Trump's preemptive war with Iran could leave him boxed in

As the joint military operation by the U.S. and Israel unfolds, officials in the Trump administration have taken pains to insist that this will not be “another Iraq.” The Secretary of Defense, the vice president and the president himself have all publicly rejected comparisons to the 2003 invasion. There will be no occupation. No nation-building. No long-term ground commitment.

I suspect they mean it.

And yet, despite those assurances, a president who has spent years condemning the Iraq War as reckless and stupid may find himself in much the same place as his predecessor. The operation against Iran reveals the dangerous, enduring appeal of preemptive war for U.S. presidents.

There is no doubt that the Trump administration is pursuing a different tactical version of preemption than George W. Bush did. But the underlying reasoning is strikingly similar: Eliminate a future threat now, reshape the strategic landscape and avoid waiting for an imminent attack.

That logic is seductive. It promises decisiveness. It promises control over uncertainty. It suggests that force used today can prevent greater danger tomorrow.

That logic has always been powerful. It is also historically fraught.

It is now clear that this operation is targeting the regime itself, evidenced by the targeted killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. That’s no longer just about centrifuges. That’s regime decapitation territory.

The president’s language expanded to include freedom and democracy when he told The Washington Post early Saturday morning: “All I want is freedom for the people.”

That is an ambitious goal — and it echoes 2003.

There are important differences in how the Trump administration is pursuing regime change. Most notably, it appears Trump is attempting to bring about regime change without boots on the ground. Instead, he has called on the Iranian people to take back their government, stating, “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will probably be your only chance for generations.”

Striking only from the sky

The interpretation seems straightforward: The U.S. will strike from the skies, but it will be up to the Iranian people to finish the job on the ground. History offers reason for caution. Regime change is rarely achieved through bombing campaigns alone.

The University of Chicago's Robert Pape, a leading expert on air power, offered a pointed reminder the morning of the attack: “Air power rarely produces friendly regime change. Since WWI, dozens of bombing campaigns have tried to coerce governments from the air. None installed leaders more cooperative with the attacker.”

Air power can destroy things. It is far less reliable at constructing new political orders.

Preventive war is seductive for a reason. It promises the chance to eliminate threats before they mature. It allows leaders to seize the initiative rather than react to events. But it also creates escalation dynamics that are difficult to manage.

Iran is arguably the weakest it has been in decades. But weakened does not mean harmless. Iran retains the ability to retaliate. And unlike previous incidents, when Tehran carefully calibrated its response to avoid escalation, that restraint may not hold if the regime believes its survival is directly at stake. Iran’s retaliation will likely aim to impose costs — militarily and politically — in ways that pressure the administration to widen the conflict.

That is how limited wars become less limited.

A consequential difference between the Trump and Bush approaches is how little explanation we’ve received for the operation in Iran. The Bush administration made a concerted effort to sell the war to the American people, to Congress, and to the international community. We can spend plenty of time dissecting the flaws in that case, but at minimum, they made one.

Days into the operation, it is still not entirely clear what the goals are. This matters because goals dictate strategy. A campaign designed to degrade nuclear facilities looks very different from one designed to topple a regime and free the Iranian people. Without clarity of purpose, it is difficult to define success. In war, if you haven’t defined the finish line, it is hard to reach it.

The administration clearly wants to avoid “another Iraq.” But it is undertaking a risky operation that could leave it in a position not unlike the one George W. Bush ultimately faced. It is difficult to predict how this will unfold. But the possibility of being drawn into a wider, longer and more costly conflict is real.

Presidents can decide when a war starts. They rarely control how it concludes.

William Muck is a professor and chair of political science at North Central College in Naperville, where he teaches international politics and U.S. foreign policy. His research focuses on international security and military intervention.