Trump’s approach to Iran is a departure from containment policy of his predecessors

The joint US-Israeli combat operation against Iran, and the killing of its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a watershed moment in the US-Iran relationship. Bilateral interactions have been tense since 1979 when a revolution ousted Iran’s pro-American Shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, and replaced him with an Islamic theocracy opposed to the US.

However, these tensions have now bubbled over into direct conflict. The US and Israel have bombed Iranian cities, which Tehran has responded to by launching strikes across the region. Hostilities have now spread to Lebanon, with the Iran-backed Hezbollah group launching missiles and drones towards Israel in retaliation for Khamenei’s killing.

In a video statement posted on social media shortly after the US-Israeli intervention began, Trump appeared to justify his approach by saying the Iranian government’s activities “directly endanger the US, our troops, our bases overseas and our allies”. His actions signal a departure from a stated American foreign policy approach to Iran that has stood since the 1990s.

Consecutive US presidential administrations had developed a strategy of containing Iran, focused on trying to prevent its government from expanding its reach and influence across the Middle East. This has taken two forms. Presidents have either sought to isolate the country on the world stage or negotiate with its leadership to temper Iran’s expansionist tendencies.

Bill Clinton coined the approach and applied its two facets. His White House appropriated the idea from the stated US stance towards the Soviet Union and its allies during the cold war. Officials in his administration initially referred to Iran as a “rouge state” that was opposed to American interests and global stability.

In 1995, Clinton signed two orders strengthening the economic sanctions on Iran that had been in place since the 1979 revolution. The first forbade American companies from investing in the Iranian oil industry. And the second banned all US firms from conducting business in Iran. Clinton also pledged to impose sanctions on any firm or organisation outside the US that traded with the country.

But after the 1997 election of a reformist Iranian president in Mohammad Khatami, Clinton offered to negotiate with Tehran. To pave the way for diplomatic dialogue, his secretary of state, Madeline Albright, even publicly admitted to the CIA’s involvement in steering a coup in 1953 that resulted in the removal of the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh.

Clinton’s apparent u-turn, which also saw US economic sanctions relaxed to pre-1995 levels, yielded next-to-no tangible results. As supreme leader, Khamenei overruled Khatami’s attempts to engage with the US diplomatically.

George W. Bush emulated his predecessor’s initial approach to Iran. Whereas Clinton regarded Iran as a rouge state, Bush took this framework one step further in his 2002 State of the Union address. Due to the Iranian government’s supposed links to and support for terrorist groups, he referred to Iran as a member of the “axis of evil” – a nation that needed to be challenged and contained.

However, despite Bush’s tough rhetoric, his other foreign policy actions while in office benefited Iranian regional interests. In removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from Iraq, the Bush administration eliminated two of Iran’s key rivals. The next decade saw Iranian-backed proxy groups grow in prominence across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Barack Obama adopted Clinton’s latter approach towards the country. His administration negotiated with the Iranian government over its nuclear programme, which resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran pledged to limit its uranium enrichment and agreed to intensive monitoring.

The Obama administration sought to use the prospect of global inclusion and the lifting of economic sanctions to persuade Iran to check its regional expansionist aspirations. Joe Biden, who was US president between 2021 and 2024, sought to resurrect the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after Trump’s abandoning of the treaty in his first term.

Containment to confrontation

In targeting Iran’s leadership and military infrastructure, the Trump administration has departed from this well-established strategy. Trump has shifted American policy towards Iran from one of containment to confrontation. This is an approach the White House has worked towards for the past year, despite also engaging Iranian officials in talks.

Trump’s backing of Israel in its victories over Iranian-backed paramilitary groups like Hamas and Hezbollah tempered Tehran’s regional reach. His support for Israeli strikes on Iran during the 12-day war in 2025 culminated in the shattering of Iran’s air defences and intelligence infrastructure. Subsequent US air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities also halted the country’s enrichment programme.

Whether the killing of Iran’s political and religious leadership will result in a less belligerent Iran remains to be seen. While the Islamic Republic’s figurehead has been removed, the power structures that maintained Khamenei’s power remain intact. All indicators are that the Islamic Republic will implement a succession plan and double down against US-led incursions and encroachment.

Trump is pushing for regime change. In his statement announcing the strikes, the president urged Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic to take to the streets. Yet he did not go as far as endorsing the installation of the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, who enjoys considerable support among the Iranian diaspora.

The Trump administration is clearly on a path that has pushed the US towards direct confrontation with Iran. Whether or not this approach ultimately leads to an Iran that is more amenable to Israel and less antagonistic towards the US’s Gulf allies, it has brought decades of containment to an abrupt end.

Darius Wainwright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.