The United States has proved its military superiority over Iran. Whether it can secure Iran’s enriched uranium, protect the Gulf states, and encourage popular protests is a different story.

What is already being called the Third Gulf War is now in its second week, and most of the commentary so far has focused on US and Israeli military operations, as well as Iran’s maximalist response. But three other issues are likely to determine the conflict’s future course and what might come next for both Iran and the region.

The first is the fate of Iran’s remaining uranium. Even if key nuclear facilities have now been damaged or destroyed, the most important issue isn’t the technology that they housed but the regime’s existing fissile material. Iran had managed to accumulate significant stocks of enriched uranium before the war, and those weren’t successfully eliminated during last summer’s “12-Day War.” According to authoritative estimates, the regime still possesses 440 kilograms or more of 60 percent enriched uranium—a sufficient quantity, if it were enriched further, to produce 10 nuclear weapons.

The location of that material is still unverified, although international authorities now believe they have a pretty good idea. Yet, unless it is located and secured, the Iranian nuclear problem at the crux of the current military campaign has not been solved in a meaningful sense. Physically gaining custody of that nascent stockpile, however, will require a ground component of some sort in the conflict.

Worried over the political optics, US officials like Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have remained coy about deploying a ground presence into Iran. But at least a small contingent of special forces operators might be needed to complete this mission. Alternatively, it could be taken up by trusted partners on the ground, which is likely part of the reason why the administration has explored other potential options (including the prospect of arming ethnic factions like the Kurds). So far, though, Washington doesn’t seem to have hit upon a workable solution. 

Second, there is a need for a regional security architecture. Persian Gulf states have watched the current conflict nervously, for a host of reasons. Most directly, they have become major targets of Iranian aggression, as Tehran has repeatedly sought to widen the war. But these energy producers are also rightly worried about escalation and oil market shocks, as the conflict continues to threaten to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of world oil exports pass.

If the war ends without a credible assurance framework—one capable of deterring Iran in the future and securing regional energy flows—Tehran will retain unacceptable leverage over politics in its neighborhood. Pentagon planners would do well to start thinking now about what such an architecture should look like, from an integrated air-and-missile defense architecture in the Gulf to expanded maritime security cooperation. They would do even better to begin those consultations without delay. 

The third critical variable is Iran’s domestic repression apparatus. In his February 28 speech announcing the start of Operation Epic Fury, President Trump told Iranians to prepare to take their country back. But that simply isn’t possible unless a good deal more is done to dismantle and neuter key elements of regime control like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij domestic militia, and internal surveillance structures.

This is so for good reason. When Iranians took to the streets earlier this year, the resulting clampdown was brutal, with perhaps as many as 36,500 killed by regime forces. It’s no wonder the war has not yet prompted the sort of mobilization the president has been hoping for. In order for that to happen, Iranians have to feel a good deal more confident in their chances of success (and safety) if they take to the streets. 

The real strategic endgame, in other words, is not just simply about military success. That goal, as the president has indicated, has already largely been achieved. Rather, bringing lasting change to Iran requires removing its nascent nuclear capability, stabilizing the Gulf, and weakening the current regime’s grip on its own population. The broader trajectory of Iran—and of the Middle East—will depend on the attainment of these conditions. 

About the Author: Ilan Berman

Ilan Berman is senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Departments of State and Defense. Mr. Berman is a member of the Associated Faculty at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, as well as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics.

The post What to Watch for Next in the Iran War appeared first on The National Interest.