Afghanistan: Unending Desolation – Analysis
By Sanchita Bhattacharya
Afghanistan remains trapped in a deep and layered crisis, marked by persistent armed resistance, extremist violence, political fragility, the collapse of law and order, and systematic institutional repression. Nearly four years after the Taliban re-captured Kabul on August 15, 2021, their military victory has failed to translate into legitimacy, recovery, or social stability.
On July 8, 2025, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants of arrest against Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani. The warrants relate to the crime against humanity of persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, specifically on gender grounds against women, girls, and other affected persons. The Taliban, however, rejected the move outright, declaring that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) does not recognize the ICC and dismissing the warrants as baseless.
Despite the Taliban’s dismantling of the former Afghan Republic, armed opposition has not been extinguished. Groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), among others, continued to mount periodic attacks on Taliban positions throughout 2025.
According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), the NRF carried out 79 attacks in 2025, resulting in the deaths of 182 Taliban fighters and injuries to 134 others. By comparison, in 2024, the group had conducted 208 attacks, killing 400 Taliban fighters and injuring 294. This represents a decline of 54.5 per cent in fatalities over one year. NRF operations were reported across provinces including Herat, Kabul, Badghis, and Badakhshan. The NRF remains the principal armed opposition group confronting the Taliban and was formed in August 2021 by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, Ahmad Massoud, and former Defence Minister Bismillah Khan.
The AFF accounted for 76 incidents in 2025, causing the deaths of 168 Taliban fighters and injuries to another 125. This compares with 202 Taliban fighters killed and 142 injured in 76 incidents in 2024, marking a decline of 16.8 per cent in fatalities. AFF activity was recorded in provinces such as Herat, Kunduz, Kabul, Takhar, and Baghlan. The group first gained visibility in March 2022, when it announced its formation on social media, and is led by General Yasin Zia, a former Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff.
While fatalities linked to both NRF and AFF operations have declined, the Taliban have simultaneously projected an image of expanding internal consolidation. On January 4, 2026, the Taliban claimed that their Ministry of Defence had conducted more than 500,000 security operations across Afghanistan during 2025, seizing large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and narcotics. Taliban Deputy Spokesperson Hamdullah Fitrat described 2025 as a “highly productive” year, noting the establishment of over 600 security posts along Afghanistan’s borders and the collection of approximately USD 48 million in revenue. He further stated that multi-month training programmes were conducted for 15,302 Taliban personnel as part of efforts to expand and professionalize the group’s security apparatus.
In addition, the Taliban confirmed the re-admission of fighters previously dismissed from their ranks. On January 10, 2026, the Ministry of Defence announced the re-recruitment of what it termed “undetermined-status” fighters. Earlier, on December 27, Taliban Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed that the group’s defence forces now exceed 181,000 personnel, with more than 100,000 police trained during the year.
Parallel to these internal developments, the Taliban achieved a limited diplomatic breakthrough. On July 3, 2025, Russia formally recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, becoming the first country to do so. Russia’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dmitry Zhirnov, conveyed the decision to Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.
At the same time, the regime continued its purge of perceived opponents. Former security personnel associated with the pre-Taliban government were repeatedly targeted. On January 7, 2026, Taliban forces executed a former commander loyal to Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, identified as Yousuf Qomandan, by shooting him in the head in the Khwaja Du Koh District of Jawzjan Province. Earlier, on December 20, the decapitated body of a former officer named Naser was discovered in the Yaftal District of Badakhshan Province. On October 25, Kameen Jan, a bodyguard of Dawood Dawood, the former commander of the 303 Pamir Zone, was killed by unidentified gunmen in Takhar Province. According to local sources, Taliban intelligence agencies have frequently carried out assassinations under the cover of “unidentified gunmen.”
Civilian killings also persisted. ICM data indicates that at least 104 civilians were killed in 2025. The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-KP) claimed responsibility for at least 27 of these deaths, while perpetrators remained unidentified in 43 cases. Taliban forces were responsible for 34 civilian killings. This represented a decline of 57.9 per cent from 2024, when 247 civilians were killed, including at least 135 by IS-KP.
Beyond killings, civilians continued to endure other forms of violence. Following a November 2022 directive by Akhundzada ordering judges to implement all aspects of Shari’a law – including public executions, flogging, stoning, and amputations – such practices have increasingly been normalized. Partial ICM data records 12 executions in 10 incidents since August 15, 2021. In the most recent case, on December 2, 2025, a man was publicly executed in a stadium in Khost city on charges of premeditated murder. Approximately 80,000 people reportedly attended the execution, which was allegedly carried out by a 13-year-old boy.
On September 8, 2025, UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan Richard Bennett stated that at least 672 individuals – 547 men and 125 women – had been subjected to judicially sanctioned public flogging during the year, more than double the number recorded during the same period in 2024.
The Taliban also intensified coercive control over land and property. On January 29, 2026, Akhundzada ordered the seizure of movable and immovable assets belonging to absent individuals and those accused of corruption. Earlier, clashes over a gold mining project in Takhar Province resulted in six deaths and 16 injuries, with residents accusing Taliban officials and contractors of looting farmland and damaging homes. Similar land seizures were reported in Ghazni and Nangarhar provinces under the guise of land restoration or state ownership.
On January 7, 2026, the Taliban further institutionalized repression by promulgating a new “Criminal Procedure Code for Courts.” Spanning 58 pages, 10 chapters, and 119 articles, the code formalizes harsh punitive measures and reinforces absolute obedience to Akhundzada. It draws heavily on the Taliban’s rigid interpretation of Shari’a law and mandates adherence to more than 200 existing decrees, many of which disproportionately target women and marginalized communities. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Taliban have issued at least 470 decrees since returning to power, including 79 directly affecting women and girls.
Internal fractures within the Taliban leadership have also persisted. Tensions between the Kandahar-based leadership under Akhundzada and figures associated with the Haqqani Network have periodically surfaced. As of November 2025, seven of the 25 Taliban Cabinet ministers hailed from Kandahar, and all key leadership positions were held by Kandahari Taliban, including Taliban’s Supreme Leader, their chief minister, their deputy chief minister, the central bank governor, and chief justice are held by Kandahari Taliban. On January 3, 2026, Akhundzada issued a 14-point directive urging unity and warning that the movement faced a “major test.” Reports also suggest that strategic sites in Kandahar have been heavily fortified. These include Mandigak Palace, a historic complex in central Kandahar where Mullah Mohammad Omar once held office, which has been heavily reinforced and is believed to host key meetings between Akhundzada and senior Taliban officials.
In contrast, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani publicly criticized governance through fear, stating in December that “a government that controls people only by frightening them is not a government.” Meanwhile, Badakhshan Province emerged as a focal point of intra-Taliban conflict, driven by disputes over mineral wealth, especially gold mines, and poppy cultivation.
Afghanistan has also continued to serve as a haven for multiple terrorist organizations. A UN report in December 2025 identified more than 20 international and regional terrorist groups operating in the country, including Al Qaeda, IS-KP, TTP, ETIM/TIP, and Jamaat Ansarullah. IS-KP’s strength was estimated at approximately 2,000 fighters. As reported on August 4, 2025, Taliban relocated several families affiliated with TTP from Kunar Province to Ghazni and Zabul Provinces. The relocated families originated from Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Local residents alleged that TTP officials have been collecting ushr (an Islamic tax) and financial contributions from the community. Further, as reported on August 17, a former ‘commander’ of the Haqqani Network, Hayatullah, known as “Ghalchaki Tangiwal”, called on his fighters to support TTP.
Moreover, on November 20, 2025, Russia warned that IS-KP was expanding in Afghanistan, strengthening influence, and posing growing risks to regional stability. Anna Evstigneeva Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, also noted that measures taken by the Taliban authorities to counter extremist groups remain insufficient, despite some acknowledged efforts. Later, on January 19, 2026, in an IS-KP orchestrated explosion, at least seven persons, including a Chinese national, identified as Ayub, were killed and several others were injured, near a restaurant in the Shahr-e-Naw area of Kabul. Taliban Police Spokesman Khalid Zadran said the blast occurred around 3 pm on Gulforoshi Street, a busy area close to diplomatic missions.
While explaining the recruitment strategy of IS-KP, on July 16, 2025, the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report, The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Waning Jihadist Threat?, warned that IS-KP had refocused its strategy on ideological recruitment, targeting Salafi clerics suppressed by Taliban crackdowns, and ethnic minorities, including Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks, who are increasingly disillusioned with the Taliban’s ethnically skewed governance.
More worryingly, as reported on December 2, a transatlantic intelligence consortium monitoring Al Qaeda activities released a video it claims shows Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden inside Afghanistan. In the released footage, Hamza appears in an outdoor setting with what looks like an urban environment in the background. The consortium did not specify the location but said the video aligns with intelligence assessments suggesting he may have relocated to Afghanistan after years of secrecy.
Regional instability intensified further with IS-KP attacks in Kabul, border clashes with Pakistan, and stalled diplomatic efforts. In October 2025, border skirmishes with Pakistan were reported in the Afghan provinces of Kandahar, Kabul, Paktika, Khost, Helmand, Kunar and Paktia. Pakistan repeatedly claimed that it targeted anti-Pakistani militant hideouts. On October 16, 2025, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that at least 37 civilians were killed and 425 were wounded, in these clashes. Giving warning about the security situation, on December 7, Abdul Hai Qanit, head of the Taliban Foreign Ministry’s Centre for Strategic Studies, stated that escalating tensions with Pakistan threaten to erode regional confidence in cross-border connectivity projects, urging Islamabad to resolve disputes through dialogue. He added, “The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan is very crucial for regional integration, since this problem deactivates the southern route of connectivity.”
Efforts to reach a peaceful settlement have stalled. On December 1, a Taliban delegation visited Saudi Arabia for talks with Pakistani officials, but discussions ended without progress. Earlier, Qatar and Türkiye facilitated three rounds of negotiations in Doha (one round) and Istanbul (two rounds) in October, also without results. The Taliban rejected Pakistan’s proposals as unrealistic, particularly demands to relocate TTP fighters in Afghanistan. Kabul’s Foreign Ministry asserted that Afghanistan would not “import” Pakistan’s militant problem, arguing that TTP violence was rooted in Pakistan’s own history. On October 22, Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid announced that Afghanistan would no longer mediate between Pakistan and the TTP, calling it an internal Pakistani matter, while denying Taliban support for TTP attacks. He further blamed elements within Pakistan’s security establishment for obstructing better bilateral relations.
The humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. About 70 per cent of Afghans live in poverty, according to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2026. As reported in May, 2025, 69 per cent of the Afghan population is unemployed and has no source of income, while child labour in handicrafts and scavenging has increased. 90 per cent of women have been excluded from the workforce, with only 7 per cent being retained for work outside their homes in the preceding year. The United Nations estimated that current restrictions on women and girls could cost Afghanistan’s economy nearly USD 920 million between 2024 and 2026.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on December 2, 2025, observed, moreover, that in 2026, an estimated 21.9 million people, 45 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, would require humanitarian assistance. Food insecurity has deteriorated sharply, with 17.4 million people projected to face acute food insecurity, including 4.7 million in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 4 (Emergency) in 2026 – more than double the figure recorded in 2025. At the same time, drought conditions persist, with 12 provinces severely affected and 3.4 million people already impacted. The provinces of Ghor, Daikundi and Faryab have been categorised as the areas of highest concern.
In 2025, UNICEF noted that 422 healthcare facilities in Afghanistan had been shut down, impacting 3 million people. Rising costs, medicine shortages and long travel times have left families, especially women in rural areas, without access to essential care. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 14.4 million people in Afghanistan are expected to need health assistance in 2026, as against 14.3 million in 2025, reflecting rising needs amid persistent vulnerabilities. Common people remain highly vulnerable to both communicable and noncommunicable diseases, while facing heightened social and economic tensions.
These crises have been compounded further, as more than 5.2 million persons were returned to Afghanistan, many of them forcibly, from Iran and Pakistan between January and the end of November 2025, including at least 1.3 million deportees, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) disclosed on January 16, 2026. Of the total, more than 3.6 million individuals returned from Iran, including around 1.2 million who were deported, while about 804,830 returned from Pakistan, of whom 116,100 were forcibly removed, according to data compiled by humanitarian partners and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Afghanistan remained a major narcotics producer in 2025, with trafficking routes extending into Europe. As reported on January 9, 2026, by Türkiye’s Anti-Narcotics Police Report, Drugs in Türkiye 2025, Türkiye is a key transit corridor for Afghan drugs. The Report noted that poppy cultivation, measured at 10,800 hectares in 2023, increased by 19 per cent in 2024. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also warned on November 6, 2025, that methamphetamine production in Afghanistan had surged, with seizures rising 50 per cent by late 2024, as criminal networks shift to cheaper, easier-to-hide synthetics. As reported in August, 2025, despite the Taliban’s ban on opium and methamphetamine production, some officials and traffickers have spiked methamphetamine production, locally called shisha, using the ephedra plant. Field research across Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul, Ghor, and Uruzgan documented active clandestine ephedra collection centres.
Repression of ethnic and religious minorities by the Taliban continues. According to the Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Report 2026, abuses included forced displacement, intimidation, and physical mistreatment of Shia Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Ismaili Shias. For instance, in July, 2025, the Taliban expelled 25 Hazara families (about 200 people) from Rashk village in Bamiyan Province, after a land ruling favouring nomadic Kuchi Pashtuns. Earlier, on July 23, Shia cleric Vaezzadeh Behsoodi disclosed that the Taliban shut down his office in Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul, expelled staff, and sealed the premises, following what he called baseless complaints.
The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), in its 2025 Annual Report, observes: "The Taliban continued to enforce its strict interpretation of Shari'a throughout the country, directly impacting the religious freedom of all Afghans - including those with differing interpretations of Islam. Its draconian religious edicts continued to disproportionately target women and girls as well as religious minorities who remain in the country, including Ahmadiyya and Shi'a Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians."
The law-and-order situation in Afghanistan continues to be chaotic. On December 27, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) noted that Afghanistan under Taliban rule ranks 158 out of 163 countries worldwide, in terms of human security and peace. Figures published in November 2025 by Taliban-controlled statistics authority, based on Interior Ministry data, show criminal cases rising sharply, to 17,320 between March 20, 2024 and March 19, 2025, up from 10,834 between March 20, 2021, and March 19, 2022. The figure rose to 12,688 between March 20, 2022 and March 19, 2023, and 16,186 between March 20, 2023 and March 29, 2024, reflecting an overall increase of about 60 per cent since the Taliban’s return. Between March 20, 2024 and March 19, 2025, 1,734 murders were recorded, compared with 1,502 between March 20, 2021 and March 19, 2022.
Total criminal cases reached 17,320 in the solar hijri year 1403 (March 2024–March 2025), up from 10,834 in 1400 (March 2021–March 2022). The figure rose to 12,688 in 1401 and 16,186 in 1402, reflecting an overall increase of about 60 percent since the Taliban’s return.
Although, Taliban is on the way to increase its capacity, Afghanistan’s direction in 2025 signals drift, not recovery. Taliban authority rests more on coercion than governance, as resistance, elimination of voices, illicit economies, expand. Institutions remain fragile and livelihoods scarce, pushing millions toward aid dependence. Without inclusive reforms and sustained regional engagement, Afghanistan’s crisis will persist rather than resolve.
In sum, despite claims of consolidation and capacity-building, Afghanistan’s trajectory in 2025 reflected drift rather than recovery. Taliban authority rests overwhelmingly on coercion rather than governance. Armed resistance persists, dissent is systematically eliminated, illicit economies expand, and institutions remain hollow. Livelihoods are scarce, humanitarian dependence deepens, and without inclusive reform or sustained regional engagement, Afghanistan’s crisis shows no sign of resolution.
- Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management