Congress Must Rein in Drone Diplomacy for Security Cooperation Before it Backfires

As unarmed US drones circle Mexico’s northern border supporting joint counter fentanyl efforts under the banner of cartel surveillance, the line between operational cooperation and political friction has never been clear. Relationships between the United States and Mexico have remained tense due to ongoing issues with border security, ongoing trade complications, and the current political climate between the two nations. President Claudia Sheinbaum publicly emphasized that the US surveillance flights were conducted “in coordination…and at the request of her government,” a framing confirmed by Mexico’s defense leadership, which clarified that US aircraft had not crossed into Mexican airspace. The continued day-to-day coordination occurs even as relations remain tense. Congress has not yet set clear guardrails for cross-border drone operations that implicate sovereignty, covert-action, and due process. Congress needs to write the rules before practice becomes precedent.

Recent reporting indicates that the CIA’s drone surveillance program, that begun under the Biden administration, has been expanded under Trump. Mexican officials simultaneously have stressed that portions of the activity occurred within the framework of bilateral collaboration. US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Air and Maine Operations (AMO) has been operating MQ-9 Predator B Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to maintain domain awareness, contributing to a surveillance ecosystem that spans both Title 50 intelligence authorities and domestic Title 6 and Title 19 enforcement authorities. While this hybrid operational reality is widely understood among practitioners, it remains largely unacknowledged in statute. Congress must act before practice hardens into precedent.

CIA operated MQ-9 Predator drone surveillance flights designated to locate fentanyl production sights was significantly expanded after January 2025, continuing a longstanding bilateral cooperation with Mexico. At the same time, CBP AMO’s MQ-9 fleet has been conducting extended range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support US border enforcement. Although the platforms and sensors may resemble one another, the authorities, command relationships, and reporting requirements behind the missions are fundamentally different. Congress has no single integrated picture of how these pieces fit together.

An argument could be made that high value targeting cartel figures risks reproducing the martyrdom dynamics seen in jihadist environments. However, after a high value target is removed from the cartel ecosystem, the real risks are fragmentation, succession of violence, territorial rebalancing, and short-term coercive signaling. The killing of Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes in February 2026 triggered sweeping blockades, arson attacks, and armed disruptions across multiple Mexican states, not ideological activation that is seen in violent extremism/jihadism. These are kinetic and political shocks that reverberate through bilateral security cooperation, policing coordination, and local governance. They reflect the operational reality that practitioners actually face.

Doctrine and laws cover certain expectations regarding the use of drones. For example, on the intelligence side, Executive Order 12333 governs the collection of foreign intelligence. Similarly, under 50 U.S.C. § 3093, requires presidential notification to Congress regarding covert actions and findings. Based on military doctrine, Joint Publication 3-60 (Joint Targeting) and CJCSI 3160.01 (No Strike & Collateral Damage Estimation) provide the doctrinal architecture for any lethal strike, which includes requirements for target development, proportionality review, and collateral effects estimations. The Department of Defense Law of War Manualreinforces verification and feasible precaution requirements. But none of these regulations were designed for grey zone conflicts in which unarmed intelligence platforms are operating near or in an allied nation’s territory, which could become steppingstones toward kinetic options.

The 2011 drone strike that killed Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Saamir Khan, and later 16-year-old Abdulrahman al Aulaqi, led to litigation in Al-Aulagi v. Panetta. The case was ultimately dismissed, but the lesson remains: the United States has no clear, legislated due process framework for governing lethal targeting of US persons outside traditional theaters. Practitioners recognize that adolescents trained or indoctrinated by extremist networks occupy a legal grey zone, but Congress must still define the minimum procedural safeguards required when intelligence is incomplete, risks are high, and no battlefield context exists.

CBP’s MQ-9 Predator flights provide vital domain awareness to maintain air and maritime border security objectives. However, the Government Accountability Office has documented coordination gaps in UAS deployment. Amnesty International warns that using drones for border enforcement risks exploitation and marginalization of asylum seekers.

The use of drones by US intelligence agencies is not limited to just the CIA. Recent reports have emerged of Predator drones being deployed from Ft. Huachuca in Arizona to crackdown on illegal immigration. The use of predator drones to track illegal immigrants should be concerning as laws of international warfare discuss a certain level of acceptable harm and what limitations should be given to domestic surveillance. Amnesty International warns that using drones for border enforcement risks exploitation and marginalization of asylum seekers. Congressional oversight has not kept pace with the scale, duration, and data retention implications persistent aerial surveillance possess.

The bottom line is that drone enabled ISR is no longer an episodic tool. Drones are an embedded component of US-Mexico bilateral security cooperation. Practitioners can execute within the authorities and doctrine they have, but Congress must modernize the statutory scaffolding through comprehensive oversight, clarified authorities, codified due process protections, doctrinal compliance for any future kinetic decisions, and privacy regulations based on existing domestic standards.

Congress must set clear rules for the use of drones—protecting privacy at home, requiring authorization for strikes abroad, and preventing sovereignty violations near borders. Congress should require statutory warrant standards for domestic surveillance overviewed by committee, mandatory reporting and review for cross-border flights, and establish a clear due-process for utilizing drone strikes for US person abroad, regardless of suspected immigration status. Without rules, drones will keep flying into grey zones—where diplomacy falters and democracy erodes. Congress must act now—not after the next diplomatic rupture or tragic mistake.

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