Diplomacy Over Coercion: The European Union’s Role In Managing Iran’s Nuclear Program – OpEd

Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates back approximately six decades to the period of the Shah’s era, when the United States and Iran concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement under which Washington committed to providing Tehran with a range of nuclear technologies, including a research reactor. Despite Iran inking the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1968 and endorsing it 1970, the Shah may have had nuclear weapons motivations. Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, secretly resumed the Iranian nuclear program, with the intention of acquiring nuclear bomb, that had set up during the Shah’s rule. The extension of the nuclear program subsequent to the Iran-Iraq protracted war is believed to be restricted. However, in the mid-1990s, Iran began to covertly purchase and take delivery of uranium enrichment centrifuges from the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network, revered as the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb and then commenced pursuing domestic nuclear fuel cycle capability by enriching uranium.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States intensified its approach toward Iran, calling it a member of the club of the “Axis of Evil.” Iran’s nuclear program emerged as a major concern for the international community. This pivotal development in Iran’s nuclear inspections can be linked to 14 August 2002, when the opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), unveiled details of a previously “clandestine” nuclear program in the country. The (NCRI) disclosed a nuclear fuel production at Natanz and heavy water reactor at Arak. A number of other nuclear facilities including power plants in Isfahan, Bushehr, and Arak were also identified by the exiled opposition group. Furthermore, the mentioned group also identified four research centres at Amirabad, Bonab, Karaj, and Saghand. After the visit of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in 2003 to Iran, Tehran endorsed the existing of those facilities. Subsequently, the IAEA conducted plenty of inspections in Iran which became apparent that Iran was involved in uranium enrichment activities in the past and as well as had sought help from A.Q. Khan Network.

Following the preliminary IAEA inspections, the US official stated that the secret facility in Natanz appear to be uranium-enrichment plant. In September 2002, published satellite imagery confirmed the existence of secret nuclear facilities at Arak and Natanz, leading to allegations that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons and called for Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA inspections. Tehran, however, denied any nuclear weapons activities, while the Washington pressed for Tehran’s immediate referral to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). European partners, by contrast,favoured a negotiation-oriented strategy. Under Western and IAEA pressure, Iran concluded a December 2003 agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the “E+3”), resulting in the signing of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, granting inspectors greater authority to verify Iran’s nuclear program. This agreement was subsequently formalized in the 2004 Paris Agreement. In March 2005, the United States declared its support for the E+3 approach and indicated that, should negotiations with Tehran fail, the European partners would support referring the matter to the UN Security Council. 

The European Union’s Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program

As of 2003, the European Union played a key role in negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program, focusing on political dialogue and diplomatic engagement to the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear activities. The EU’s approach largely emphasized persuasion, engagement, and dialogue, in contrast to the United States, which relied on coercive measures and the exercise of hard power. The European Security Strategy (2003), formulated in response to the U.S. National Security Strategy (2002), emphasizes the EU’s commitment to diplomacy and international agreements in addressing Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is therefore required to provide credible guarantees that its nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. In line with its foreign policy objectives, the European Union sought to strengthen economic ties and enhance cooperation for peaceful nuclear technology to persuade Tehran to suspend its nuclear activities. Furthermore, the EU attempted to encourage Washington to adopt a similar diplomatic approach. This approach was most clearly reflected in Javier Solana’s speech, delivered following Vice President Dick Cheney’s threats of a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, in which he stated ; “I think that would be something I would not like to see occur. That would be a fault. That will obscure extremely the circumstances. One-sided act of that nature I don’t think will be backed by everybody. I don’t think that the USA has at moment of time the desire or the motivation or the competence to act militarily.” Obviously after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the US believed that economic embargo and diplomatic sanctions as a “stick would compel Tehran to change its behaviour whereas the EU has been inclined to use business and cooperation as a “carrot”.

In essence, the United States relied on diplomatic pressure, sanctions and coercive measures, to compel Iran into altering its nuclear policies, whereas the European Union opted for engagement and partnership Tehran. As a result, both the EU and the US adopted contrasting strategies to achieve the same objectives. The divergence can be attributed chiefly to their distinct perceptions and contradictory objectives. The E+3 asserted that any agreement must involve the complete termination of uranium enrichment, whereas the Iranian side maintained that Iran’s nuclear activities were completely peaceful and stated that they would never relinquish the fuel cycle, arguing that the country had a legitimate right to pursue a nuclear program for energy objectives. After failing to reach an agreement with the E+3, Tehran announced its intention to recommence enrichment activities in 2005 and quickly began producing UF6 at Isfahan site following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. By early 2006, Iran removed the IAEA seals at Natanz and other sites aimed at resuming research on its centrifuge program. Subsequently, in February, Tehran began feeding natural uranium UF6 (NATUF6) into centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and, in April, declared that it had effectively enriched uranium to 3.5% U-235. Moreover, Tehran stated that it would no longer implement the “voluntary” measures previously agreed with the IAEA. Accordingly, the IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council. For more than two decades, European states have taken a leading role in seeking a diplomatic resolution as a means of putting an end to this dispute. However, military intervention designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would likely escalate regional tensions and could result in a broader military conflict, while simultaneously respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation. 

The Emergence of the P5+1 to the JCPOA

Developments of January 2006 marked a critical turning point in Iran’s nuclear dispute. On 10 January 2006, Iranian authorities broke the seals placed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on centrifuges at the Natanz facility and announced the resumption of research and development activities at the site. This decision was widely interpreted as crossing a key threshold in EU–US relations with Iran. While the action did not violate Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, it contravened the IAEA’s request that Iran reinstate the suspension of all enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities. As a political signal, the move was clear and consequential. While U.S. officials, including Nicholas Burns and Condoleezza Rice, had anticipated such a development, they nonetheless regarded it as a fundamental challenge to the authority and norms of the United Nations by a member state. Iran’s action also provoked immense frustration across European Union states, contribution to a shift in the coalition’s strategic posture, including the adoption of comprehensive sanctions.

In response, Washington determined that the United States should deepen its engagement and pursue a multilateral strategy involving the United Nations Security Council and Germany, aimed at exerting sustained diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran. The P5+1 developed gradually in response to the escalating dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities and the limitations of earlier E+3 negotiations. Initially, negotiations were led by the E+3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), which sought a diplomatic resolution through engagement with Iran. As the crisis intensified and Iran resumed sensitive nuclear activities in 2006, it became clear that a broader and more authoritative framework was required. The United States, Russia, and China were therefore brought into the process, linking European diplomatic efforts with the authority of the United Nations Security Council. The resulting P5+1 format combined the five permanent members of the Security Council with Germany, forming a unified multilateral negotiating group capable of coordinating diplomatic pressure and sanctions while pursuing a negotiated settlement. The establishment of the P5+1 marked a significant shift from fragmented bilateral and European-led initiatives to a consolidated multilateral approach to Iran’s nuclear dispute.

By uniting the permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany, the framework enhanced both greater diplomatic coordination and institutional legitimacy, which resulted in Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in 2015, demonstrating the potential of multilateral diplomacy as an alternative to coercive approach. The Iran Nuclear Agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in July 2015, represented a multilateral effort to address international concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. Under its provisions, Iran committed limiting its nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, in return for the lifting of significant economic sanctions that had been imposed over fears of potential nuclear weapon development. However, the agreement faced substantial challenges in 2018 when the United States withdrew and reinstated sanctions, threatening the enduring effectiveness of the agreement, and creating tensions between the remaining parties in the p5+1 and Iran. EU–Iran relations have historically been marked by tension, however, states have consistently expressed a willingness to gradually expand bilateral relations with Tehran, particularly in the economic sector. Despite this economic engagement, the EU has no formalized bilateral framework with Iran beyond cooperation in the humanitarian sector and in the area of drugs control. The EU’s designation of Iran’s IRGC as a terrorist organization in January 2026 effectively ends decades of diplomatic engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

External War and Internal Fracture: Iran after the Israel Conflict

In June 2025, coordinated military operations against Iran’s nuclear and defence infrastructure Operation Rising Lion by Israel and Operation Midnight Hammer by the United States (frequently referred to as the 12-Day War) marked a significant escalation in direct hostilities. The twelve-day military strikes against Iran, happening just two days before the sixth round of Washington-Tehran nuclear negotiations in Oman. Citing an “imminent nuclear threat,” Israeli airstrikes targeted military installations and nuclear sites, resulting in the deaths of top military commanders, nuclear scientists, and hundreds of soldiers. The 12-Day War immensely influenced Iran’s regime stability, societal dynamics, and strategic orientation in regional and international affairs. The 12-Day War was not only a short-lived hostility: It was a rupture that is generating deep consequences for the Islamic Republic’s internal architecture, ideology, policymaking, and long-term transformation. The Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer operations revealed Iran’s vulnerabilities and damaged its air defences, nuclear program and stockpile of missiles. Hamas and Hezbollah, which have enjoyed Iran’s support, have also been extremely weakened and the establishment of a new Syrian government has marked a decisive rupture in Iran–Syria relations, as Damascus has distanced itself from Tehran and abandoned its former role as a strategic partner. 

During the Iran-Israel war, Iran fired an estimated 550 missiles and approximately 1,000 drones toward Israel. Although the vast majority were intercepted or failed to reach Israeli territory, those that penetrated Israeli territory inflicted notable material damage. The loss and marginalization of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and the consolidation of power within narrower elite circles have altered Iran’s internal balance of authority. At the same time, economic deterioration driven by sustained sanctions compelled the regime to consider renewed engagement with the United States. The fate of other sanctioned regimes, such as Venezuela, reinforced Tehran’s perception that resistance carries escalating risks, particularly in light of President Trump’s demonstrated willingness to apply maximum pressure. In the aftermath of Iran-Israel war, the US Armed Forces significantly bolstered their force posture in the Middle East region, enhancing both their offensive and defensive capabilities. In the beginning of 2026, the US Navy took the rare step of deploying not one but several aircraft carrier strike groups, USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Carl Vinson and USS Nimitz, to the Arabian Sea, putting it closer to assist in any potential US operations targeting Iran. The post–12-Day War era has placed Iran in a protracted state of strategic uncertainty. Despite the formal end of conflicts in June 2025, the Islamic Republic continues to face unresolved security challenges that have prevented stabilization. The Supreme leader Khamenei characterizing the post-war environment as “neither war nor peace” underlines the absence of a clear strategic direction, producing paralysis across institutions and intensifying social uncertainty. The underlying drivers of Israel’s attack remain unresolved, reinforcing a pervasive sense of instability and the expectation of further escalation. Iran is at a turning point. Nearly five months after the war ended in June, the Islamic Republic is facing internal unrests.

In December 2025, protests began in Iran, initially sparked by economic and energy grievances. In recent years, social and political divisions within Iranian society have intensified, reflecting growing social, ethnic, and political divisions. These developments have contributed to a growing fragmentation within Iranian society, challenging the regime’s capacity to maintain control and legitimacy. A telling illustration of the Islamic Republic internal challenges is the energy crisis, which saw daily two-hour power outages prior to the Israeli airstrikes-highlights the challenges of managing energy resources in a country that holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves. The Iranian regime launched a violent response to the protests. An internet blackout starting on 8 January, together with existing restrictions on foreign media, has made it challenging to determine the full extent of the unrest and the scope of the regime violence. Over 36,500 killed in Iran's deadliest massacre, documents reveal.

As the protests expanded, on 13 January, President Donald Trump addressed Iranian demonstrators via social media, urging them to remain resilient and declaring that “help is on its way.” The statement generated widespread speculation that the United States might be preparing military action against Iran. The following day, reports indicated that U.S. personnel had been evacuated from al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, a development that appeared to reinforce perceptions of potential escalation. The dual threat of “war or negotiation” is weighing heavily on Tehran at a time when Iran is facing its deepest economic crisis in nearly five decades. Prolonged economic challenges and a broader loss of confidence in the Islamic Republic following historic military and foreign policy setbacks in 2025 suggests that 2026 may be the most challenging year in the history of the Islamic Republic.

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