Purges in the Chinese Military
Image by Unsplash+.
The Anti-Corruption Campaign
China’s purge of Gen. Zhang Youxia, long considered a confidante of Xi Jinping and a vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), and General Liu Zhenli, has set off a wide range of interpretations. Officially, Gen. Zhang, the lone CMC member with combat experience, is under investigation for “grave violations of discipline and the law,” which can mean just about anything. That has led to speculation about the real reason for his fall—for example, that he questioned Xi’s likely desire for a fourth five-year term when the next Party congress convenes in 2027; or that he and Xi were at odds over how to handle Taiwan; or that Zhang shared nuclear secrets with the US; or that Xi is simply paranoid. None of these explanations strike me as being persuasive.
The purge leaves the seven-member CMC, which is equivalent to our National Security Council, with only one other member besides Xi, leaving a critical decision making group in the Chinese leadership nearly vacant. The situation reflects Xi’s targeting of the PLA brass almost from the beginning of his rule in 2012. Altogether, over 100 People’s Liberationn Army (PLA) officers have been removed in the Xi era, most for violations of communist party discipline, i.e., corruption. Research by New York Times journalists found that of thirty-one generals and admirals in office in 2023, nine were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), thirteen “disappeared,” and two were under investigation. All the major theater commands and military services have been affected.
The Official Explanation
To discover what actually accounts for the purge of the two generals, we might take a look at what the PLA’s own newspaper had to say. A key article, translated by Manoj Kewalramani in his trackingpeoplesdaily@substack.com, made these points:
First, the purges pose “some short-term difficulties and pains” but the stakes are high.
“The anti-corruption struggle concerns the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, concerns the nature and purpose of the PLA, and concerns the long-term peace and stability of the Party and country. The placing of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on file for disciplinary review and investigation once again demonstrates the clear stance of no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance in anti-corruption. It is a resolute struggle to eliminate major political hidden dangers.”
Second, the central issue is corruption and the key to eliminating it is party leadership and loyalty to the party. Thus,
“it is necessary to more deeply recognise that the fundamental principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military is playing a decisive role, and the strategic design, path arrangements, and target tasks for advancing toward world-class status have already become the entire military’s shared understanding and common action.”
Third, a period of introspection is in order. The army “is currently undergoing a special kind of tempering, just like removing impurities when refining steel, this is re-strengthening, re-purifying, re-casting, and re-cohering.”
Fourth, a new generation of officers will be installed. Taking charge in the future will be “new-era officers and soldiers who have grown up nurtured by Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military are trustworthy and reliable, admirable and respectable.”
Fifth, no one is immune to prosecution.
“The deep digging and thorough investigation of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and others proves with irrefutable facts that no matter how high one’s position or how great one’s power, all are equal before Party discipline and state law; as long as one engages in corruption, there will be absolutely no leniency.”
One Too Many Campaigns?
Reading between the lines of what the Chinese are saying, I think the core issue in Gen. Zhang’s removal is not that he was corrupt, but that he criticized the prolonged anti-corruption campaign Xi has been waging. Zhang may have believed—perhaps with good reason—that the anti-corruption campaign was damaging the military. It was hurting morale and readiness, depleting the office corps of experienced leaders, and making the PLA look weak in the eyes of China’s adversaries. Strengthening this argument is a follow-up front-page article in the Chinese press that stressed that in the anti-corruption campaign “it’s not a matter of ‘the more we investigate, the more corruption we find’ but rather ‘the deeper we go, the more we dig up.’” This second article justified the campaign in Maoist terms: It is in keeping with the Chinese Communist Party’s long history of rectification to remove impurities in the party’s and the military’s ranks.
Of interest in Chinese reporting of the purge is that it gave it so much publicity. That speaks to Xi Jinping’s high level of confidence that he could carry out a purge of one of the most senior people in the entire leadership. At the same time, this openness also reveals serious concerns about the military—its leadership, its dependability in warfare, its loyalty to communist party rule and to Xi himself. Contrary to many assessments of China’s military these days, it shows signs of instability, tension, and dysfunction. What looks formidable on the outside may be brittle within.
The post Purges in the Chinese Military appeared first on CounterPunch.org.