Iran: Why Mojtaba Khamenei Was Chosen To Succeed His Father – Analysis

By Hassan Al-Mustafa

Mojtaba Khamenei would not have become the supreme leader of Iran had his father, Ali Khamenei, died naturally. The prevailing custom in Shiite “scientific hawza” (seminaries) — whether in Najaf, Karbala, Qom or Mashhad — holds that religious authority is not passed from father to son, as such conduct is regarded as a pursuit of leadership that contradicts the principle of piety.

Throughout Shiite history, when a religious leader died, his sons did not immediately assume authority after him, even when they possessed the necessary qualifications. In the few instances when a form of familial succession occurred, such as within the Kashif Al-Ghita and Al-Shirazi families, it was met with significant disapproval and rejection by senior professors of scientific hawza.

When the religious authority Mohammed Saeed Al-Hakim died in 2021 in the Iraqi city of Najaf, his family broke his seal, the ring he used to authenticate his religious edicts, immediately after his funeral. The seal was broken publicly to ensure that it could not be used illegally or unlawfully by any party.

Grand Ayatollah Al-Hakim was survived by several sons who possessed the qualifications of a “faqih” (Islamic jurist) capable of issuing fatwas, the most prominent among them being Riyadh Al-Hakim, a professor in the scientific hawza in the Iranian city of Qom. However, his sons did not nominate themselves for the position of “marja’iyya” (authority), although they met the criteria required of a mufti.

The late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was well acquainted with this hawza convention. He was aware that his son, Mojtaba — despite holding the rank of “ijtihad” and having taught “Bahth Al-Kharij” at the hawza for several years, an advanced tier of seminary instruction roughly equivalent to doctoral-level studies in the academic world — would not be accepted by the seminaries as his successor. He understood that the hawza would not countenance a hereditary transfer of the marja’iyya. This is precisely what kept him from pursuing the succession of his son to the office of supreme religious authority. Sources close to him reported that he explicitly rejected such a course.

There is also another important reason: the legitimacy of the Islamic revolution in Iran was founded on the rejection of political succession. The late shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown in favor of a republican system that rejected hereditary rule. Iranians did not want to replace a shah wearing a crown with another shah wearing a turban.

So, what changed and how did Mojtaba Khamenei become the third supreme leader?

The fundamental factor behind this radical shift was the assassination of Ali Khamenei in an attack in which he and several members of his family were killed. The event proved pivotal for Iran. It created a profound leadership vacuum and generated a deep emotional and social shock, given Israel’s direct targeting of him from the first day of the war and its demonstrated ability to assassinate him, along with a large number of prominent military and administrative figures on the same day.

The current supreme leader thus emerged as a form of “blood legitimacy” and an heir whose father, mother and several other members of his family were killed. This development also has a mythological dimension deeply rooted in Shiite history, emotionally linked to the events of Karbala, thereby granting it an additional layer of symbolism.

This symbolism was reinforced by the timing of the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader on the 19th day of Ramadan — the first of three nights during which Shiite Muslims celebrate the martyrdom of Ali bin Abi Taleb, believed to include the “Laylat Al-Qadr” (Night of Power), which is considered sacred in Islamic consciousness.

Together, these factors highlight the immense symbolic weight surrounding the context in which Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed as Iran’s faqih.

Moreover, through this decision, the Assembly of Experts sought to stress that the “revolution” would continue along the path of its former leader and that it remained capable of resistance and confrontation.

This is particularly significant because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the hard-line faction allied with it expressed strong anger and resentment toward the initiative of President Masoud Pezeshkian, who apologized to the Arab Gulf states for the attacks that had struck their territories. He announced that the “temporary leadership council” had decided to “halt attacks on neighboring countries unless their territories were used to launch strikes against Iran.” This initiative was aborted as the Guards interpreted it as a sign of weakness and retreat. Consequently, the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei was intended to convey a clear political message: Iran remains strong and its pride has not been broken.

Another important point is that prominent candidates close to the reformist and moderate currents — such as Hassan Khomeini and Hassan Rouhani — were excluded from consideration, despite the fact they are pillars of the IRGC and possess the credentials that qualify them to assume the position.

Today, Mojtaba Khamenei stands as the faqih of Iran, as well as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He is also regarded as a figure with deep ties to the IRGC and to the country’s various hard-line currents. Will he adopt a confrontational and uncompromising course or will he seek pragmatic solutions capable of extricating Iran from war, preserving what remains of the regime’s institutional structure and restoring relations with neighboring Gulf countries that have been affected by Iran’s continued attacks?

In politics, all possibilities remain open. The new leader may prove even more uncompromising than his late father or he may emerge as the leader who guides the “revolution” into a new phase.

One crucial consideration, however, is that Mojtaba Khamenei is the only figure who is capable of participating in halting the war without provoking strong resistance from the Revolutionary Guards. This is not only due to his close relationship with them but also because he now holds the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. And, perhaps more importantly, he is widely perceived as the actual heir. For this reason, hard-liners cannot accuse him of betraying the legacy of his father and his family.

Which course will Iran take under Mojtaba Khamenei? The coming days will reveal his direction.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and relations between the Gulf states and Iran.