Belief, border and bombs: What long-term instability in Iran means for Pakistan
On Sunday afternoon, protesters in Islamabad pressed shoulder to shoulder, most of them dressed in black, and chanted slogans that rippled through the crowd. “Death to America, death to Israel,” they shouted in unison. Among them was also Kazim Hussain, who clutched a portrait of Ayatollah Khamenei.
The student, also an activist affiliated with Shia group Imamia Students Organisation (ISO), believes that the crisis unfolding in Iran was not a distant geopolitical conflict playing out beyond Pakistan’s western border. For him, it is deeply personal and emotionally moving.
“This is not just an attack on Iran. It concerns all Shia Muslims,” he said, raising his voice above the chants as the crowd marched toward the US embassy. “The death of Ayatollah Khamenei will not end the movement. It has strengthened it.”
Kazim’s words reflect a growing wave of anger and grief within Pakistan’s Shia community following the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader amid escalating attacks by Israel and the United States, as well as Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and Gulf states.
The demonstration in Islamabad and other parts of the country, which was carried out hours after Khamenei’s assassination was confirmed by the Iranian state media, turned deadly soon after it commenced. At least 22 protesters, most of them Shia, were killed in violent demonstrations outside the US consulate in Karachi, the US embassy in Islamabad and Skardu.
But beyond the emotional outpour and charged sentiments lies a consequential question for Pakistan: what could prolonged instability in Iran mean for our own fragile security landscape?
Islamabad and Tehran share a 900-kilometre border that has long been vulnerable to militant activity, smuggling networks, and sectarian spillover. Pakistan is also home to an estimated 15 to 20 per cent Shia population, one of the largest outside Iran. Many in this community look to Tehran’s clergy and leadership for religious guidance and, at times, political support.
Experts and Pakistani security officials warn that instability in Iran could increase cross-border movement by armed groups and inflame sectarian tensions within Pakistan’s already polarised society.
For a country already battling insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, facing a hostile Taliban-led government in Afghanistan that Islamabad accuses of sheltering Pakistani militant groups, and grappling with deep internal divisions, instability in a neighbouring state carries tangible security risks.
Pakistan’s precarious balancing act
Pakistan has historically navigated a careful equilibrium between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Each relationship carries strategic and economic weight for Islamabad.
Saudi Arabia is a key source of financial support and employment for millions of Pakistani workers. Iran carries both geopolitical and religious significance, particularly since the 1979 Islamic Revolution brought Shia clerical leadership to the forefront of regional politics. Meanwhile, the United States plays a significant role in Pakistan’s access to international financial institutions.
A defence pact signed last year between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia stipulates that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on the other. Saudi Arabia was struck by Iran in the current conflict, further complicating Islamabad’s diplomatic calculus.
Amid the latest escalation, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry condemned what it described as “unwarranted attacks” on Iran, calling them a threat to regional stability, but stopped short of naming the United States or Israel. It also criticised Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states.
The government’s position has drawn criticism from some Shia groups. Senator Allama Nasir Abbas, who leads Majlis Wahdat Muslimeen — a major Shia political party — said that the government should issue “an explicit condemnation” of Israel and the United States and formally affirm “Iran’s right to defend its sovereignty”.
The sentiment is echoed not just in the Shia power corridors but also among the public. “Pakistan cannot stay silent when our religious leadership is under attack,” said Ali Raza, a protester in Islamabad. “By refusing to clearly name those responsible, the government is turning its back on its own people.”
For their part, Pakistani officials insist that foreign policy decisions cannot be driven by sentiment; they must be guided by security, stability, and long-term strategic consideration.
“We understand the emotional response on the streets,” said a senior Pakistani security official in Islamabad. “But the state must act in accordance with national interests amid a changing geopolitical situation.”
‘Vulnerable’ sectarian landscape
Pakistan’s sectarian landscape has long been vulnerable to external shocks. Analysts and officials frequently characterise domestic Sunni-Shia tensions as intertwined with broader geopolitical rivalries between Tehran and Riyadh.
Although sectarian violence between the two communities has declined in most parts of the country over recent years, some exceptions remain. Case in point: Kurram, a former tribal district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where sectarian tensions continue to intersect with long-standing land disputes between Sunni and Shia tribes.
Security officials maintain that the state retains the capacity to contain unrest in major urban centres in the short term. However, they caution that sustained instability in the Middle East could stretch domestic security resources, particularly if demonstrations were to become prolonged and coordinated across cities.
A senior Shia community figure noted that Khamenei was viewed not merely as Iran’s leader but as a symbolic authority for Shia communities worldwide, and that developments affecting Iran resonate deeply among Shia youth in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, analysts warn that prolonged instability in Iran could revive patterns previously observed during the Syrian conflict, when marginalised individuals were drawn into foreign battlefields
“If Iran’s regime collapsed and different centres of power began fighting for control, or even if it remains unified but faces prolonged mass unrest, Pakistan could once again see its Shia communities, especially those on the margins, recruited to fight, as happened in Syria,” said Adam Weinstein, deputy director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute in Washington.
“This war will also complicate US-Pakistan relations as Pakistan’s sizeable Shia population and much of the broader public are likely to view it as imperial overreach,” he added.
Security officials also express concern about the potential revival of cross-border recruitment networks. During the Syrian conflict, Pakistani Shia fighters were mobilised under the banner of the Zainebiyoun Brigade to defend Shia holy sites from the militant Islamic State’s (IS) attacks.
A renewed regional confrontation involving Iran could create opportunities for militant actors, particularly with anti-Shia tendencies, to exploit sectarian polarisation.
Although Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the major anti-Shia militant group, has been significantly weakened following the deaths and arrests of many of its senior leaders, security assessments indicate that some former members have aligned themselves with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), continuing attacks under a new organisational banner.
A suicide bombing at a Shia mosque last month near Islamabad, killing 31 worshippers, claimed by the ISKP, highlighted the operational capacity of transnational jihadist networks.
A Lahore-based police officer monitoring sectarian groups said that periods of heightened tension between Iran and its adversaries often lead local actors in Pakistan to interpret international developments through sectarian narratives.
Such framing, he warned, creates openings for banned organisations or splinter factions in Pakistan to mobilise supporters.
Border instability and the Balochistan factor
Security officials and analysts caution that escalating instability in Iran could create “ungoverned spaces” along the 900-kilometre frontier with Pakistan. The rugged, mountainous border has long served as a conduit for separatist militancy, jihadist networks, and entrenched smuggling routes, making it acutely vulnerable to spillover unrest.
The risks are most acute in Balochistan. Gripped by a decades-long separatist terror movement, the province maintains deep ethnic and tribal linkages with Iran’s neighbouring Sistan and Baluchestan Province. Families straddle the border, and local economies depend heavily on both formal and informal cross-border trade.
Michael Kugelman, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote on X that a “new war in Iran could badly disadvantage Pakistan as it faces an all-out conflict with Afghanistan,” potentially leading to unrest spilling over into Balochistan, emboldening separatist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and forcing Islamabad to manage instability along both its northwestern and southwestern borders.
“And this would all play out amid a dangerously tense eastern border with India, with relations in a deep freeze less than a year after their worst conflict since 1971,” he added.
Relations between Islamabad and Tehran have remained strained for years. Pakistani officials have long accused Iran of turning a blind eye to BLA militants targeting security forces and Chinese-funded infrastructure.
In return, Tehran accuses Islamabad of harbouring Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni Iranian extremist group. Tensions peaked in early 2024 when the two neighbours traded unprecedented missile strikes.
Some analysts warn that renewed turmoil in Iran could also provide further space and impetus to certain factions affiliated with the terrorist BLA, such as the one led by Herbayar Marri, which calls for “Greater Balochistan”, a cross-border parcel of land threatening the territorial integrity of both Islamabad and Tehran.
The instability is already being felt in the Makran region of Balochistan, bordering Iran, home to the Chinese-operated deep-sea port of Gwadar. Local district authorities have advised residents to avoid travel to Iran and stay out of Iranian territorial waters, citing “volatile security conditions”.
For these scattered settlements, the border is an economic lifeline. With Karachi roughly 700km away and Quetta nearly 900km away, Iranian markets fill critical supply gaps. Affordable Iranian fuel sustains transport and small industries, while essential goods, including flour, cooking oil, and household staples, flow across the border. When crossings close, the disruption is immediate: shuttered shops, idle blue Zambad pickup trucks, and mounting uncertainty.
“Our survival is tied to what happens across that border,” said Abid Ashraf, a trader engaged in cross-border commerce in Makran. “If Iran is unstable, we do not just lose business, we lose the means to live.”
The future
The death of Iran’s supreme leader threatens to redraw the Middle East’s power map, leaving Pakistan bracing for a multi-front security crisis and a systemic test of its borders.
Security officials and regional analysts outline three trajectories. In the most contained scenario, Tehran restores order swiftly, enabling Islamabad to sustain its uneasy balancing act, managing limited protests and diplomatic pressure without systemic disruption.
In the second, a period of sustained unrest without full state collapse could sharpen sectarian tensions inside Pakistan and revive militant recruitment pipelines. This would strain Islamabad’s ties with Washington and Riyadh while security forces remain overstretched along the Afghan border.
And the most destabilising outcome involves state fragmentation, creating power vacuums along the shared border. Combined with existing tensions with Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities, Pakistan would confront simultaneous instability on two western fronts.
Much will depend on Pakistan’s ability to contain the spillover — and on whether regional actors opt for restraint over escalation.
Header image: A Shia supporter of the Imamia Student Organisation holds a portrait of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran’s national flag, during a protest against Israel and the US strikes on Iran, in Karachi, Pakistan, February 28, 2026. — Reuters