Operation Herof 2.0: Pakistan’s Strategic Resilience In Balochistan – OpEd

The recent narrative on Pakistan as a failing state as far as Balochistan is concerned, especially with the rubric of “Operation Herof 2.0,” has more to do with narrative speculation than actual strategic realities on the ground. Assertions that insurgency activity signals state collapse, has delegitimized military power, and has neutered Pakistan as a mere great game pawn miss the larger history on the ground as well as recent happenings.

Balochistan has always been the nexus of both internal security and regional geopolitics. Nevertheless, the fact remains that episodic militant operations, possibly through information warfare, do not signify a loss of strategic control. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism and stabilization strategy in Balochistan remains dynamic and has undergone a paradigm shift from a kinetic strategy to a security development model.
Assertions of the fact that “Operation Herof 2.0” being an indicator of the loss of control of the Pakistani government misunderstand the purpose and implications of the attainment of those capabilities. Terrorist groups operating in the region of Kohistan remain disunited, on a small scale, and instrumental in their reliance on external enablers, particularly those in the form of cross-border sanctuaries and propaganda infrastructure.

The security forces in Pakistan have succeeded in maintaining an effective security grid in different corridors, including the coastal areas, communication routes, and economic corridors. This integration of intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces, and law enforcement agencies has succeeded in reducing the scope of operation of the militant networks. Most importantly, the state’s strategy has focused more on protecting its civilians, thereby denying legitimacy to the insurgent forces.
Another prominent notion is that the growth of insurgency has held the plans for CPEC into limbo, has deterred the Chinese, and created problems for Pakistan's overtures to Western investors. These claims gloss over factual circumstances. CPEC and Gwadar were not meant to be pursued linearly; they are long-term projects.

At no stage has the Chinese activity in Pakistan derailed, but it certainly shows a new course towards sustainability, consolidation of security, and phased investment rather than an accelerated trend of engagement. This perhaps needs no further exploration as it confirms global trends of economic diplomacy rather than any reflection on the management of operations by Pakistan. At another level, Pakistan’s search for economic diplomacy with the Gulf nations, Central Asian states, and Western nations on issues like energy, mining, and ports appears to have met with a positive response without abandoning the policy of strategic autonomy.

Pasni, Gwadar, and mineral zones inland of it continue to be part of long-term plans, which have been further augmented with increased security features and local employment, as this directly addresses the insurgents’ agenda of depicting developmental activity as externally driven and unsustainable.
In fact, the dramatization of Pakistan as a "pawn" in great-power rivalry at the gate of the Strait of Hormuz simplifies a much more nuanced reality. Pakistan's geography is indeed at a crossroads-but the same terrain confers agency upon it as much as vulnerability. Islamabad has continuously pursued a balanced foreign policy, setting up working relations with China, the United States, Gulf partners, Iran, and Central Asia while resisting alignment that came at some compromise to sovereignty.

It is Balochistan's strategic relevance that reinforces, rather than weakens, Pakistan's bargaining position. Far from being a battleground dictated by others, the province sits at the heart of Pakistan's vision for regional connectivity, trade facilitation, and maritime relevance. External interest in the region reflects its potential not Pakistan's weakness.

It is also very important to recognize that some narratives around "Operation Hero 2.0" function more in the information domain than in the physical one. Militant messaging has often seemed to be an attempt at internationalizing localized incidents, exaggerating impact, and framing Pakistan as unstable to deter investment and diplomatic engagement. Such tales require being weighed with a degree of skepticism, anchored in verifiable outcomes rather than rhetorical amplification.