Pakistan-Occupied Gilgit-Baltistan in Limbo: Extraction, Exclusion, and Rising Anger
Pakistan’s handling of dissent in Pakistan-Occupied Gilgit-Baltistan (PoGB) has increasingly exposed the structural contradictions in its governance model in the region. Despite exercising administrative control since 1948, Islamabad has avoided granting GB full constitutional status, leaving the territory in prolonged political limbo. This ambiguity has enabled the federal government and military-linked entities to exercise decisive authority over GB’s resources and political institutions while limiting meaningful local representation. In recent years, as economic grievances, energy shortages, and concerns over China-backed infrastructure projects have intensified, the Pakistani state has responded to public mobilization with coercive measures, arrests, and regulatory pressure. The pattern points to a widening gap between Islamabad’s extractive economic approach and the growing political consciousness of GB’s population.
The constitutional ambiguity of PoGB remains the core structural driver of unrest. After the region’s incorporation in 1948, Pakistan governed it through executive orders rather than constitutional integration. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 created the posts of chief minister and governor, but real authority remained concentrated in the Gilgit-Baltistan Council, chaired by the prime minister of Pakistan. Analysts noted at the time that key sectors such as minerals, hydropower, and security remained under federal control despite the apparent devolution. The Gilgit-Baltistan Order of 2018 formally abolished the council and transferred powers to the GB Assembly, yet multiple legal experts and local political actors argued that Islamabad retained authority over the region through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and the federal cabinet. The persistence of this quasi-provincial arrangement has reinforced local perceptions that institutional reforms were cosmetic rather than substantive.
Political frustration deepened after former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s 2020 pledge to grant provisional provincial status failed to materialize. Instead, the federal government imposed new taxation measures in 2022, triggering widespread protests across Gilgit, Skardu, Hunza, and other districts. Local trader associations and the Awami Action Committee organized shutdowns and demonstrations, arguing that taxation without constitutional representation violated basic federal principles. Protest leaders warned that revenue collected from PoGB was flowing directly to the federal exchequer without proportional reinvestment in the region, a pattern that reinforced the view that Islamabad treats PoGB as a revenue and resource frontier rather than an equal political unit.
Despite hosting critical glaciers that feed the Indus River system and possessing deposits of gold, copper, and rare earth minerals, the region continues to suffer chronic energy shortages, particularly during winter months when electricity deficits can exceed 18 to 20 hours per day in some areas. Hydropower potential remains underutilized even as major projects such as the Diamer-Bhasha Dam proceed. Residents and civil society groups have repeatedly raised concerns about delayed compensation for displaced communities and the lack of local employment guarantees. Reports indicate that the vast majority of workers on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)-linked projects in PoGB are non-local, including Chinese nationals and laborers from other Pakistani provinces.
These structural grievances have translated into sustained protest activity. Organizations such as the Awami Action Committee, Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance, GB Youth Movement, and various trader bodies have led recurring demonstrations over electricity shortages, wheat subsidy cuts, taxation, and land acquisition policies. In 2023 and 2024, protests intensified following the federal government’s decision to reduce subsidized wheat quotas, a particularly sensitive issue in a region heavily dependent on government-supported food supply. Large sit-ins in Gilgit and Skardu drew thousands of participants demanding the restoration of subsidies and constitutional rights. Pakistani authorities responded by deploying additional security forces, detaining activists, and invoking public order laws to restrict assemblies. Human rights observers, including the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, have repeatedly warned about shrinking civic space in PoGB and the use of anti-terror and public safety legislation against peaceful protesters.
Environmental concerns associated with Chinese-supported projects have added another layer of contention. Local activists have raised objections to land acquisition practices, ecological risks, and the lack of transparency in CPEC-related ventures and dam construction. Protest movements in Hunza and Diamer have periodically targeted these projects over the past three years, with demonstrators arguing that local populations bear the environmental costs while economic benefits flow outward to Punjab and China.
Institutionally, PoGB’s exclusion from key federal bodies continues to fuel resentment. Because the region lacks full provincial status, it has no representation in the National Finance Commission, the Council of Common Interests, or the Indus River System Authority. Decisions regarding mineral licensing, hydropower development, and major infrastructure are therefore often taken by federal ministries or military-linked enterprises with limited local consultation. This governance structure creates a classic extractive periphery dynamic in which a resource-rich region remains politically underempowered.
Demographic anxieties have also become increasingly visible in local discourse. GB is historically a Shia-majority region, and local political groups have periodically accused the state of encouraging demographic shifts through land allocation policies, the settlement of retired security personnel, and documentation drives. Shia Muslims are estimated to have constituted roughly 75 to 85 percent of PoGB’s population in 1947, a proportion that local groups claim has declined sharply in recent decades to around 38 to 42 percent. Simultaneously, the Sunni population, primarily from Punjab, is said to have grown from approximately 10 to 15 percent in 1947 to around 28 to 32 percent in recent years. These demographic fears have become intertwined with political grievances, deepening mistrust between local communities and federal authorities.
The cumulative effect of these policies is visible in PoGB’s increasingly securitized response to civil mobilization. This approach may contain unrest in the short term but risks deepening long-term instability by reinforcing the perception that peaceful dissent is unwelcome. PoGB represents a case of strategic overreach paired with political under-integration. Islamabad depends on the region for hydropower potential, mineral resources, and its geographic link to China, yet continues to deny it equitable political standing while governing it in ways that many residents and observers describe as colonial in character. As economic pressures, climate stresses, and CPEC-related disruptions intensify, public mobilization in PoGB is likely to persist.
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