Understanding North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy and the Role of the ROK-US Alliance
Abstract
This article seeks to rebut the recently published “How to Deter North Korea while Pursuing America First Policy”. It identifies and clarifies fundamental misunderstandings present in the original article about the Kim regime’s motives and goals, the function of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the role of United States Forces Korea and the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and presents challenges with the proposal to allow South Korea to proliferate.
Introduction
A recently published article on this platform advocates for the removal of US forces from South Korea and to allow for the ROK to become another nuclear-armed state. It makes the claim that these actions would serve to stabilize the Korean Peninsula amid ongoing tensions with the DPRK and benefit the American people by reducing the costs of keeping troops stationed in the region. While the article correctly notes that denuclearization on the peninsula is a long-sought-after goal that numerous approaches by the international community have failed to achieve, the proposed policy solutions demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the regional dynamics that impact such discussions – namely, Pyongyang’s motivations for the pursuit and maintenance of nuclear capabilities, the role of South Korea in broader regional stability from an American military perspective, and the risks and challenges inherent in allowing South Korea to proliferate. The article incorrectly identifies the DPRK’s nuclear program as primarily a response to USFK and the Combined Forces Command; in reality, the North’s arsenal serves coercive diplomacy and domestic political purposes in addition to security benefits, so removing USFK does not remove the incentive structure. In the present article, I seek to expand the scope of Capt. Kim’s arguments to demonstrate why nuclear tensions on the peninsula are not strictly nor primarily determined by US troop presence in the South; to explain the critical role of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in both Korean and broader East Asian stability; and to challenge the assertion that a nuclear-armed South Korea is sufficient to deter Kim Jong-Un’s (KJU) escalatory behaviors or otherwise contribute to a lessening of tensions in the region. I will conclude with policy recommendations which run directly counter to those proposed by Capt. Kim: advocating for a stronger US-ROK alliance, taking a more nuanced approach to burden sharing that enables South Korea to stand firm against interference while promoting greater interoperability, and increasing investments in American and allied political or irregular warfare capabilities that allow for the promotion of US strategic interests below the threshold of armed conflict.
Why Does KJU Want Nukes?
In his article, Capt. Kim correctly assesses a neorealist logic that asserts the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. Certainly, the Kim regime sees their nuclear arsenal as an effective deterrent against armed intervention by the United States, South Korea, Japan, or other nations who are perceived as adversarial. In fact, some neorealist thinkers have advocated for limited proliferation to both friendly and adversary states alike, claiming that their presence stabilizes regions and ultimately raises the stakes of armed conflict past an acceptable threshold. Certainly, the Kim regime sees examples of US military intervention in other countries (Capt. Kim’s article identifies the invasions of Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan, though it conflates the limited 2025 airstrikes against Iran as a full-scale invasion) as running counter to its main goal of regime survival, and would seek an effective deterrent to such actions by way of a nuclear arsenal. However, adhering to a purely realist perspective and viewing the nuclear question solely through balance-of-power dynamics fails to capture the full purpose of nuclear weapons to the Kim regime, which ultimately undermines the claim that a change in the balance of power on the peninsula (through the removal of US forces and nuclear arming of the ROK) would be enough to nudge the DPRK towards denuclearization.
From a coercive bargaining standpoint, nuclear weapons fit neatly into KJU’s foreign policy and economic statecraft strategies. Through brinkmanship behaviors, Pyongyang can leverage nuclear threats and escalatory rhetoric to draw other countries to the bargaining table, extracting concessions while promising steps towards disarmament on which it will later renege. This has been demonstrated time and time again throughout history; the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Sunshine Policy era, Six-Party Talks, and even the 2018/2019 Trump-Kim summits all fit into this strategy: escalate tensions, negotiate for concessions as a stopgap measure to keep the economy afloat, continue to develop the nuclear program, rinse, and repeat. While the full scope of the economic strategy inherent in the DPRK’s nuclear program is outside of the purview of this article, it is reasonable to argue that the economic and bargaining utility of the North’s nuclear program markedly reinforces security motives.
Moreover, nuclear weapons provide substantial utility when considering domestic political aims as well as foreign ones. Nuclear weapons serve as a tangible symbol of the success of Juche (self-reliance) and songun (military first) ideologies, complementing the threat narrative on which the regime relies to maintain repressive domestic control and shuttle scarce resources towards the elite class and strategic programs. As such, the nuclear arsenal serves not only to deter external threats, but also the most substantial threat to KJU and his regime: the population of the DPRK itself. Were the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons, the regime would lose the ability to capitalize on one of its most profound propaganda themes and risk ceding political control over its repressed population. As such, the nuclear question is much more than a balance-of-power dynamic between US forces and the DPRK. It is a culmination of deeply held ideology, authoritarian governance, blackmail diplomacy, economic bargaining chips, and security considerations that drives the North to pursue nuclear weapons. Therefore, simply removing US forces from South Korea does little to alter any of the regime’s motivations, and Capt. Kim’s proposed solution of arming the South with nuclear weapons may actually exacerbate the situation further, rather than contributing to deterrence.
The Value of the Combined Forces Command
The US-ROK Combined Forces Command has existed since 1978 with the present mission to “Deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the ROK; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK” – not, as Capt. Kim’s article claims, to pressure the DPRK to denuclearize. The purpose of the various joint and multinational exercises in Korea, such as Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield (FS and UFS, respectively), surpasses a mere show of force. Ultimately, the goal of such exercises is to increase interoperability between allied militaries in preparation for crisis or conflict while simultaneously demonstrating US and allied resolve in the face of external threats. Such exercises exist globally independent of denuclearization efforts; African Lion occurs in Morocco to “strengthen interoperability” and “build readiness”, while Balikatan in the Philippines is “designed to strengthen the alliance, showcase the capable combined force, and demonstrate the commitment to regional security and stability”. While US-ROK exercise scope and participation waxes and wanes in response to tensions on the peninsula, sometimes even being leveraged during nuclear negotiations, the outright goal of the exercises and the CFC’s existence writ large has never been denuclearization. Therefore, evaluating the benefits of US Forces Korea (USFK) or the CFC must consider such factors as deterrence as a whole, our relationship with South Korea, and continued stability through demonstrated strength, as outlined in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. In terms of deterrence, which is most applicable in the present discussion, USFK serves a crucial role in the formula: Deterrence = Capability x Will x Perception by building the CFC’s capability to fight and win together, demonstrating the will of both the American and South Korean governments to contribute well-trained and capable forces to respond to threats and aggression. Further, leveraging joint exercises such as FS and UFS as observable events is designed to shape DPRK and other regional perceptions of alliance strength while contributing to increases in capability.
Moreover, US military presence in South Korea is crucial for stability in the entire region, not just in response to the DPRK threat but also in managing threats from actors such as China and Russia. USFK/CFC Commander GEN Xavier Brunson’s recently released “East-Up Map” notes Korea’s positional advantage for contingency response, geographically central to Pyongyang, Beijing, and Vladivostok. Camp Humphreys’ presence on the Korean Peninsula is crucial to responding to threats from the DPRK, certainly, but also allows for American activities to impose costs on Chinese and Russian interests while simultaneously closer alliance ties with Japan and the Philippines. US troop presence in South Korea becomes crucial when considering multiple regional contingencies, including escalations with North Korea, wherein rapid staging of American and multinational forces will be enabled by existing logistical nodes in-country. The removal of the American military presence from the region may indeed save some money for the American taxpayer ($3 billion per year in an annual defense budget of more than $850 billion), but would incur massive risks in the loss of strategic placement and flexibility. Moreover, the costs of USFK are not capturable in a single line item; host nation contributions and indirect support further complicate the accounting. To summarize the benefits of continued troop presence in Korea and elsewhere in the Pacific, a Government Accountability Office report cited in Capt. Kim’s article identifies: regional stability and security, defense capability and interoperability, contingency response, denuclearization and nonproliferation (author emphasis added), strong alliances, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. These benefits offered by USFK’s continued existence far outweigh any current monetary costs.
Challenges to a Nuclear Seoul
Capt. Kim’s second assertion, that South Korea should become a nuclear-armed state, is problematic on a number of levels. According to his article, a nuclear armed South Korea could reach “credible parity” with the North, thus deterring a nuclear strike by Pyongyang in the absence of USFK. However, this fails to assess how the Kim regime would likely perceive this development. KJU recently declared South Korea as the North’s “principal enemy”, not the United States, and rejected the goal of peaceful reunification. As such, providing South Korea with the ability to become a nuclear power while denying the North the same recognition would likely exacerbate tensions, potentially leading to increased nuclear brinkmanship, and risks strategic miscalculations devolving into full-scale conflict between the DPRK and the ROK. This is the classic “security dilemma”: Seoul’s attempt at increased security would be perceived in Pyongyang as an existential threat, risking escalation. Secondly, public opinion polls on the South Korean public’s trust of the US nuclear umbrella, and subsequent support for an indigenous nuclear capability, ignore a number of crucial concerns. First, there has been no nuclear or WMD use by the North against the ROK or other regional allies under the US’s extended deterrence framework, despite periods of extremely high tension and threatening rhetoric. In addition, public opinion polls fail to recognize the legalities of such proliferation activities; South Korea has long been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would likely incur massive international repercussions if it withdrew. Finally, South Korea’s ascension to nuclear power status could prompt the same proliferation domino effect that the US has long sought to avoid in granting the same recognition to the North; other nations, both friendly and adversary, may see their own opportunities to nuclearize and upset the delicate balance in an already tense region or elsewhere in the world. While some theorists advocate for limited proliferation, doing so in a region as volatile as East Asia could quickly spiral into war.
Another potentiality not explored in Capt. Kim’s article is an increase in gray-zone warfare and interference by the DPRK and other actors like China and Russia. According to his logic, the strategic deterrence provided by nuclear weapons may be sufficient to deter conventional or nuclear threats. History demonstrates that in similar circumstances, less powerful nations, such as the DPRK, or even great powers such as China, will undertake political warfare, “lawfare”, propaganda, cybercrime, and other activities meant to destabilize another state below the threshold of armed conflict. Capt. Kim points out that this is already the case in South Korea, who is the frequent recipient of interference attempts by both the PRC and DPRK; this would almost certainly be increased, were Seoul to develop nuclear weapons. The effects of such gray-zone activities are already apparent throughout the First Island Chain and even in the American mainland, imposing substantial social and cultural costs and creating political rifts that adversaries seek to exploit. While these efforts will continue regardless of South Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, an increase in destabilizing actions by the PRC and/or DPRK plays directly into their strengths and political playbooks while forcing South Korea, who along with much of the Western world is woefully unprepared to react to such attacks, to fight from the back foot. In sum, the ROK’s nuclear armament is an option with a great deal of hidden costs, legal and political challenges, and is ultimately an unacceptable replacement for conventional deterrence measures such as the presence of a well-trained, capable, and interoperable Combined Forces Command against the backdrop of a robust ROK-US alliance.
Conclusion
The complexities of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the strategic dynamics of the Korean Peninsula demand a nuanced understanding of the Kim regime’s motives and the role of the ROK-US alliance. This article has demonstrated that Pyongyang’s nuclear program is not solely a response to the presence of US forces in South Korea but is deeply rooted in coercive diplomacy, domestic political control, and ideological narratives. The US-ROK Combined Forces Command plays a critical role in maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and ensuring interoperability between allied forces. Furthermore, the proposal to arm South Korea with nuclear weapons introduces significant risks, including exacerbating the security dilemma, undermining nonproliferation norms, and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation. The strategic benefits of the US-ROK alliance far outweigh the financial costs, as the presence of US forces in South Korea not only deters North Korea but also strengthens regional security against broader threats from China and Russia. In conclusion, the removal of US forces and the nuclearization of South Korea would destabilize the region and embolden adversaries. Instead, a robust and well-coordinated alliance remains the cornerstone of deterrence and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The next step is to explore actionable strategies to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and address emerging challenges in the gray-zone, which I will elaborate on in a future article.
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