Trump’s Push For Nuclear Tests And The Erosion Of The Nuclear Taboo – Analysis

By Shravishtha Ajaykumar

In late October 2025, United States (US) President Donald Trump announced through a social media post that US forces may begin testing nuclear weapons to remain at par with rival nuclear powers. This statement signalled a grave shift in the global nuclear security landscape, as more than three decades of voluntary restraint on nuclear weapon tests had come to an end. Since the original announcement, US officials have clarified that the planned actions do not include explosive nuclear detonations, yet the ramifications of this policy shift are profound and far-reaching.

Since 1992, there has effectively been a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing in the United States, following its last underground nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. The moratorium continued from the previous to the current administration, complemented by internal projects such as the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program, which assesses the safety, security, and efficacy of the US nuclear stockpile through simulation and laboratory testing without conducting an explosive test. However, this practice ended with President Trump’s public statement in October last year, declaring an urgent need to continue the tests “immediately,” implying that other nations were also conducting secret tests. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright clarified that the tests referred to are now understood as “system tests” of delivery systems and non-nuclear materials, rather than nuclear explosions. Nevertheless, this distinction does little to mitigate the political and strategic implications of the statement.

In the global arena, no nuclear-armed state, aside from North Korea, has conducted a nuclear test since the 1990s. This is reflected in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted in the mid-1990s, which has yet to enter into force pending ratification by certain nuclear-armed states. Public statements supporting the resumption of nuclear testing, even if not initially seen as significant, risk eroding the longstanding taboo on nuclear tests and may prompt other states to reassess their own policies.

This is particularly significant given that Russia has already instructed its agencies to develop proposals for a possible resumption of nuclear tests if the United States takes such action. Resuming such testing would undermine long-standing taboos and could prompt other nuclear-armed states, including Russia and China, to reconsider their moratoriums, potentially reigniting competition in the nuclear sphere. While the Chinese and Russian governments have reaffirmed their commitment to existing moratoriums, they are closely monitoring US actions.

Eroding Confidence in Non-Proliferation Frameworks

The US decision comes at a time when the global arms control architecture is already under strain. A key pillar of this framework is New START, the bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia that limits both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems. New START is set to expire in February 2026, and as of mid-January 2026, Russia was still awaiting a US response to a proposal to extend the treaty for another year. The potential lapse of New START would leave the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals without binding constraints for the first time in over a decade, and US statements on resuming testing risk undermining the transparency and accountability mechanisms that have helped stabilise US–Russia nuclear relations.

Regional and Global Security Impacts

A renewed US testing program could have ripples far beyond Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. Beyond these nuclear powers, countries in regions of actual or potential nuclear tension—especially in South Asia, including India and its neighbourhood—could face new pressures to reconsider their nuclear postures if major powers visibly depart from the restraint that has governed nuclear policy for more than three decades.

Diplomacy based on mutual restraint, such as efforts to strengthen the CTBT and broader non-proliferation norms, requires credible commitments from the major powers. With the US, a leading nuclear power, signalling its willingness to reverse a long-standing moratorium, the leverage of global disarmament advocacy is weakened. Trust built over decades—both among nuclear states and between nuclear and non-nuclear states—is further undermined among States Parties that have upheld these norms despite the treaty’s non-entry into force.

This is not limited to nuclear detonations; even underground testing carries environmental risks, including land disruption and radioactive contamination, affecting civilians near test sites, as evidenced by the Nevada National Security Site, which the US extensively used for testing. Such activities introduce new ethical and security considerations that should be addressed in future treaties and non-proliferation frameworks.

Arms control experts have strongly criticised the signal sent by the US regarding nuclear testing. Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, stated that the prospect of restarting nuclear explosive tests lacks any technical, military, or political justification and could be highly damaging to international security.

Conclusion

The international nuclear order faces a significant shift with public orders from the US President to restart nuclear testing. This development comes at a time when existing controls, such as the nuclear test moratorium and the New START treaty, appear to be under pressure. This development will not only contribute to the erosion of established norms but also precipitate similar action from other nuclear-weapon states.

The outcome will depend on how soon testing begins and its scale, but the announcement ending decades of nuclear restraint has already triggered strategic recalculations in capitals worldwide. While the nuclear age has avoided full-scale testing for over thirty years, returning to such restraint will require more than mere rhetoric.

• About the author: Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.