Turkey views Iran’s sizable Kurdish population as a potential threat to Turkey’s internal unity.

Prior to the start of US and Israeli military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey attempted to maintain a poker face, urging de-escalation and denying rumors of planned action from Ankara. Now that an attempt is underway to remove Iran’s theocratic regime, the United States must remain vigilant about Turkish military actions. 

Turkey’s government, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has refrained from taking part in the conflict. Instead, despite several US allies coming around to support the military action, Erdogan has chosen to condemn the strikes. Erdogan even expressed “sadness” for the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who was eliminated in the opening hours of the war. 

Turkey’s reticence to take part in this evolving regional war for now does not mean that its actions will be limited to rhetoric indefinitely. Erdogan is calculating his next moves to best capitalize on what may become an opportune crisis. For now, Ankara is highlighting national security concerns arising from migratory pressures along its eastern border with Iran. Erdogan has taken to calling regional counterparts in the Arab Gulf in a fruitless round of telephone diplomacy, attempting to garner support for a ceasefire—without which he claims the Middle East will be engulfed in a “ring of fire.” 

Ankara has chosen not to participate in combat operations with Washington, its treaty ally, to remove the regime in Tehran. This helps to explain why Iran has not targeted military assets in Turkey thus far, as it has done with several Arab states like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

But a conflict that grinds on for several weeks could compel Ankara to position its military inside Iran. And the most likely catalyst that would lead Ankara toward military action is a determination that a Kurdish threat to Turkey could emerge from an Iran in turmoil.

And that possibility may soon appear on the horizon: President Donald Trump recently held a telephone call with regional Kurdish leaders. If the president intends to precipitate a Kurdish uprising inside Iran to topple the regime, this could very well be the pretext Erdogan needs to enter Iran.

How Turkey Is Playing Up an Iranian Kurdish Threat

When the prospects of US military action rose sharply in January 2026, Turkish leaders sued for negotiations on Tehran’s behalf, even platforming the regime’s foreign minister at an eleventh-hour press conference in Istanbul on January 30. Since then, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have harried Washington and NATO to avoid a military response, citing regional destabilization as their chief fear.

Ankara’s supposed preparations for a worst-case scenario—Iranian regime collapse and chaos on the border—have drawn broad attention. While the Turkish Communications Directorate quickly denied “plans to invade Iranian territory for security reasons,” speculation on Turkey’s course of action has abounded. If Turkey acts militarily, the most likely justification it will give is an operation to prevent “terrorist attacks” arising from Iranian Kurds affiliated with Iran’s Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). PJAK is an offshoot of Turkey’s separatist Kurdish movement, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey, the United States, and the European Union consider to be a terrorist organization.

On February 22, PJAK joined with four other Iranian Kurdish parties to form a coalition for “the struggle for the liberation of Eastern [Iranian] Kurdistan.” Turkish ultranationalist outlets have already begun raising alarm over what they deem PJAK’s inevitable plan to establish a “terror corridor” on Turkey’s eastern border, akin to Kurdish forces’ former zone of control in Syria.

Turkey’s Military Posture

As of late February, Ankara’s military posture indicated readiness to conduct cross-border operations should Turkish leaders deem them necessary or opportune. Despite opposing military intervention in Iran, Turkey has permitted NATO airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft to fly monitoring missions over eastern Turkey. These planes are designed to monitor the movements of hostile aircraft and will provide Turkey with valuable intelligence on immediate developments.

Neither Turkish nor international sources have yet reported major movements from Turkey’s Second Army, the field army responsible for securing the borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. However, coverage of supposed cross-border plans has exploded throughout Turkey and Western outlets, with the possibilities remaining vague. 

Turkish statements currently reflect a mix of denial and open-ended justification on the matter of cross-border operations into Iran. Addressing rumors of incursion plans in the event of a US strike, the Turkish Defense Ministry reasserted that such claims “do not reflect the truth” on February 26. On the other hand, Erdogan cited Turkish readiness for unilateral military action: “Wherever there is a threat, we will eliminate them at the source without seeking permission from anyone.”

Turkish military adventurism over the last decade has demonstrated Ankara’s flippancy in respecting neighbors’ territory. Despite Erdogan’s persistent claims that Syrian territorial integrity is a “strategic necessity” for Turkey, Ankara’s army continues to occupy large swaths of northern Syria, the fruits of three invasions between 2016 and 2019. This could be an option that Turkey considers as the situation in Iran unfolds. 

What Might Trigger Turkish Military Action

International media have cited a possible refugee crisis as a sufficient cause for Turkish cross-border activity. Turkey’s border with Iran—while with military observation posts—could be strained by mass civilian displacement, even considering the remote and hazardous terrain. 

Yet the most salient pretext for major Turkish cross-border operations or territorial seizure in northwestern Iran is the PJAK issue. Should PJAK’s freedom of maneuver grow with major strikes on Iran’s government, Turkey may launch cross-border operations. PJAK is not involved in the PKK’s current disarmament process with the Turkish government, which may soften the political heat Erdogan would face at home in intervening against the Iranian Kurds. Ankara has also previously targeted PJAK elements in Iran and elsewhere. Kurdish outlets reported in September 2020 that Turkish artillery shelled alleged PJAK positions near the Iran-Turkey border. In August 2022, a Turkish drone strike killed a senior PJAK officer during a visit to Syria. 

Independent Turkish press described two possible scenarios for Turkish military action: an early-stage push to establish border shelters for a refugee crisis, and later incursions into Iran to secure a buffer zone if the Iranian state fails. Turkey’s intervention in northern Iraq—combining extensive airstrikes with a network of ground outposts in a mountainous, insurgent-sheltering hinterland—holds clues as to what such a buffer zone might look like in Iran. Nevertheless, the magnitude of PJAK or Kurdish coalition activity in a collapsing Iran would be the final determinant.

Erdogan has a concrete interest in limiting cross-border operations. Turkey’s next election is two years away at most, and the president appears poised to set his son, Bilal Erdogan, up for the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). An extensive and costly military deployment is not conducive to his party’s political future, and any military incursions will most likely be balanced with a concern for domestic electability.

About the Authors: Sinan Ciddi and William Doran

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow on Turkey at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. Sinan has over two decades of research experience focused on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy, with bylines in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Politico, Newsweek, The National Interest, and 19FortyFive. He frequently provides commentary on various media outlets, including BBC, CNN International, DW News, France 24, the Greek Current Podcast, and CBS’s John Batchelor Show. Sinan is also an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

William Doran is a student at Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service and a research intern at the Turkey Program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

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