Trump’s National Security Chaos: What Needs to be Done

Earlier this week, I wrote about the dysfunction and danger associated with Donald Trump’s national security policies, processes, and personnel.  No one should expect the Trump administration to correct these deficiencies.  It lacks the personnel, the experience, the inclination to do so.  But we should nonetheless focus on what needs to be done.

The most important problem is the current tension and rivalry between the United States and China.  This is Washington’s most important bilateral relationship as well as the most important bilateral relationship in the international arena.  The United States must abandon the notion that Chinese power can be “contained” by the power of the United States.  Containment may have worked against a weak Soviet Union, but it is a non-starter with China.  Washington and Beijing appear to be operating on the basis of long-term hostility, which may well be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

U.S. and Chinese national security would be more stable—indeed, the entire international community would be more stable—if the two sides could agree to pursue normal forms of communication.  Sino-American cooperation is essential to addressing our greatest security challenge—the climate crisis. Ironically, Trump has an opportunity to pursue such a dialogue when he arrives in Beijing on March 31st for the first meeting with Xi Jinping since October 2025 in South Korea.

It is noteworthy, and a good sign, that Trump has softened his rhetoric toward China, and omitted China from his bellicose State of the Union address last week.  Trump’s recent reference to describing Sino-American relations as a “G-2” points to an interest in closer bilateral relations.

A major problem was created by the Bush administration 25 years ago. The key roles were played by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  With their guidance, the Pentagon emerged at the top of the national decision-making ladder.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 enhanced the influence of the military by making the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the “principal military advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense.”  The civilian secretaries of the army, navy, and air force lost a great deal of power and influence.  Prior to World War II, the military rarely had influenced foreign and national security policy.

The enhanced powers of regional commanders of chief in key areas of the world weakened the stature of assistant secretaries of state and ambassadors in the international community.  The regional commanders emerged as “proconsuls of the empire,” as general officers such as Anthony Zinni and David Petraeus gained influence and stature at home and abroad.  The uniformed military had increased influence over the budgetary process, foreign policy formulation, and the debate over transformation of the military in the 21st century.

Conversely, placing Marco Rubio at the helm of both the Department of State and the National Security Council has weakened both important institutions.  These two institutions must be rehabilitated in order to have any opportunity to place U.S.-European relations on a firmer footing.  Similarly, the DoS and the NSC are need to  explore “risk reduction” measures between the major nuclear powers.

The United States must reduce its bloated defense budget, which has topped $1 trillion, taking into account not only the Pentagon, but the Department of Energy, the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Veterans Administration.  The United States is responsible for  half of all military spending in the world, and the final bill for the endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be several trillion dollars, with no strategic benefits for U.S. interests.  President Eisenhower warned that military demands on U.S. spending would become a “cross of iron” that would limit essential spending on domestic needs.

Trump or his successor must find a way to return to the arms control table to reverse the current arms race between the United States, Russia, and China, particularly the race regarding strategic weaponry.  Arms control was the primary instrument for conducting a detente policy with the Soviet Union that defrosted the Cold War.  A resumption of an arms dialogue with the Russia and the inclusion of China could provide a similar instrument for at least mollifying the current cold war environment.

To paraphrase Mark Twain, if the only tool in the toolbox is a hammer, then all of our problems will soon look like nails.

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