Targeting neutral states
I ONCE carried into my lecture room The Law of Targeting by William H. Boothby. A student asked if the title was not a contradiction in terms. That’s the kind of question people ask whenever I give talks on the ‘laws of war’ — how can there be any law intact during war? Isn’t conflict defined as the complete breakdown of all laws and rules? In reality, though, there have been extensive efforts behind creating a body of law that regulates war — including the selection of targets. From the Lieber Code to the Oxford Manual, 1880, and onwards to the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the San Remo Air and Missile Warfare Manuals, a lot exists against which the conduct of states is measured during wars.
Another aspect of the law of war is the law of ‘neutrality’. The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion of 1996 on the threat and use of nuclear weapons and in its judgement on the ‘Nicaragua case’ (1986) recognised the validity of the law of neutrality as part of customary international law — meaning it is backed by almost all civilisations. According to Hague Convention V ‘Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land’, 1907, the territory of neutral power is inviolable and cannot be attacked unless it allows a belligerent to move munitions and troops or communication equipment installation (radar systems) across it. Allowing the use of territory for rescuing the sick and wounded is permitted and does not compromise neutrality. The first and foremost obligation of a neutral state is not to involve itself militarily in an armed conflict between states. Secondly, the neutral state is prohibited from providing military assistance to the warring parties.
It was during negotiations between the US and Iran on nuclear proliferation that the US and Israel militaries suddenly attacked mainland Iran. After the launch of Operation Epic Fury on Feb 28, US President Donald Trump described the operation as defensive and attempted to justify it by saying it was launched to eliminate ‘imminent threats’ from Iran. Israel described it as a ‘pre-emptive strike’, aimed at preventing an anticipated missile attack from Iran. Neither the US nor Israel has been able to provide any evidence that Iran intended to attack them. In private briefings to Congress, American officials are reported to have admitted that US intelligence did not demonstrate that Iran was preparing to strike before the US-Israeli joint attack on it. A statement issued by the American Society of International Law also concluded that Trump had failed to give any evidence of an imminent attack by Iran. Seen from this perspective, the US-Israel attack on Iran violates the UN Charter and customary international law relating to the use of force.
On its part, Iran, within an hour of being attacked, proceeded to strike back at US military bases across neighbouring Middle Eastern states, hitherto neutral in a political sense, as well as targets in Israel. Iranian officials insist that their response was both strategically necessary and legally defensible under the doctrines of both self-defence and anticipatory self-defence. Tehran claimed that its target selection conformed to the criteria provided in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Guidelines developed by respected institutions like the International Committee of the Red Cross.
A neutral state is prohibited from providing military assistance to the warring parties.
The most controversial aspect of Iran’s strikes was their location: sovereign territories of states in the region — all OIC fellow member states that were staying politically neutral and not supporting either side. However, they had allowed the US to have military bases on their territories long before the conflict. The real question is whether having US military bases on their soil compromises their neutrality in a legal sense during this conflict. The answer is regrettably in the affirmative even if they have no knowledge of military operations being executed from these bases. And that’s how — it seems — Tehran derives its legal basis to target them. First, these states had compromised their neutrality by hosting US forces actively engaged in hostilities. Under the Hague Convention, 1907, particularly Articles 2 and 5, a neutral state must not allow belligerents to use its territory for military operations; if it does, it risks losing its neutral protections. Iran’s position was that the presence of American strike assets transformed these bases into extensions of the battlefield.
Second, Iran emphasised that it was not targeting the host states themselves. Its foreign ministry clarified that the strikes were defensive actions taken against imminent threats and not violations of sovereignty. This meant that Iran was signalling that it respects the political neutrality of its neighbours and in its state practice during this conflict, Iran is drawing a distinction between ‘targeting foreign military bases’ versus ‘attacking the state’ — ‘targeting’ a term for the law of war and ‘attack’ a term to demonstrate the well-thought-out use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of a neighboring state.
This distinction has many implications. A crucial one is for the Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement — which can be put into action only if the attack by Iran is aimed squarely at Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and political independence. Tehran has continuously said that its use of force is only aimed at American military bases located on Saudi soil. In other words, Tehran, still accepts the political neutrality of Saudi Arabia that has opposed Operation Epic Fury. Once Iran changes its official position and declares that its action is now aimed at Saudi Arabia, then it will constitute an attack or aggression as contained in the meaning of the joint defence pact, making it obligatory on Pakistan to consider entering the theatre of war from the Saudi side.
The reason targeting is extensively regulated under the laws of war since long is primarily to prevent the cycle of reactions. The targeting by the US and Israel of a head of state, the assassination of those in the civilian and military command structure, the killings of schoolgirls and the sinking of a naval vessel with no belligerent intentions are bound to invoke bitter responses and strong reprisals. On the other hand, we await an explanation from Iran about the military necessity of going for targets away from US military bases such as hotels, data centres, civilian infrastructure and airports.
The writer is a former caretaker federal law minister and a public international law practitioner.
Published in Dawn, March 7th, 2026