fall of Troy, selected in her book as the symbolic prototype of a freely chosen calamity, to America’s disastrous involvement in Vietnam, she analysed a phenomenon that recurs throughout history. “Mankind,” she wrote, “makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity.” Her book examined what she called the pursuit of policy contrary to the self-interest of the state or constituency involved. Tuchman defined self-interest as “whatever conduces to the welfare and advantage of the body being governed”. From that follows her conception of folly: a policy that is counterproductive in these terms.
To be considered folly, the policy or a course of action must meet three criteria. It must be seen as counterproductive at that time, and not by hindsight. Two, a feasible alternative course of action must have been available. And three, to distinguish folly in government from the capricious whims of a single person, “the policy in question should be that of a group, not an individual ruler”.
Trump’s war meets all three criteria to be considered a folly. It has been counterproductive to the stated aim of regime change by decapitating leaders. The regime has survived and there is no indication of regime collapse. This has prompted the widespread observation that it took the US 20 years to replace the Taliban with the Taliban in Afghanistan but Trump managed to replace Khamenei with Khamenei in just over a week. Moreover, Iran’s devastating attacks on its neighbours’ oil facilities and disruption of oil shipments has produced a global energy crisis which will also hurt the US economy. The Trump administration’s failure to anticipate these economic repercussions means it pursued a course of action detrimental to US interests. Iran’s control of the flow of oil is entirely counterproductive to the outcome Washington wanted.
As for the second criterion, whether an alternative to war was available, the answer is yes. Indirect talks between the US and Iran, mediated by Oman’s foreign minister Badr Albusaidi, were at a point of breakthrough and a deal was “within reach” according to him. Iran had made substantial nuclear concessions including zero stockpiling of enriched uranium, down-blending of existing stockpiles to the lowest possible level inside Iran and full access to IAEA for verification. Tehran’s commitment not to possess material to make a nuclear weapon should have met the stated US objective. From here, details could have been worked out through further negotiations. But Trump chose force over diplomacy. When his special envoy Steve Witkoff sought last week to justify the war by saying Iranian negotiators had claimed Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, this disingenuous account was contradicted by a knowledgeable Gulf diplomat. Trump wilfully spurned a feasible diplomatic course, to pursue war.
Tuchman’s third criteria is also met for the Iran war to be deemed a folly. While Trump’s whim played a dominant role in the decision, he chose this path in concert with Netanyahu and counsel from his hawkish advisers.
Whichever way this war ends it will change the regional equation and establish new strategic realities which are unlikely to advantage Washington.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2026