The Houthis stand to gain very little from joining the fight on Iran’s side despite Tehran’s past support for their cause.

The United States and Israel are at war with Iran, and the conflict is spreading across the Middle East. Tehran is for the first time imposing a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, choking off global oil and gas shipping and hoping to raise the costs of attacking the Islamic Republic.

Iran learned to weaponize trade routes by watching its Houthi partners apply those tactics in and around the Red Sea. Since Hamas’ October 7 attacks in Israel, Houthi military pressure on critical shipping lanes has caused economic damage of upwards of $15–$20 billion dollars, as well as significant increases in cargo rates and insurance premiums.

Yet to this point, the Houthis have stayed out of Iran’s war. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi has made three statements on the conflict, but none have signaled the group’s military intentions or suggested that they are on the verge of striking out at Iran’s widening list of adversaries. What might be holding the Houthis back?

First, the Houthis are probably stung by earlier US and Israeli campaigns against them, and are feeling the ambient heat from Operation Epic Fury. One of the Trump administration’s key strategic goals for Iran, which it pursued first through negotiations and now via war, is to eliminate Iran’s support for its proxy networks, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. While focused on its air campaign in Iran, Israel pivoted to strike Hezbollah hard after the Lebanese group fired rockets early in the war. The Houthis are surely watching from Yemen, and may anticipate a similar response if they launch projectiles at Israel.

US strikes during Operation Rough Rider destroyed many Houthi weapons storage facilities and killed a number of Houthi technical staff supporting weapons manufacturing operations. It is likely, moreover, that Israel has increased its intelligence collection on the Houthis and could have new leadership strikes planned in response to a Houthi launch.

Last August and September, Israel conducted leadership strikes in Sanaa that killed nine members of the Houthi cabinet, which surely magnified the group’s internal concerns about operational security. A joint US-Israeli campaign that included decapitation strikes targeting Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the influential Jihad Council decision-making body could set the Houthis back more than they are willing to tolerate.

Second, the Houthis probably fear that Iran’s weakening will limit Tehran’s additional military support for the group. Iran has been the Houthis’ main supplier of weapons since at least 2009. Tehran today provides the Houthis with most of their high-value military equipment, including components for long-range projectiles that threaten Israel and the Gulf states. Iran’s supply of high-quality arms to the Houthis will undoubtedly decline after the current fighting stops. The Houthis could be fearful of depleting their existing stores of those weapons against Israel with no replenishment plan on the horizon.

Third, the Houthis probably know that their intervention won’t save Iran and would only harm their own interests. Since October 2023, the Houthis have demonstrated that they can hit targets in both the Gulf states and Israel, which are together the focus of Iran’s current counteroffensive. Yet the large distances involved and the significant failure rate of those launches would make any further attacks largely symbolic. Houthi missile strikes in any direction would be unable to tip the balance in Iran’s favor, and could invite decisive and potentially devastating retaliation.

Fourth, the Houthis are probably fearful of pressure from the Gulf states and their designs on Yemen. Saudi Arabia, which has maintained a truce with the Houthis since 2022, stands to gain the most if the Houthi movement is weakened. The Saudis sponsor armed Yemeni factions that are waiting in the wings to dislodge the Houthis from power in northern Yemen, and a false move by the Houthis could provide them the opening they need. The Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are probably leaning on the Houthis not to intervene in the war, confident that the Yemeni group will emerge weakened regardless of whether or not they join the fight.

Fifth, and finally, the Houthis want to preserve options with China, an increasingly important patron. Since 2023, China’s relationship with the Houthis has blossomed. In March 2024, Beijing cut a deal with the Houthis to immunize PRC-linked ships from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Last year, a Chinese company provided satellite targeting data that could support attacks against ships linked to the US and allies. China also enables a robust supply of weapons manufacturing components to the Houthis, accounting for one-third of the Houthis’ entire weapons supply chain.

Houthi leadership probably recognizes that Iran’s weakening increases its importance to China in the region. By cultivating strong ties with the Houthis and maintaining its PLA base in Djibouti, China stands astride a key chokepoint in the Red Sea, an advantageous position that could become critically important during a global conflict. The Houthis, for their part, probably believe that their dependence on PRC supplies to their indigenous weapons industry stands only to increase as Iran confronts its own military-industrial reconstruction needs. The PRC wants a swift end to Epic Fury, and the Houthis could be listening closely to that message.

These five rationales help explain why the Houthis have thus far stayed out of the war on Iran’s behalf. Of course, only Abdul Malik al-Houthi knows the group’s intentions, and several factors could shift their calculus toward active engagement. For the time being, however, the Houthis sit quietly from their mountain perch, watching the action with a good view.

About the Author: Nadav Samin

Nadav Samin is a fellow with Hudson Institute’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. He has two decades of experience working on Middle East issues, including more than a decade of government service in intelligence, counterterrorism, and international human rights investigations across the Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, and New York City Police Department. Dr. Samin is the author of two books on Middle East history and has taught previously at Dartmouth College, Hunter College, and New York University. He holds a PhD in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University.

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