Other side of the coin

IN the midst of upheaval in the region, Pakistan has been busy with its own challenges in the neighbourhood. I wrote ‘struggling’ to then replace it with ‘busy’, for most of the reporting and commentary on local platforms is unequivocal about the success of Pakistan’s attacks on Afghanistan, which began some days ago.

The air attacks within the Afghan territory or the skirmishes on the border are not the first of their kind. In the past too, provoked by terrorist attacks, Pakistan has carried out strikes in Afghanistan. This time was no different. From the coordinated attacks across Balochistan to the imambargah suicide bombing in Islamabad, retaliation against Afghanistan was simply a matter of time. It is no secret that the regime in Kabul is doing more than simply providing sanctuary to the TTP and allowing it to pursue its violent agenda in Pakistan. Multiple efforts to address this matter through diplomacy have failed, leaving force as the only option on the table, is the argument.

These assaults are aimed at weakening the TTP based in Afghanistan and raising the costs for the government in Kabul, which, it is hoped, will convince it to rethink its support for the TTP. So far, however, there is no news of the deaths of high-profile TTP leaders, while the jury is still out on the change in behaviour in the Afghan Taliban.

From one vantage point, though, the strikes in Afghanistan seem reactive rather than part of a broader strategy. This is not an easy statement to make because emotions are running high in Pakistan over the terrorist attacks and sentiment is being whipped up rather than a comprehensive response being formulated.

This time around, there is little effort to win over the public.

Consider that the terrorist threat in both KP and Balochistan has changed considerably in recent years in terms of tactics, capacity and the mood of the society in which they operate. From the little one can see, the military continues to operate by the same playbook put together in the noughties, when Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani first shaped the response to the militant threat in what was then Fata. The approach still is to displace residents and then sweep the area clean. But while this tactic made sense at a time when large swathes were in the control of the TTP, it is hard to understand why this is so now when the TTP is no longer holding areas and the local population is resentful of displacement.

Indeed, the locals’ discontent seems to have no impact on the government. Instead, all energies are focused on the Afghan end of the Taliban problem, with the assumption that little needs to be done domestically to control the problem. The presence of those TTP elements in Pakistan who may not be crossing the border back and forth; the casualties in IBOs which points to insufficient or wrong information and the lack of support from the communities are not discussed.

Contrast this with the approach in the noughties. Terrorism, in some ways, was a bigger threat in 2007. But the then army chief approached it very differently. The first step was to allow elections and a legitimate government in Islamabad and KP. The coalition government in KP was willing to back the military operations as the military then also distanced itself — on the surface from Gen Musharraf and the political arena. During this period, the political government was given the chance to resolve the situation — when Sufi Mohammad was released and according to some accounts, even TTP fighters were freed. In retrospect, that dialogue was bound to fail.

Once this ‘one-page’ approach to extremism and militancy was in place, an effective media campaign was carried out to build up sentiment against the Taliban. There were stories about the atrocities carried out in Swat, for instance. Journalists reported openly from the valley and there were stories aplenty that did the rounds through word of mouth in the absence of social media and anonymous accounts. But so effective was the campaign that by the time the operation in Swat began, it was widely welcomed in many parts of the country.

And after it did begin, there were daily briefings, carried out by then DG ISPR Athar Abbas and then information minister Qamar Zaman Kaira, together. It didn’t get more one-page than that. In parallel, reports circulated of how many TTP men were non-Muslims and were found to be uncircumcised — to convince those military men who may have been reluctant to fight co-religionists. I remember during a trip (with the military) to an area in then Fata, a soldier saying that before being deployed to the area, he had been sceptical of how serious the situation was and whether the fighting was real.

This time around, there is little effort to win over the public. The mood in KP (Balochistan is a different ball game altogether) is being ignored, and it seems no one is trying to change it. In fact, there is little awareness outside of KP of the fact that no political party in the province seems willing to support operations — the recent jirga called by the PTI government there made this clear. Instead of creating support for the military operations and shaping public opinion, the government’s own prejudices are alienating communities outside of Punjab. The recent ‘achaa jee’ video put out by the federal government illustrates this.

Neither do the power wielders appear to have a new plan. To repeat, they continue to use the Kayani playbook, but not effectively. The approach is to displace people, subsequently denied in the mainstream press. Tirah was a case in point. There is not even a debate on whether new ideas or strategies are needed, 20 years down the line.

The point here is not to say Afghanistan is not a part of the larger problem but to suggest that terrorism will not end by simply twisting Kabul’s arm. Insurgencies cannot be eradicated by only focusing on external factors and ignoring local conditions. And I ran out of space before I could even touch on Balochistan. Next time, perhaps.

The writer is a journalist.

Published in Dawn, March 3rd, 2026