What Government Might Replace the Ayatollah – Possibly a New Ayatollah

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is dead, as are many of the country’s top leaders. However, there is still a leadership structure in place, and the regime has not yet fallen. Predicting what comes next is difficult because multiple factions are in play. Those with the most power and the greatest chance of succeeding are calling for the appointment of a new ayatollah.

The strikes were described as “decapitation strikes” and reportedly killed more than 40 high-ranking officials. Notable casualties include the defense minister, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

While the leadership has been severely depleted, the regime itself has not collapsed. The coercive apparatus, specifically the remaining elements of the IRGC, appears to be maintaining control through checkpoints and a nationwide internet blackout.

Per Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution, an Interim Leadership Council has been formed to manage the state until a permanent successor is chosen. The council includes Masoud Pezeshkian, the president of Iran; Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the chief justice; and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, a senior cleric from the Guardian Council appointed to represent the religious establishment. There have been unverified rumors of an attack on Arafi, but his death has not been confirmed.

The existing government, clerics, and military would seek to preserve the Islamic system, while the opposition would attempt to move the country in a different direction. However, opposition factions lack the popular support and power to seize control without external help. President Trump appears to be taking a pragmatic stance in Iran, similar to Venezuela, using U.S. military pressure to tip the scale in favor of the opposition while avoiding entangling the United States in another Iraq or Afghanistan with boots on the ground or attempting to build a new government from scratch under fire.

The primary opposition elements are the MEK, the NCRI, and Reza Pahlavi. The MEK, formally known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, also called the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, is one of the oldest and most controversial Iranian opposition groups. Founded in the 1960s by university students, its ideology has been described as a blend of Islamism and Marxism.

The group originally opposed the Shah and played a role in the 1979 Revolution but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini and was forced into exile. During the Iran-Iraq War, the MEK sided with Saddam Hussein against Iran, a decision that led many Iranians to view the organization as traitors.

Now based primarily in Albania, the group operates politically through the National Council of Resistance of Iran. While it maintains significant lobbying influence in Washington, D.C., many analysts argue it has little popular support inside Iran because of its past actions and what critics describe as a cult-like internal structure.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, led by Maryam Rajavi, has moved quickly to fill the power vacuum.

On February 28, 2026, the NCRI formally declared the formation of a provisional government, presenting itself as the only organized alternative ready to assume power immediately. Its Ten-Point Plan for what it calls a democratic republic includes the dissolution of the IRGC and the Basij, a non-nuclear Iran, and complete gender equality.

During the 2026 protests, one of the group’s prominent slogans has been, “No to the Shah, No to the Mullahs.” The NCRI is openly anti-monarchy and argues that restoring the Pahlavi family would amount to exchanging one dictatorship for another.

The NCRI operates from two primary international hubs while claiming to expand activity inside Iran. For decades, its main political headquarters has been in Auvers-sur-Oise, France, where Maryam Rajavi and the Secretariat are based. The location functions as a parliament-in-exile, hosting international delegations and coordinating lobbying efforts.

Operationally, much of the group’s manpower is concentrated at Ashraf-3 in Manëz, Albania. After being expelled from Iraq in 2016, thousands of MEK members relocated there. The fortified complex serves as the organization’s logistical hub, media center, and residence for its cadres.

The NCRI also maintains a representative office in Washington, D.C., where it regularly briefs U.S. policymakers and holds press conferences on developments inside Iran.

Following the February 28 declaration, the organization’s structure has reportedly become more decentralized. The NCRI claims its base is increasingly shifting inside Iran through so-called Resistance Units operating in cities such as Tehran, Tabriz, and Shiraz. According to the group, these units have hung banners of Maryam Rajavi and coordinated local strikes in preparation for a potential return.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains the pivotal force in this power struggle. As a paramilitary organization that answers directly to the ayatollah, the IRGC has long been viewed as the key to preserving or dismantling the regime. Its actions will likely determine the success or failure of any intervention.

Even as military strikes target IRGC leadership and assets, the Guard is reportedly consolidating control in Tehran by securing vital infrastructure and preventing the interim council from making concessions to the West. Some observers describe the situation as a soft coup in progress.

There have also been reports over the last 72 hours of limited defections. While the core leadership remains hardline, some local commanders in provinces such as Sistan-Baluchistan and Kurdistan have reportedly refused orders to fire on protesters, allowing small liberated zones to emerge. The NCRI is said to be attempting to coordinate with local committees inside Iran to support these areas, although its senior leadership remains in France for security reasons.

Several scenarios are under discussion. One is that the IRGC could formally seize control and swear allegiance to a newly selected ayatollah. Reports indicate the Guard is lobbying the Assembly of Experts to appoint Mojtaba Khamenei, seeking what some describe as “a Khamenei without the clergy,” a figure who would provide religious legitimacy while leaving real power in military hands.

Another risk is fragmentation. Intelligence reports suggest the Quds Force, the IRGC’s external-operations wing, may have activated contingency cells in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to target U.S. assets, exporting the crisis abroad to relieve pressure at home.

Although it is an official armed force, the IRGC is distinct from the regular army, known as the Artesh. The Artesh is a traditional national military institution and is generally viewed as more professional and more respected by the public.

The Artesh remains a wild card. During the 2026 protests, it has largely stayed in its barracks. If the IRGC were to attempt a full military coup to install Mojtaba, armed confrontation between the IRGC and the Artesh could trigger a civil war and potentially collapse the country.

Beyond the military, the mullahs command tremendous influence. Given that the ayatollah was already 90 years old, a succession plan was likely in place.

One possible successor is his second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, 56, who has long been viewed as a behind-the-scenes power broker and gatekeeper to his father. Often referred to by supporters as “Ayatollah Mojtaba,” his religious credentials remain debated among senior clerics. He is believed to have exercised significant influence over the IRGC and the Basij militia and has been associated with some of the regime’s harshest crackdowns, including the suppression of the 2009 Green Movement and later protests.

Mojtaba’s candidacy presents an ideological dilemma. The 1979 Revolution sought to end hereditary monarchy under the Shah, and elevating the former leader’s son could be seen as contradicting that principle. Unlike many clerical contenders, Mojtaba is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and has cultivated a soldier-cleric image. That persona reportedly makes him popular with elements of the military elite while generating concern among segments of the public.

Another potential contender is Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran. Living in exile since the 1979 Revolution, primarily in the United States, he has positioned himself as a leading opposition figure.

Unlike his father, who ruled as an absolute monarch, Pahlavi says he supports a secular parliamentary democracy. He has stated that he does not necessarily seek to return as king but would serve as a transitional figure to facilitate a national referendum allowing Iranians to choose their form of government.

In 2025 and 2026, as tensions escalated, Pahlavi advanced a governance proposal known as the Iran Prosperity Project and adopted a pro-Western, pro-Israel stance, advocating what he calls a Cyrus Accord to restore ties between Iran and Israel. He remains one of the most recognizable faces of the opposition. During protests inside Iran, demonstrators have chanted, “Reza Shah, bless your soul,” reflecting nostalgia for the Pahlavi era or rejection of clerical rule.

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