Iran is putting pressure on the US-UK ‘special relationship’ – but it has survived worse over the years

The so-called “special relationship” between the UK and the US appears to be at its lowest ebb for decades. As he sat alongside the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, at a White House press call on March 3, Donald Trump bitterly criticised Keir Starmer for his refusal to let the US use British bases to launch initial strikes on Iran.

Declaring he was “not happy with the UK”, he added: “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with.” Churchill was, of course, the first person to talk of a special relationship between the UK and the US in a speech made at Westminster College in Missouri in March 1946.

Over eight decades since then, successive British and US governments have projected an image of exceptional closeness, particularly in matters of defence and foreign policy. But Trump’s return to the US presidency and his pursuit of a more aggressive foreign policy, including most recently his decision to launch, with Israel, a campaign of airstrikes against Iran in pursuit of regime change, has revived an old question for the Starmer administration: how far should the UK publicly diverge from Washington given the significance of this relationship?

Starmer ruled out joining America and Israel in their campaign in a speech in the House of Commons on March 2, saying “the British government does not believe in regime change from the skies”. Having initially refused to allow British airbases to be used by the US in its campaign, he later softened his stance, allowing some UK bases in the Middle East to be used for strictly “defensive purposes”.

The US president and his secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, have strongly condemned his position. Trump said the prime minister “has not been helpful” and that the special relationship is “obviously not what it was”. Hegseth spoke of “traditional allies who wring their hands and clutch their pearls hemming and hawing about the use of force” in a clear reference to Starmer’s stance on Iran.

But, as Starmer told the Commons: “President Trump has expressed his disagreement with our decision not to join the initial strikes. But it is my duty to judge what is in Britain’s national interest, and that is the judgment I made. I stand by it.”

There were shades of his criticism of Trump over his declaration in January that the US must acquire Greenland by force if necessary. Then Starmer said that the world’s largest island “belongs to the people of Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark alone” and that “applying tariffs on allies for pursuing the collective security of Nato allies is completely wrong”, adding that: “We will of course be pursuing this directly with the US administration.”

The special relationship is often characterised as Britain acting as Washington’s subordinate, sacrificing independent judgement to remain close to the US. This view of the alliance is usefully captured by the caricature of Tony Blair as George W. Bush’s “poodle” over the 2003 Iraq war, blindly following Bush into folly. Indeed, with Iraq, the special relationship was described as having a “vice-like grip”, constraining British foreign policy.

But in important ways, this interpretation is misleading. Understanding why can help give an indication of how Keir Starmer’s government can respond to differing views with the US over foreign policy.

2003: ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’

Over Iraq, preserving the special relationship unquestionably mattered to British decision-makers – but it was not their primary focus. Instead, British and American leaders were in agreement. Both governments came to believe that regime change through military action was the only viable policy option to disarm and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.

It was felt that containment and weapons inspections were unworkable to prevent the Iraqi dictator from fulfilling his intention to regain a weapons programme in the future (he had previously used chemical weapons to terrible effect against Iran and his own people, but had destroyed them before the Gulf war).

Blair’s thinking was determined by his exposure to UK intelligence briefings. Analysing declassified briefings shows how the key concern changed over time. Intelligence moved the focus away from existing “weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs) in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war to Iraq’s breakout potential. This is having the technological, intellectual and financial resources to acquire them in the future.

Blair was reportedly willing to resign over his support for the invasion. This was nothing to do with pressure from Washington – he was a true believer in regime change in Iraq and was in lockstep with Bush as a result. Interviewed for a Channel 4 documentary in February 2026 – more than two decades later – Blair repeated his passionate belief that a military invasion of Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam from developing WMDs: “I did it because I thought it was right.”

No longer in lockstep?

But you don’t have to look far to find notable examples of where the UK has not aligned with the US: the Vietnam war was one – then prime minister Harold Wilson refused Lyndon Johnson’s request to send British troops to Vietnam. Previously in 1956, the Suez crisis, when the British prime minister Anthony Eden ignored US president Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning not to intervene in the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez canal, but was forced to back down.

So the idea that the UK has acted in lockstep with the US over major foreign policy decisions is far from the truth.

Starmer’s challenge, whether it’s over Greenland, Iran or a future foreign policy issue, is how to manage a relationship in which disagreement is open and rooted in competing views. Trump’s habit of seeking retribution against those he thinks have slighted him is worrying, his condemnation of Starmer for their differences over Iran shows this with some sharp words on both sides.

There’s no doubt that the divergence between the US and Britain over Iran is putting pressure on relations between the two countries. But for a relationship to be “special” implies respect that goes both ways. How that survives the current episode will tell us a lot about the relationship’s future.

Matt Barr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.