How lessons from Iraq are shaping Starmer’s Iran response

When Keir Starmer briefed the House of Commons on the situation in Iran, the UK’s prime minister ended with a clear message: “We all remember the mistakes of Iraq, and we have learned those lessons.”

Tony Blair’s decision to bring British forces into the Iraq war in March 2003 has long loomed over the Labour party and British foreign policy. In 2011, then prime minister David Cameron was keen to stress to parliament that any action in Libya would “not [be] another Iraq”.

Two years later, the same reassurance was provided for intervention in Syria – only this time, the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, led the opposition to block military action.

For the current prime minister, the lessons from the events of 2003 were to ensure the legality of any military intervention, and that a clear plan for the future was in place.

It is unsurprising that he has picked up on the question of legalities, given his previous career. However, Starmer also specifically campaigned against action in Iraq. On the eve of the war, he wrote to The Guardian warning against military action: “Engaging in armed conflict in breach of international law is a precarious business.”

In the case of Iran, legalities remain just as sticky. There was no United Nations Security Council resolution to support US-Israeli activities, and it remains unclear how the current intervention relates to individual or collective self-defence.

When Starmer decided to instigate the use of British military assets in the region, and allow the US to use British bases for actions against missile sites, the language used in his statement was careful and specific. It focused on Iran’s “indiscriminate attacks” and “unlawful strikes”, allowing the UK to argue its position under international law as acting in self-defence.

There does not appear to be a “phase 4” – a post-combat plan for Iran. Nor is it clear what the US’s objectives are before combat operations can end.

Donald Trump has explicitly stated that he would like to see regime change. But whether a different leadership is sufficient, or if the full roots of the Islamic Republic have to be removed, remains unknown.

Lessons from the Iraq inquiry

Iran is not Iraq. There are many key differences in their political situations, geography and people, not to mention the amount of time to plan the military operation (despite pre-deployment at the beginning of the year and assets already in the area).

There are also differences in the intelligence situations, the recent diplomatic progress that has been made over nuclear issues, and the fact that the war in Iran is not an ideological pursuit akin to the neoconservative agenda of the 2000s.

However, both wars are ones of choice, and it is clear that Starmer intends to take a different approach to Blair. He would do well to return to some of the key lessons identified by the formal inquiry into events surrounding Britain’s role in the Iraq war.

In 2016, the results of the public inquiry – comprising 12 volumes and 2.6 million words – were published. Inquiry chair John Chilcot’s key points (as Starmer has alluded) were that “the circumstances in which it was decided there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory” – and that “the planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate”.

However, more issues remain relevant today. In particular, the ongoing Operation Epic Fury is a US military operation. It will not be possible for the UK to exert any significant influence in its planning. Any participation will be – as it was in Iraq – in subordination to the US.

As the Iraq inquiry report noted: “The US and UK are close allies, but the relationship between the two is unequal.” Despite the UK providing significant military assets and personnel to Iraq, it failed to exert any significant influence on US decisions.

Chilcot also reflected on the UK-US relationship in general. He stated that prime ministers will always exercise their political judgment in how to handle the US, depending on personal relationships and the issues under discussion. He also recognised there is no standard formula for this relationship.

Trump has made no secret of his frustration with the prime minister, telling journalists: “This is not Winston Churchill that we are dealing with.” Nonetheless, Starmer has so far refused to be pressured into a different approach.

The prime minister would do well to remember one of Chilcot’s points: that “the UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgments differ.”

While this may be challenging in the short term when dealing with the Trump administration, it will remain true in the long term.

Chilcot offered one final point that rings true today: “Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour. And when decisions have been made, they need to be implemented fully.”

Thus far, Starmer is following this advice, and should continue to do so.

Louise Kettle has received funding from the AHRC.